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64Accurate Updating for the Risk SensitiveBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3): 751-776. 2020.Philosophers have recently attempted to justify particular belief revision procedures by arguing that they are the optimal means towards the epistemic end of accurate credences. These attempts, however, presuppose that means should be evaluated according to classical expected utility theory; and there is a long tradition maintaining that expected utility theory is too restrictive as a theory of means–end rationality, ruling out too many natural ways of taking risk into account. In this paper, we…Read more
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45Probability Filters as a Model of BeliefProceedings of Machine Learning Research 147 42-50. 2021.We propose a model of uncertain belief. This models coherent beliefs by a filter, ????, on the set of probabilities. That is, it is given by a collection of sets of probabilities which are closed under supersets and finite intersections. This can naturally capture your probabilistic judgements. When you think that it is more likely to be sunny than rainy, we have{????|????(????????????????????)>????(????????????????????)}∈????. When you think that a gamble ???? is desirable, we have {????|Exp???…Read more
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22Indeterminate Truth and CredencesIn Carlo Nicolai & Johannes Stern (eds.), Modes of Truth: The Unified Approach to Truth, Modality, and Paradox, Routledge. 2021.When one allows truth to be indeterminate, “fixed point” interpretations can be found even when the language includes sentences such as the liar paradox. In this chapter this kind of account is applied to rational credences, to find non-undermining indeterminate epistemic states even in certain situations which have been discussed as challenges for rationality. In the process of doing this, a deeper understanding of how the supervaluational account of truth works is obtained, especially when one…Read more
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61Strict propriety is weakAnalysis 81 (1): 8-13. 2021.Considerations of accuracy – the epistemic good of having credences close to truth-values – have led to the justification of a host of epistemic norms. These arguments rely on specific ways of measuring accuracy. In particular, the accuracy measure should be strictly proper. However, the main argument for strict propriety supports only weak propriety. But strict propriety follows from weak propriety given strict truth directedness and additivity. So no further argument is necessary.
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151Avoiding Risk and Avoiding EvidenceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3): 495-515. 2020.It is natural to think that there is something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this thought is inconsistent with a kind of risk-avoidance...
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614Moss (2018) argues that rational agents are best thought of not as having degrees of belief in various propositions but as having beliefs in probabilistic contents, or probabilistic beliefs. Probabilistic contents are sets of probability functions. Probabilistic belief states, in turn, are modeled by sets of probabilistic contents, or sets of sets of probability functions. We argue that this Mossean framework is of considerable interest quite independently of its role in Moss’ account of probabi…Read more
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72Probability for the Revision Theory of TruthJournal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1): 87-112. 2019.We investigate how to assign probabilities to sentences that contain a type-free truth predicate. These probability values track how often a sentence is satisfied in transfinite revision sequences, following Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. This answers an open problem by Leitgeb which asks how one might describe transfinite stages of the revision sequence using such probability functions. We offer a general construction, and explore additional constraints that lead to desirable prop…Read more
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92Limits in the Revision Theory: More Than Just Definite VerdictsJournal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1): 11-35. 2019.We present a new proposal for what to do at limits in the revision theory. The usual criterion for a limit stage is that it should agree with any definite verdicts that have been brought about before that stage. We suggest that one should not only consider definite verdicts that have been brought about but also more general properties; in fact any closed property can be considered. This more general framework is required if we move to considering revision theories for concepts that are concerned…Read more
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56How to Express Self-Referential Probability. A Kripkean ProposalReview of Symbolic Logic 8 (4): 680-704. 2015.We present a semantics for a language that includes sentences that can talk about their own probabilities. This semantics applies a fixed point construction to possible world style structures. One feature of the construction is that some sentences only have their probability given as a range of values. We develop a corresponding axiomatic theory and show by a canonical model construction that it is complete in the presence of the ω-rule. By considering this semantics we argue that principles suc…Read more
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64Rational Probabilistic Incoherence? A Reply to Michael CaiePhilosophical Review 124 (3): 393-406. 2015.In Michael Caie's article “Rational Probabilistic Incoherence,” Caie argues that in light of certain situations involving self-reference, it is sometimes rational to have probabilistically incoherent credences. This essay further considers his arguments. It shows that probabilism isn't to blame for the failure of rational introspection and that Caie's modified accuracy criterion conflicts with Dutch book considerations, is scoring rule dependent, and leads to the failure of rational introspectio…Read more
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411Self-referential probabilityDissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. 2016.This thesis focuses on expressively rich languages that can formalise talk about probability. These languages have sentences that say something about probabilities of probabilities, but also sentences that say something about the probability of themselves. For example: (π): “The probability of the sentence labelled π is not greater than 1/2.” Such sentences lead to philosophical and technical challenges; but can be useful. For example they bear a close connection to situations where ones confid…Read more
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion
PhD, 2016
Bristol, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
1 more
Degrees of Belief |
Nonclassical Logics |
Liar Paradox |
Subjective Probability |
Imprecise Credences |
Formal Epistemology |