Cansu Canca

In this Black Mirror Christmas special, we meet two men in a desolate cabin, who each share stories that center around two different but related technologies: The cookie technology that allows one to make digital copies of individuals and use them as personal assistants, and the Z‐Eye technology, which can be used to block people in real life. As the stories unfold, they make for a very dark Christmas tale and it becomes clear that each of these technologies raise a string of ethical questions, especially related to the trade‐off between the value of privacy vs. the value of access to information. The chapter looks at these problems through different ethical frameworks, in order to explore what solutions each framework would offer to these problems.

A prominent argument against a market in kidneys is the Argument from Coercion. AfC claims that a market would violate the autonomy of typical suppliers by presenting them with coercive offers. Engaging with Cherry’s response to AfC, this paper argues that while a consistent AfC could be constructed, it would still fail to justify a prohibition of a market. AfC, as fully formulated, only holds if we assume that the state is obligated to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Once such a state functions ideally, a market ceases to involve coercion, thus making a prohibition redundant. In fact, such a state’s obligation to care for its citizens supports a market in kidneys. On the other hand, if the state is dysfunctional, then while a market could involve coercive offers, a prohibition would not restore, and would present a further constraint on, individual autonomy.

A prominent argument against a market in kidneys is the Argument from Coercion. AfC claims that a market would violate the autonomy of typical suppliers by presenting them with coercive offers. Engaging with Cherry’s response to AfC, this paper argues that while a consistent AfC could be constructed, it would still fail to justify a prohibition of a market. AfC, as fully formulated, only holds if we assume that the state is obligated to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Once such a state functions ideally, a market ceases to involve coercion, thus making a prohibition redundant. In fact, such a state’s obligation to care for its citizens supports a market in kidneys. On the other hand, if the state is dysfunctional, then while a market could involve coercive offers, a prohibition would not restore, and would present a further constraint on, individual autonomy.

In this paper, I present two types of arguments against the prohibition as they apply to a regulated market in kidneys from living suppliers: the utilitarian argument and the argument from non-uniqueness. The utilitarian argument shows a regulated market is likely to result in a significant increase in overall well-being. The international guidelines and treaties supporting the prohibition invariably quote the harm associated with the illegal organ trade; yet, a regulated market does not share the characteristics of the illegal trade that gives rise to such harm. I argue that objections to such a market claiming that it would result in poor health outcomes, lead to crowding-out, and harm the global poor are unfounded. The argument from non-uniqueness, on the other hand, focuses on three objections to the market following the pattern of widely quoted principles of bioethics: objections from autonomy, “do no harm”, and justice. I argue that these objections, if taken seriously, apply equally to the sale and donation of kidneys, the latter of which is unanimously endorsed in all international guidelines and treaties. Unable to identify any relevant unique aspect of a market, these objections fail to justify an exclusive prohibition of a market in kidneys.