-
1Consciousness and intentionalityIn Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
-
Understanding ConsciousnessDissertation, University of California, Berkeley. 1994.My aim is to clarify a certain concept of consciousness, to describe its relation to intentionality, and to explain its importance. ;I begin by arguing that one has a knowledge of one's own mind distinct in kind from that one has of another's, and propose that we rely on this distinctively first-person knowledge in thinking about consciousness. Adopting this first-person approach, I discuss certain kinds of illustrative instances, both actual and possible, of consciousness and its absence. The a…Read more
-
4ConsciousnessIn Hubert L. Dreyfus & Mark A. Wrathall (eds.), A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism, Wiley-blackwell. 2006.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Brentano Husserl Heidegger Sartre Merleau‐Ponty.
-
22Book reviews (review)Philosophical Psychology 9 (3): 391-410. 1996.The engine of reason, the seat of the soul: a philosophical journey into the brain, Paul M. Churchland. Cambridge: Bradford Books, MIT Press, 1995 ISBN: 0–262–03244–4Cognition in the wild, Edwin Hutchins. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. ISBN: 0–262–08231–4Dimensions of creativity, Margaret A. Boden, (Ed.) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994 ISBN 0–262–02368–7Contemplating minds: a forum for Artificial Intelligence, William J. Clancey, Stephen W. Smoliar & Mark J. Stefik (Eds) Cambridge: Bradford Book…Read more
-
Phenomenological approachesIn Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
-
Speaking Up for ConsciousnessIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, Routledge. pp. 199-221. 2013.
-
48Why we need descriptive psychologyEuropean Journal of Philosophy 31 (2): 341-357. 2023.This article defends the thesis that in theorizing about the mind we need to accord first-person (“introspective” or “reflective”) judgments about experience a “selective provisional trust.” Such an approach can form part of a descriptive psychology. It is here so employed to evaluate some influential interpretations of research on attention to conclude that—despite what conventional wisdom suggests—an “introspection-positive” policy actually offers us a better critical perspective than its cont…Read more
-
29The Phenomenal basis of intentionality, by Angela A. Mendelovici. Oxford University Press, 2018. 296 pages. ISBN:9780190863807 (review)European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4): 1097-1100. 2019.
-
16The Phenomenal basis of intentionality, by Angela A.Mendelovici. Oxford University Press, 2018. 296 pages. ISBN:9780190863807 (review)European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4): 1097-1100. 2019.European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
-
70On needing time to think: consciousness, temporality, and self-expressionPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3): 413-429. 2020.I examine an argument proposed by Tye and Wright, inspired by Geach, which holds that a correct understanding of how conceptual thought occurs in time demands we expel it from experience. This would imply—pace William James— that the “stream of consciousness” is not, even in part, a “stream of thought.” I argue that if we closely examine what seems to support crucial premises of their argument, we will find this undermines its other assumptions, and points us to a way of placing thought in time …Read more
-
44Who's Afraid of Phenomenological Disputes?Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 1-21. 2007.There are general aspects of mental life it is reasonable to believe do not vary even when subjects vary in their first‐person judgments about them. Such lack of introspective agreement gives rise to “phenomenological disputes.” These include disputes over how to describe the perspectival character of perception, the phenomenal character of perceptual recognition and conceptual thought, and the relation between consciousness and self‐consciousness. Some suppose that when we encounter such disput…Read more
-
2Phenomenality and intentionality---which explains which?: reply to GertlerJournal of Experimental Psychology 10 (2). 2004.In Chapter 7 I argue that we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having phenomenal features. According to Gertler, my claim needs, but does not receive from me, a defence against the allegedly rival thesis that phenomenal features are explained by intentional ones. I maintain that this criticism involves a misunderstanding of my view’s implications. In my book I oppose the “rival” thesis only to this extent: where my conception of consciousness conflicts with broad ways of trying to explain…Read more
-
302In favor of (plain) phenomenologyPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2): 201-220. 2007.Plain phenomenology explains theoretically salient mental or psychological distinctions with an appeal to their first-person applications. But it does not assume that warrant for such first-person judgment is derived from an explanatory theory constructed from the third-person perspective. Discussions in historical phenomenology can be treated as plain phenomenology. This is illustrated by a critical consideration of Brentano’s account of consciousness, drawing on some ideas in early Husserl. De…Read more
-
64Self-knowledge and rationality: Shoemaker on self-blindnessIn Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Ashgate. pp. 131. 2003.
-
228The Significance of ConsciousnessPrinceton University Press. 1998."This is a marvelous book, full of subtle, thoughtful, and original argument
-
99Precis of The Significance of ConsciousnessPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6. 2000.The aims of this book are: to explain the notion of phenomenal consciousness in a non-metaphorical way that minimizes controversial assumptions; to characterize the relationship between the phenomenal character and intentionality of visual experience, visual imagery and non-imagistic thought; and to clarify the way in which conscious experience is intrinsically valuable to us. It argues for the legitimacy of a first-person approach to these issues--one which relies on a distinctively first-perso…Read more
-
76Phenomenal thoughtIn Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 236-267. 2011.
-
22Eliminativism, First-Person Knowledge and Phenomenal Intentionality A Reply to LevinePSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9. 2003.Levine suggests the following criticisms of my book. First, the absence of a positive account of first-person knowledge in it makes it vulnerable to eliminativist refutation. Second, it is a relative strength of the higher order representation accounts of consciousness I reject that they offer explanations of the subjectivity of conscious states and their special availability to first-person knowledge. Further, the close connection I draw between the phenomenal character of experience and intent…Read more
-
78Consciousness, Intentionality, and Self-Knowledge Replies to Ludwig and ThomassonPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8. 2002.Both Ludwig and Thomasson question my claim that many phenomenal features are intentional features. Further, Ludwig raises numerous objections to my claim that higher order mental representation is not essential to phenomenal consciousness. While Thomasson does not share those objections, she wonders how my view permits me to make first-person knowledge of mind depend on phenomenal consciousness. I respond to these challenges, drawing together questions about the forms of mental representation, …Read more
-
165Socratic introspection and the abundance of experienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1): 63-91. 2011.I examine the prospects of using Hurlburt's DES method to justify his very 'thin'view of experience, on which visual experience is so infrequent as to be typically absent when reading and speaking. Such justification would seem to be based on the claim that, in DES 'beeper' samples, subjects often deny they just had any visual experi-ence. But if the question of 'visual experience' is properly construed, then it is doubtful they are deny-ing this. And even if they were, that would not generally …Read more
-
41Respecting Appearances: A Phenomenological Approach to ConsciousnessIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology, Oxford University Press. 2012.This chapter reports the philosophy focusing mainly on just three foundational concerns. These are: the character of a phenomenological approach; its use to clarify the notion of phenomenal consciousness ; and its application to questions about a specifically sensory phenomenality and its ‘intentionality’ or ‘object-directedness’. Phenomenology involves the use of ‘first-person reflection’. The ways into the notion of phenomenality are elaborated. The ‘subjective experience’ conception of phenom…Read more
-
101For Analytic PhenomenologyIn Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 95-110. 2016.
-
112Attention and sensorimotor intentionalityIn David Woodruff Smith & Amie Lynn Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 270. 2005.
-
62Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First‐Person PerspectivePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 840-843. 2008.
Houston, Texas, United States of America