Christof Rapp

Although he does not provide a general analysis of argumentation, Aristotle is a highly influential source of modern argumentation theory. In his treatises the Topics, the Sophistical Refutations and the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents complementary aspects of a theory of sound arguments that are seen as the most effective means of persuasion. Aristotle’s central notion of a deductive argument (sullogismos) does not include references to an addressee, the situative context or non-verbal aspects of communication, and thus differs from some modern views on argumentation. A deductive argument in the Aristotelian sense is a sequence of intellectual steps where the conclusion follows of necessity from the premises. Aristotle does not relativize or relax this notion but takes other factors into account by providing supplementary theoretical elements. For example, he reflects on acceptable premises (endoxa), the adjustment of rhetorical arguments to the horizon of the audience, methods of finding premises on the basis of argumentative schemes (topoi), the use of non-argumentative means of persuasion, and a framework of implicit discourse rules. Many of these themes are, albeit under a different name, still discussed in modern argumentation theory

Although Aristotle’s name is regularly mentioned when it comes to the question of where the notion of the will historically derives from and although one of the most influential exponents of philosophical theories of the will, Thomas Aquinas, seems to think that he is just applying the Aristotelian theory, many historians of philosophy explicitly deny that Aristotle had a notion of the will. If we think that the notion of the will is among the notions that have been gradually developed in the history of philosophy, nothing is strange about saying that some philosophers prior to this development lacked this particular notion. However, Aristotle’s case is peculiar, because the same historians, who are reluctant to describe such a notion to Aristotle, admit that he played some role in the formation of the same notion. The line-up of more or less recent philosophers and scholars who are of the opinion that Aristotle had no notion of the will is a very remarkable one. This could almost be called a standard or default position, while the list of exponents of the opposed position, i.e. that Aristotle did have a notion or theory of the will, is much shorter.

The program offered by Alasdair MacIntyre in answer to what he diagnoses as the moral crisis of the present, he understands to be Aristotelian. I will therefore attempt, by way of a consideration of MacIntyre’s approach and the Aristotle-interpretation entailed therein, to answer the question as to whether Aristotle’s practical philosophy itself in fact fulfills the requirements set by the communitarians or whether it can be drawn upon in a non-trivial way in the formulation of the communitarian standpoint.

In der neueren Forschung gehören die Substanzbücher der Metaphysik zu den meistdiskutierten Aristotelischen Texten. In den letzten zweieinhalb Jahrzehnten entwickelte sich eine umfangreiche Diskussion, die zu einem ganz neuen Bild von der Aristotelischen Substanzlehre führte. Eine für die Seminararbeit zugängliche Übersicht über diese Diskussion und den neuesten Stand der Forschung lag aber bisher im deutschen Sprachraum nicht vor. Der Band hilft diesem Mangel ab. Seine Beiträge geben unterschiedliche Standpunkte wieder und reflektieren den jeweiligen Forschungsstand, so dass sowohl für die Seminardiskussion als auch für die eigene Beschäftigung mit diesem Thema eine direkt aus der Forschung gewonnene Grundlage vorliegt. MIT BEITRÄGEN VON: Andreas Anagnostopoulos, Thomas Buchheim, Mary Louise Gill, Donald Morrison, Christof Rapp, Holmer Steinfath, Walter Mesch und Michael V. Wodin.

A much-maligned feature of ancient and medieval political thought is its tendency to appeal to nature to establish norms for human communities. From Aristotle's claim that humans are "political animals" to Aquinas' invocation of "natural law," it may seem that pre-modern philosophers were all too ready to assume that whatever is natural is good, and that just political arrangements must somehow be natural. The papers in this collection show that this assumption is, at best, too crude. From very early, for instance in the ancient sophists' contrast between nomos and physis, there was recognition that political arrangements may be precisely artificial, not natural, and it may be questioned whether even such supposed naturalists as Aristotle in fact adopt the quick inference from "natural" to "good." The papers in this volume trace the complex interrelations between nature and such concepts as law, legitimacy, and justice, covering a wide historical range stretching from Plato and the Sophists to Aristotle, Hellenistic philosophy, Cicero, the Neoplatonists Plotinus and Porphyry, ancient Christian thinkers, and philosophers of both the Islamic and Christian Middle Ages.

This paper suggests that within Aristotle’s well-known contribution to the history of ontology two different levels should be kept apart, an analytic-critical and a constructive level. On the first level Aristotle mainly provides analytic-critical tools for overcoming the main problems of all dealings with the notions of being and to be, while the second level consists in Aristotle’s ambitious project of conducting first philosophy (i.e. the specific part of his philosophy that is meant to continue the old and time-honoured project of identifying what Aristotle calls ‘first principles and causes’) as ontology, i.e. as an inquiry into being qua being.

Does Aristotle's terminology provide some guidance when we inquire into the origins of the notion of thing? Naturally, one might think of Aristotle's notion of being, which is meant to capture everything that is. However, ‘being’ in Aristotle seems to be significantly broader than what we take to be a ‘thing’. I will take up a thesis introduced and defended by Rainer-Wolfgang Mann, namely that Aristotle is actually the inventor of the notion of thing in that his Categories conceptualized the distinction between properties on the one hand and their bearers, individual substances, on the other. It will be argued though that Aristotle, when conceptualizing things as bearers of properties, depicts a notion that is actually stronger than what we usually mean by ‘thing’.

Aristoteles wurde geboren, arbeitete und starb. Mit diesen Worten begann Heidegger seine Vorlesung über Aristoteles. Über das Leben des Philosophen liegen uns nur wenige verlässliche Informationen vor, sein Werk ist jedoch im Wesentlichen überliefert. Er nahm damit maßgeblich Einfluss auf sämtliche Wissenschaften von der Philosophie und Literatur über die Biologie bis zur Kosmologie. Das Handbuch gibt Einblick in sämtliche Werke Aristoteles , behandelt ausführlich die Rezeption und macht mit wiederkehrenden Begriffen wie Glück, Tugend, Freundschaft, Polis und Verfassung vertraut.

Just as Aristotelian dialectic sharply distinguishes between real and fallacious arguments, Aristotelian rhetoric distinguishes between real and fallacious enthymemes. For this reason Aristotle’s Rhetoric includes a chapter – chapter II.24 – that is exclusively devoted to what Aristotle calls “topoi” of fallacious enthymemes. Thus, the purpose of this chapter seems to be equivalent to the purpose of the treatise Sophistici Elenchi, which attempts to give a complete list of all possible types of fallacious arguments. It turns out that, although the Rhetoric’s list of fallacious types of rhetorical arguments basically resembles the list from the Sophistici Elenchi, there also are some striking differences. The paper tries to account for the relation between these two, more or less independent, Aristotelian approaches to the phenomenon of fallacious arguments. Can one of these two lists be seen as the basic or original one? And what is the point in deviating from this basic list? Are all deviations occasioned by the specific contexts of the rhetorical use on the one hand, and the dialectical on the other? Or do the two lists display different logical assumptions? Even an only tentative answer to this set of questions will help to clarify another but closely related scholarly problem, namely the relation between the Rhetoric’s list of topoi for real enthymemes and the Topics’ list of topoi for real dialectical arguments. It will also help to account for the general place of fallacious arguments within Aristotle’s dialectic-based approach the rhetoric.