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A Phylogeny-Based Approach to StressBrain, Behaviour and Evolution 16 1-3. 2024.I propose conceptualizing stress in standard phylogenetic terms of stress characters, as well as stress phenotypes, as a way to improve stress research involving nonhuman models. PMID: 38626744.
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116Individuating Cognitive Characters: Lessons from Praying Mantises and PlantsPhilosophy of Science. forthcoming.This paper advances the development of a phylogeny-based psychology in which cognitive ability types are individuated as characters in the evolutionary biological sense. I explain the character concept and its utility in addressing (or dissolving) conceptual problems arising from discoveries of cognitive abilities across a wide range of species. I use the examples of stereopsis in the praying mantis, internal cell-to-cell signaling in plants, and episodic memory in scrub jays to show how anthrop…Read more
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294What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Cognition?: Human, cybernetic, and phylogenetic conceptual schemesJOLMA - The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts 4 (2): 149-162. 2023.This paper outlines three broad conceptual schemes currently in play in the sciences concerned with explaining cognitive abilities. One is the anthropocentric scheme – human cognition – that dominated our thinking about cognition until very recently. Another is the cybernetic-computational scheme – cybernetic cognition – rooted in cognitive science and flourishing in such fields as artificial intelligence, computational neuroscience, and biocybernetics. The third is an evolutionary biological sc…Read more
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39Muhammad Ali Khalidi's Cognitive Ontology (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2023.A review of Muhammad Ali Khalidi's Cognitive Ontology: Taxonomic Practices in the Mind-Brain Sciences
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288Science Journalism and Epistemic Virtues in Science Communication: A defense of sincerity, transparency, and honestyEpisteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology (n.a.): 1-12. 2023.In recent work, Stephen John (2018, 2019) has deepened the social epistemological perspective on expert testimony by arguing that science communication often operates at the institutional level, and that at that level sincerity, transparency, and honesty are not necessarily epistemic virtues. In this paper I consider his arguments in the context of science journalism, a key constituent of the science communication ecosystem. I argue that this context reveals both the weakness of his arguments an…Read more
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5879Is Free Will Necessary for Moral Responsibility?: A Case for Rethinking Their Relationship and the Design of Experimental Studies in Moral PsychologyMind and Language 30 (5): 603-627. 2015.Philosophical tradition has long held that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. We report experimental results that show that the folk do not think free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Our results also suggest that experimental investigation of the relationship is ill served by a focus on incompatibilism versus compatibilism. We propose an alternative framework for empirical moral psychology in which judgments of free will and moral responsibility can vary independently i…Read more
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251Doxastic Addiction and Effective InterventionsIn Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2024.We are consumers of drugs and news, and sometimes call ourselves addicts or junkies of one or both. I propose to take the concept of news – more generally, doxastic – addiction seriously. I define doxastic addiction and relate this type of addiction to echo chambers and religious belief. I show how this analysis directs attention to appropriate interventions to help doxastic addicts, and how it offers a new type of justification for limits on free speech.
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319What could cognition be, if not human cognition?: Individuating cognitive abilities in the light of evolutionBiology and Philosophy 37 (6): 1-21. 2022.I argue that an explicit distinction between cognitive characters and cognitive phenotypes is needed for empirical progress in the cognitive sciences and their integration with evolution-guided sciences. I elaborate what ontological commitment to characters involves and how such a commitment would clarify ongoing debates about the relations between human and nonhuman cognition and the extent of cognitive abilities across biological species. I use theoretical proposals in episodic memory, languag…Read more
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268Animal Models in Neuropsychiatry: Do the benefits outweigh the moral costs?Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 32 (4): 530-535. 2022.Animal models have long been used to investigate human mental disorders, including depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia. This practice is usually justified in terms of the benefits (to humans) outweighing the costs (to the animals). I argue on utility maximization grounds that we should phase out animal models in neuropsychiatric research. Our leading theories of how human minds and behavior evolved invoke sociocultural factors whose relation to nonhuman minds, societies, and behavior has not …Read more
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275Editorial: Theoretical and Practical Issues in the Epistemology of Science JournalismFrontiers in Communication 7 (868849): 1-2. 2022.This Editorial summarizes the papers in a Frontiers in Communication Research Topic that looks at science journalism’s mediating role between the production of scientific knowledge and its public uptake. The four papers in the Research Topic consider science communication and journalism from the perspective of philosophy of science and epistemology. Framing the Research Topic is a conceptual analysis of the multiple aims of science communication and an assessment of empirical evidence to date re…Read more
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650Shannon + Friston = Content: Intentionality in predictive signaling systemsSynthese 199 (1-2): 2793-2816. 2021.What is the content of a mental state? This question poses the problem of intentionality: to explain how mental states can be about other things, where being about them is understood as representing them. A framework that integrates predictive coding and signaling systems theories of cognitive processing offers a new perspective on intentionality. On this view, at least some mental states are evaluations, which differ in function, operation, and normativity from representations. A complete natur…Read more
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497Relationship between Cognition and Moral Status Needs OverhaulAnimal Sentience 29 (3): 1-2. 2020.I commend Mikhalevich & Powell for extending the discussion of cognition and its relation to moral status with their well researched and argued target article on invertebrate cognition. I have two small criticisms: that the scala naturae still retains its appeal to some in biology as well as psychology, and that drawing the line at invertebrates requires a bit more defense given the larger comparative cognitive-scientific context.
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70Beyond the human standard in the cognitive domain: a reply to Rodriguez' “Cognition beyond the human domain”Philosophical Psychology 33 (8): 1204-1208. 2020.In "Cognition Beyond the Human Domain", Angel Garcia Rodriguez provides critical commentary on Pieces of Mind: The proper domain of psychological predicates (Oxford UP, 2018). In this reply, I argue that his alternative "No-Core" semantic proposal is not an alternative to the Literalist view I defend, but rather one way of elaborating that position.
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63Why literalism is still the best game in town: Replies to Drayson, Machery, and SchwitzgebelMind and Language 35 (5): 687-693. 2020.In Pieces of Mind: The Proper Domain of Psychological Predicates (Oxford UP, 2018), I argue that psychological predicates used to ascribe cognitive capacities to many nonhuman biological species should be interpreted literally with the same reference for humans and nonhumans alike. In this Mind & Language book symposium, I respond to comments and criticisms by Zoe Drayson, Edouard Machery, and Eric Schwitzgebel, and conclude that the Literalist position is still the best interpretation of these …Read more
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1315The Psychological Speciesism of HumanismPhilosophical Studies 178 1545-1569. 2021.Humanists argue for assigning the highest moral status to all humans over any non-humans directly or indirectly on the basis of uniquely superior human cognitive abilities. They may also claim that humanism is the strongest position from which to combat racism, sexism, and other forms of within-species discrimination. I argue that changing conceptual foundations in comparative research and discoveries of advanced cognition in many non-human species reveal humanism’s psychological speciesism and …Read more
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366The Mental Lives of Sheep and the Quest for a Psychological TaxonomyAnimal Sentience 25 (16): 1-3. 2019.In this commentary on Marino and Merskin's "Intelligence, complexity, and individuality in sheep", I argue that their literature review provides further evidence of the fundamental theoretical shift in psychology towards a non-anthropocentric psychological taxonomy, in which cognitive capacities are classified in a structure that provides an overall understanding of the place of mind (including human minds) throughout nature.
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1359The Fallacy of the Homuncular FallacyBelgrade Philosophical Annual 31 (31): 41-56. 2018.A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively "stupider" capacities ("homunculi") until the mind is "discharged" by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at subpersonal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative vie…Read more
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534Trust Me: News, Credibility Deficits, and BalanceIn Joe Saunders & Carl Fox (eds.), Media Ethics, Free Speech, and the Requirements of Democracy, Routledge. pp. 69-86. 2019.When a society is characterized by a climate of distrust, how does this impact the professional practices of news journalism? I focus on the practice of balance, or fair presentation of both sides in a story. I articulate a two-step model of how trust modulates the acceptance of tes-timony and draw out its implications for justifying the practice of balance.
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642Experiences of Duration and Cognitive PenetrabilityIn Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception, Oxford University Press. pp. 188-212. 2020.This paper considers the cognitive penetrability of our experiences of the durations of everyday events. I defend an account of subjective duration based in contemporary psychological and neurobiological research. I show its philosophical adequacy by demonstrating its utility in explain-ing the phenomenology of duration experiences. I then consider whether cognitive penetrability is a problem for these experiences. I argue that, to the contrary, the problem presupposes a relationship between per…Read more
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1376What’s the Use of an Intrinsic Property?In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties, De Gruyter. pp. 139-156. 2014.Work on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is often motivated by its use in other areas, such as intrinsic value, real vs. Cambridge change, supervenience and other topics. With the exception of Figdor 2008, philosophers have sought to articulate a global distinction -- a distinction between kinds of properties, rather than ways in which individuals have properties. I argue that global I/E distinctions are unable to do the work that allegedly motivates them, focusing on the case of intrinsic va…Read more
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906Semantic externalism and the mechanics of thoughtMinds and Machines 19 (1): 1-24. 2009.I review a widely accepted argument to the conclusion that the contents of our beliefs, desires and other mental states cannot be causally efficacious in a classical computational model of the mind. I reply that this argument rests essentially on an assumption about the nature of neural structure that we have no good scientific reason to accept. I conclude that computationalism is compatible with wide semantic causal efficacy, and suggest how the computational model might be modified to accommod…Read more
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521Is objective news possible?In Christopher Meyers (ed.), Journalism ethics: a philosophical approach, Oxford University Press. pp. 153. 2010.This chapter discusses the nature of objective news and the debate regarding its possibility. It then assesses the main arguments for the unattainability of objective news. A close examination of these arguments shows that, contrary to widespread belief, journalists who try to provide objective news are not striving in vain. The chapter discusses the effect of competing journalistic aims and other limitations on our efforts to generate objective news. It suggests that the unwarranted skepticism …Read more
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2541The Rise of Cognitive Science in the 20th CenturyIn Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6, Routledge. pp. 280-302. 2018.This chapter describes the conceptual foundations of cognitive science during its establishment as a science in the 20th century. It is organized around the core ideas of individual agency as its basic explanans and information-processing as its basic explanandum. The latter consists of a package of ideas that provide a mathematico-engineering framework for the philosophical theory of materialism.
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978Objectivity in the news: Finding a way forwardJournal of Mass Media Ethics 25 (1). 2010.Many media critics believe news reports are inevitably biased and have urged journalists to abandon the objectivity norm. I show that the main arguments for inevitable bias fail but identify factors that make producing objective news difficult. I indicate what the next steps should be to understand bias in the news and to combat it.
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270Can mental representations be triggering causes?Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1): 43-61. 2003.Fred Dretske?s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other type, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends for his account of behavior can …Read more
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806What is the “Cognitive” in Cognitive Neuroscience?Neuroethics 6 (1): 105-114. 2012.This paper argues that the cognitive neuroscientific use of ordinary mental terms to report research results and draw implications can contribute to public confusion and misunderstanding regarding neuroscience results. This concern is raised at a time when cognitive neuroscientists are increasingly required by funding agencies to link their research to specific results of public benefit, and when neuroethicists have called for greater attention to public communication of neuroscience. The paper …Read more
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273Mindvaults: Sociocultural Grounds for Pretending and Imagining, by Radu J. Bogdan (review)Mind 124 (496): 1235-1240. 2015.
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385Verbs and MindsIn Mark Sprevak Jesper Kallestrup (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind, . 2014.I introduce and defend verbialism, a metaphysical framework appropriate for accommodating the mind within the natural sciences and the mechanistic model of explanation that ties the natural sciences together. Verbialism is the view that mental phenomena belong in the basic ontological category of activities. If mind is what brain does, then explaining the mind is explaining how it occurs, and the ontology of mind is verbialist -- at least, it ought to be. I motivate verbialism by revealing a kin…Read more
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1136On the Proper Domain of Psychological PredicatesSynthese 194 (11): 4289-4310. 2017.One question of the bounds of cognition is that of which things have it. A scientifically relevant debate on this question must explain the persistent and selective use of psychological predicates to report findings throughout biology: for example, that neurons prefer, fruit flies and plants decide, and bacteria communicate linguistically. This paper argues that these claims should enjoy default literal interpretation. An epistemic consequence is that these findings can contribute directly to un…Read more
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737Experimental Philosophy and the Underrepresentation of WomenIn Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Blackwell. pp. 590-602. 2016.This paper summarizes recent and ongoing experimental work regarding the reality, nature, effects, and causes of the underrepresentation of women in academic philosophy. We first present empirical data on several aspects of underrepresentation, and then consider various reasons why this gender imbalance is problematic. We then turn to the published and preliminary results of empirical work aimed at identifying factors that might explain it.
Iowa City, Iowa, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Aesthetics |
Applied Ethics |
General Philosophy of Science |
Media Ethics |