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26The Fourth ConditionIn D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 105--117. 1988.
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22Norman Kretzmann 1928-1998Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5). 1999.
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106Excerpts from John Martin Fischer's Discussion with Members of the AudienceThe Journal of Ethics 4 (4). 2000.
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LibertarianismIn Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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3Comments on Plantinga’s two-volume work on warrantPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 403-408. 1995.
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Norman Malcolm (1911–1990)In Aloysius Martinich & David Sosa (eds.), A companion to analytic philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Knowledge Mind Memory Philosophy of religion.
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143On Mele and Robb’s Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style CasePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 440-446. 2010.Alfred Mele and David Robb (1998, 2003) offer what they claim is a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In their example, a person makes a decision by his own indeterministic causal process though antecedent circumstances ensure he could not have done otherwise. Specifically, a simultaneously occurring process in him would deterministically cause the decis…Read more
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28Review of Carl Ginet and Sydney Shoemaker: Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays (review)Ethics 95 (2): 357-358. 1985.
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52On Action.Explaining Human Action.The Philosophy of Action: An IntroductionPhilosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 498. 1991.
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89Knowledge and Mind: Essays Presented to Norman Malcolm (edited book)Oxford Univresity Press. 1983.
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Reasons explanation of action : an incompatibilist accountIn Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action, Oxford University Press. 1997.
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Can an Indeterministic Cause Leave a Choice Up to the Agent?In David Palmer (ed.), Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 14-26. 2014.This chapter argues for a noncausal libertarian account of free will. According to this account, a person’s free actions cannot be caused at all. The chapter compares its libertarian view to Kane’s event-causal libertarian view. It critiques Kane’s proposals concerning self-forming actions and indeterministic causation. The chapter explains why it thinks that its non-causal view is to be preferred over Kane’s event-causal view. The chapter also discusses the luck objection to libertarianism. The…Read more
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4Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology (review)Philosophical Review 85 (2): 216-224. 1976.
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42The Significance of Free WillPhilosophical Review 107 (2): 312. 1998.If among the spate of books on free will in recent years there are any that a philosopher concerned with that topic should have handy, this is one of them. Its coverage of the free-will issues debated in the philosophical literature of the last twenty years or so is penetrating, instructive, and by far the most thorough I’ve seen. Kane defends his own positions, but he is unusually fair, even generous, in expounding opposing views. And, while the book is not a popular treatment, it is written in…Read more
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39Working with Fischer and Ravizza’s Account of Moral ResponsibilityThe Journal of Ethics 10 (3): 229-253. 2006.This paper examines the account of guidance control given in Fischer and Ravizza's book, Responsibility and Control, with the aim of revising it so as to make it a better account of what needs to be added to having alternatives open to yield a specification of the control condition for responsibility that will be acceptable to an adherent of the principle that one is responsible for something only if one could have avoided it
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463In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don't find Frankfurt's argument convincingPhilosophical Perspectives 10 403-17. 1996.
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12Self-EvidenceVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2): 9-31. 2009.Este estudo desenvolve uma abordagem do que significa para uma proposição ser autoevidente para alguém, baseado na ideia de que certas proposições são tais que plenamente entendê-las significa crer nelas. Argumenta-se que, quando uma proposição p é autoevidente para alguém, tem-se justificação a priori não-inferencial para crer que p e, eis um traço bem-vindo, uma justificação que não envolve exercer qualquer tipo especial de faculdade intuitiva; se, em adição, é verdade que p e não existe nenhu…Read more
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60Trying to ActIn Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Freedom and Determinism, Bradford. 2004.
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5CommentsIn Calvin Dwight Rollins (ed.), Knowledge and experience, University of Pittsburgh Press. 1962.
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |