In his recent book Mental imagery: Philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, Nanay presents a far-reaching empirically grounded account of mental imagery. This commentary focuses on Nanay's proposal that individuals with aphantasia, a cognitive norm variant characterized by an absence of imagery experience, have unconscious mental imagery. Recent empirical findings on aphantasia are reviewed, and evidence both for and against voluntary and involuntary unconscious mental imagery in aphantasia is disc…
Read moreIn his recent book Mental imagery: Philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, Nanay presents a far-reaching empirically grounded account of mental imagery. This commentary focuses on Nanay's proposal that individuals with aphantasia, a cognitive norm variant characterized by an absence of imagery experience, have unconscious mental imagery. Recent empirical findings on aphantasia are reviewed, and evidence both for and against voluntary and involuntary unconscious mental imagery in aphantasia is discussed in the context of Nanay's general account of mental imagery and its taxonomy. It is argued that people with aphantasia, contrary to Nanay's proposal, do not possess unconscious mental imagery.
