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Louis de Molina, Göttlicher Plan und menschliche Freiheit, lat.-deutsch, (edited book)Felix Meiner Verlag. 2018.
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151False AuthoritiesActa Analytica 1-19. forthcoming.An epistemic agent A is a false epistemic authority for others iff they falsely believe A to be in a position to help them accomplish their epistemic ends. A major divide exists between what I call "epistemic quacks", who falsely believe themselves to be relevantly competent, and "epistemic charlatans", i.e., false authorities who believe or even know that they are incompetent. Both types of false authority do not cover what Lackey (2021) calls "predatory experts": experts who systematically mis…Read more
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1410Religious experience and the probability of theism: comments on SwinburneReligious Studies 53 (3): 353-370. 2017.I discuss Richard Swinburne’s account of religious experience in his probabilistic case for theism. I argue, pace Swinburne, that even if cosmological considerations render theism not too improbable, religious experience does not render it more probable than not.
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Der Wert des WissensIn Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie, Metzler. pp. 102-109. 2019.Die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie beschäftigte sich vor allem mit drei großen Fragen. (i) Was ist Wissen? (ii) Ist Wissen möglich und in welchen Bereichen und in welchem Umfang können wir es, wenn überhaupt, erwerben? (iii) Was sind die Quellen des Wissens, und spielen womöglich einige von ihnen (etwa Wahrnehmung oder Introspektion) eine besondere Rolle für die Fundierung epistemischer Systeme? Neben der Einbeziehung sozialer Wissensquellen in die Behandlung von Frage (iii) ist in den letzten …Read more
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Epistemology: Contexts, Values and Disagreement. Proceedings of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium. (edited book)Druckwerker. 2012.
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11Scientia Media and Freedom to Do OtherwiseIn Christian Kanzian, Winfried Löffler & Josef Quitterer (eds.), The Ways Things Are: Studies in Ontology, Ontos. pp. 241-262. 2011.
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583The social fabric of understanding: equilibrium, authority, and epistemic empathySynthese 199 (1-2): 1185-1205. 2020.We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that enable epistemic authorities to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”.
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258Falsche AutoritätenIn Rico Hauswald & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Wissensproduktion und Wissenstransfer unter erschwerten Bedingungen. Der Einfluss der Corona-Krise auf die Erzeugung und Vermittlung von Wissen im öffentlichen Diskurs, Alber. pp. 219-243. 2022.
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812Epistemic AuthorityIn Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2024.This handbook article gives a critical overview of recent discussions of epistemic authority. It favors an account that brings into balance the dictates of rational deference with the ideals of intellectual self-governance. A plausible starting point is the conjecture that neither should rational deference to authorities collapse into total epistemic submission, nor the ideal of mature intellectual self-governance be conflated with (illusions of) epistemic autarky.
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466Molina und das Problem des theologischen DeterminismusIn Louis de Molina, Göttlicher Plan und menschliche Freiheit, lat.-deutsch,, Felix Meiner Verlag. pp. 13-178. 2018.Der Download enthält die penultimative Fassung (noch unter dem vorläufigen Titel "Molina über Vorsehung und Freiheit"). Diese ausführliche Einleitung zu dem Band "Luis de Molina: Göttlicher Plan und menschliche Freiheit", hg. und übersetzt von C. Jäger, H. Kraml und G. Leibold, Hamburg: Meiner 2018, rekonstruiert auf 165 S. Molinas berühmte Theorie der Willensfreiheit und die Frage ihrer Vereinbarkeit mit göttlichem Vorherwissen und göttlicher Vorsehung. Sie zeichnet wesentliche Stationen de…Read more
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31Symposium zu: Geert Keil: Willensfreiheit : Determinismus und verantwortung: Was Kann Das konsequenzargument?Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1). 2009.
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37Fischer’s Fate with FatalismEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4): 25-38. 2017.John Martin Fischer’s core project in Our Fate is to develop and defend Pike-style arguments for theological incompatibilism, i. e., for the view that divine omniscience is incompatible with human free will. Against Ockhamist attacks on such arguments, Fischer maintains that divine forebeliefs constitute so-called hard facts about the times at which they occur, or at least facts with hard ‘kernel elements’. I reconstruct Fischer’s argument and outline its structural analogies with an argument fo…Read more
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301Contextualism and the knowledge norm of assertionAnalysis 72 (3): 491-498. 2012.Keith DeRose has argued that ‘the knowledge account of assertion – according to which what one is in a position to assert is what one knows – ... provides a ... powerful positive argument in favor of contextualism’ (2009: 80). The truth is that it yields a powerful argument against contextualism, at least against its most popular, anti-sceptical versions. The following argument shows that, if we conjoin (such versions of) epistemic contextualism with an appropriate meta-linguistic formulation of…Read more
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Scientia media and Freedom to Do OtherwiseIn Josef Quitterer Winfried Löffler Christian Kanzian (ed.), The Ways Things Are - Studies in Ontology Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2011, Ontos. 2011.
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44The value problem in epistemology is to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Or so it is commonly construed. Various solutions to the quandary have been proposed, but so far none has gained wide acceptance. Perhaps, then, we should abandon the idea that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This is what we shall argue, but with one important qualification: Knowledge is not generally more valuable than mere true belief. Certain epistemic contexts, however, are…Read more
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161Process Reliabilism and the Value ProblemTheoria 77 (3): 201-213. 2011.Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar kind in the futu…Read more
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1854Das KonsequenzargumentIn Rolf W. Puster (ed.), Klassische Argumentationen der Philosophie, . pp. 275-296. 2013.The paper reconstructs causal and theological versions of the consequence argument against the compatibility of free will and determinism and discusses the most influential objections to them.
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163Reliabilism and the extra value of knowledgePhilosophical Studies 157 (1): 93-105. 2012.Goldman and Olsson ( 2009 ) have responded to the common charge that reliabilist theories of knowledge are incapable of accounting for the value knowledge has beyond mere true belief. We examine their “conditional probability solution” in detail, and show that it does not succeed. The conditional probability relation is too weak to support instrumental value, and the specific relation they describe is inessential to the value of knowledge. At best, they have described conditions in which knowled…Read more
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1003Kunst, Kontext und ErkenntnisIn Christoph Jäger & Georg Meggle (eds.), Kunst und Erkenntnis, Mentis. pp. 9-39. 2005.
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426Religious experience and epistemic justification: Alston on the reliability of mystical perceptionIn Carlos Ulises Moulines and Karl-Georg Niebergall (ed.), Argument und Analyse, Mentis. pp. 403-423. 2002.I discuss Alston's theory of religious experience and maintain that his argument to the effect that it is rational to suppose that the 'mystical doxastic practice' is epistemically reliable does not stand up to scrutiny. While Alston's transitions from practical to epistemic rationality don't work here, his arguments may be taken to show that, under certain conditions, it is not epistemically irresponsible to trust one's religious experiences.
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486Is Coherentism Coherent?Analysis 67 (4). 2007.In ‘A reductio of coherentism’ (Analysis 67, 2007) Tom Stoneham offers a novel argument against epistemological coherentism. ‘On the face of it’, he writes, ‘the argument gives a conclusive reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. But that cannot be right, can it?’ (p. 254). It could be right, but it isn’t. I argue that coherentists need not accept the central premises of Stoneham’s argument and that, even if these premises were acceptable and true, Stoneham’s reductio woul…Read more
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Autorität der Ersten Person und emotionale VerdrängungE-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 4. 2006.
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37Privileged Access and RepressionIn Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle, De Gruyter. pp. 59-80. 2002.
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687Wittgenstein über Gewissheit und religiösen GlaubenIn Florian Uhl and Artur R. Boelderl (ed.), Die Sprachen der Religion, . pp. 221-256. 2003.
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514Prolegomena zu einer philosophischen Theorie der Meta-EmotionenIn Barbara Merker (ed.), Leben mit Gefühlen, Mentis. pp. 113-137. 2009.
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126Determinismus und Verantwortung: Was kann das Konsequenzargument?Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1): 119-131. 2009.In his recent book Willensfreiheit Geert Keil defends a version of libertarianism. Yet he criticizes a flagship argument for incompatibilism. Van Inwagen's consequence argument, Keil thinks, relies on an irrelevant premise when it claims that agents have no choice about the remote past. I argue that Keil's charge rests on a misunderstanding. I then sketch why discussions of the consequence argument should focus on the question whether or not a certain version of rule Beta is valid
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47Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreements (Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium) (edited book)Ontos Verlag. 2012.The present volume collects papers that were presented at the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium “Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement” 2011 in Kirchberg. Contributors include: P. Baumann, A. Beckermann, E. Brendel, J. Bromand, G. Brun, M. David, W. Davis, C. Elgin, E. Fischer, W. Freitag, S. Goldberg, J. Greco, E. Harcourt, A. Kemmerling, M. Kober, D. Koppelberg, A. Koritensky, H. Kornblith, M. Kusch, M. Lee, N. Miscevic, K. Munn, B. Niederbacher, E. J. Olsson, C. Piller, R. Raaa…Read more