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28Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology, editted by Nathan Ballantyne and David DunningInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1-6. forthcoming.
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16How Not to Be a FallibilistThe Monist 106 (4): 423-440. 2023.I develop one partial explanation of the origins of our fallibilist intuitions about knowledge in ordinary language fallibilism and argue that this explanation indicates that our epistemic methodology should be more impartial and theory-neutral. First, I explain why the so-called Moorean constraint (cf. Hawthorne 2005, 111) that encapsulates fallibilist intuitions is fallibilism’s cornerstone. Second, I describe a pattern of fallibilist reasoning in light of the influential dual processing and h…Read more
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25Why Monarchy Should Be AbolishedThink 22 (65): 39-44. 2023.Monarchy is a form of government that, roughly, dictates that the right to rule is inherited by birth by a single ruler. But monarchy (absolute or constitutional) breaches fundamental moral principles that undergird representative democracy, such as basic moral equality, dignity and desert. Simply put, the monarchs (and their family) are treated as morally superior to ordinary citizens and as a result ordinary citizens are treated in an unfair and undignified manner. For example, monarchs are re…Read more
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18The Moral Argument Against Monarchy (Absolute or Constitutional)Res Publica 30 (1): 171-182. 2024.I argue that monarchies, in any possible form (absolute or constitutional), should be abolished once and for all. This is because of the deeply immoral presuppositions such a system of government upholds (implicitly or explicitly). Call this _‘the moral argument against monarchy’_. I identify three basic moral principles that monarchy by definition breaches: ‘the basic moral equality principle’, ‘the basic dignity principle’ and ‘the basic moral desert principle’. Finally, I examine and reply to…Read more
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20Skepticism, Mental Disorder and RationalityInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (1): 1-30. 2023.I stipulate and motivate the overlooked problem of demarcating radical skeptics (perceptual and moral) from mentally disordered persons, given that both deny that they know ordinary Moorean propositions (e.g., that they have hands or that killing for fun is morally wrong). Call this ‘the demarcation problem’. In response to the demarcation problem, I develop a novel way to demarcate between mentally disordered persons and radical skeptics in an extensionally adequate way that saves the appearanc…Read more
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24Probability fixed points, (in)adequate concept possession and COVID-19 irrationalitiesPhilosophical Psychology 36 (6): 1037-1061. 2023.We argue that probability mistakes indicate that at least some of us often do not adequately possess the concept of probability (and its cognates) and that the digital dissemination of such misinfo...
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17Moral Fixed Points, Error Theory and Intellectual VicePhilosophia 51 (4): 1785-1794. 2023.Ingram (2015) has argued that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s (2014) ‘moral fixed points’ theory entails that error theorists are conceptually deficient with moral concepts. They are conceptually deficient with moral concepts because they do not grasp moral fixed points (e.g. ‘Torture for fun is pro tanto wrong’). Ingram (2015) concluded that moral fixed points theory cannot substantiate the conceptual deficiency charge and, therefore, the theory is defeated. In defense of moral fixed points theory, K…Read more
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13Is Spinoza's Ethics Metaethically Constructivist?History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (2): 131-146. 2022.Charles Jarrett and P. D. Zuk have argued on independent grounds that Spinoza's Ethics delineates a moral antirealist/constructivist position. I reconstruct their basic arguments, present their textual evidence, and suggest that the evidence is, in principle, compatible with moral realism. As I argue, Jarrett and Zuk have opted for an antirealist/constructivist interpretation of the adduced textual evidence because they tacitly rely on a mistaken metaethical assumption: that relational normativi…Read more
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11Matthieu Queloz, the Practical Origins of Ideas. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2021. ISBN: 9780198868705, £72, Hbk (review)Journal of Value Inquiry 1-5. forthcoming.
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35Good Guys, Bad Guys: How to Reliably Tell Virtue from SchmirtueAnalysis 82 (4): 775-786. 2022.Matti Eklund’s fascinating and wide-ranging Choosing Normative Concepts is an excellent contribution to metaethical debates (and beyond).1 Eklund’s professed di.
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30Richard Rowland, The Normative and the EvaluativeJournal of Moral Philosophy 19 (1): 82-84. 2022.
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17Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & IIPhilosophy Compass 16 (10). 2021.I review proposed skepticisms in recent literature (or skeptical invariantisms, if we understand skepticism semantically), contrast their basic commitments and highlight some of their comparative theoretical attractions and problems. To help set the scene for the discussion, I start with Unger’s (1975) modern classic of global skepticism about knowledge (and justification). I then distinguish three extant categories of skepticism in the recent literature: two non‐traditional and one more traditi…Read more
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12Varieties of skeptical invariantism IIPhilosophy Compass 16 (10). 2021.AbstarctIn the first installment of Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism, we set the scene for subsequent discussion with Unger's (1975) modern classic of global skepticism and distinguished three varieties of skeptical invariantism in recent literature: traditional skeptical invariantism, fallibilist science-based skepticism and practical skepticism. We then presented fallibilist science-based skepticism, that is, the position that relaxes the stringency of the standard of knowledge but still qu…Read more
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19Varieties of skeptical invariantism IIPhilosophy Compass 16 (10). 2021.AbstarctIn the first installment of Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism, we set the scene for subsequent discussion with Unger's (1975) modern classic of global skepticism and distinguished three varieties of skeptical invariantism in recent literature: traditional skeptical invariantism, fallibilist science-based skepticism and practical skepticism. We then presented fallibilist science-based skepticism, that is, the position that relaxes the stringency of the standard of knowledge but still qu…Read more
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35Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & IIPhilosophy Compass 16 (10). 2021.I review proposed skepticisms in recent literature (or skeptical invariantisms, if we understand skepticism semantically), contrast their basic commitments and highlight some of their comparative theoretical attractions and problems. To help set the scene for the discussion, I start with Unger’s (1975) modern classic of global skepticism about knowledge (and justification). I then distinguish three extant categories of skepticism in the recent literature: two non‐traditional and one more traditi…Read more
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30Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered (edited book)Routledge. 2021.This collection of original essays explores the topic of skeptical invariantism in theory of knowledge. It eschews historical perspectives and focuses on this traditionally underexplored, semantic characterization of skepticism. The book provides a carefully structured, state-of-the-art overview of skeptical invariantism and offers up new questions and avenues for future research. It treats this semantic form of skepticism as a serious position rather than assuming that skepticism is false and a…Read more
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77MetaepistemologyInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016.Metaepistemology Metaepistemology is, roughly, the branch of epistemology that asks questions about first-order epistemological questions. It inquires into fundamental aspects of epistemic theorizing like metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, agency, psychology, responsibility, reasons for belief, and beyond. So, if as traditionally conceived, epistemology is the theory of knowledge, metaepistemology is the theory of the theory of knowledge. … Continue reading Metaepistemology →
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14Epistemic Contextualism. A Defense: by Peter Baumann, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, vi +265 pp., £49.99 (hardback), ISBN: 9780198754312 (review)International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1): 128-135. 2020.Volume 28, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 128-135.
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75Assertion and Practical Reasoning, Fallibilism and Pragmatic SkepticismActa Analytica 35 (4): 543-561. 2020.Skeptical invariantism does not account for the intuitive connections between knowledge, assertion, and practical reasoning and this constitutes a significant problem for the position because it does not save corresponding epistemic appearances (cf. Hawthorne (2004:131-5)). Moreover, it is an attraction of fallibilist over infallibilist-skeptical views that they can easily account for the epistemic appearances about the connections between knowledge, assertion, and practical reasoning (cf. Willi…Read more
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29Evolutionary DebunkingLogos and Episteme 10 (2): 175-182. 2019.Recent literature has paid considerable attention to evolutionary debunking arguments. But the cogency of evolutionary debunking arguments is compromised by a problem for such arguments that has been somewhat overlooked, namely, what we may call ‘the demarcation problem.’ This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief justified, or debunk it as unjustified. In this paper, I present and explain why in the absence of…Read more
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87Moral Fixed Points, Rationality and the ‘Why Be Moral?’ QuestionErkenntnis 86 (3): 647-664. 2019.Cuneo and Shafer-Landau have argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive and non-vacuous in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. If the moral proposition ‘torturing kids for fun is pro tanto wrong’ is such a conceptual truth, it is because the essence of ‘wrong’ necessarily satisfies and applies to the substantive content of ‘torturing kids for fun’. In critique, Killoren :165–173, 2016) has revisited the old skeptical ‘why be moral?’ question and argued that th…Read more
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73Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism (edited book)Palgrave Macmillan. 2018.This book contains twelve chapters by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on metaepistemology, that is, on the nature, existence and authority of epistemic facts. One of the central divides in metaepistemology is between epistemic realists and epistemic anti-realists. Epistemic realists think that epistemic facts exist independently of human judgements and practices, and that they have authority over our judgements and practices. Epistemic anti-realists think that, if epistemic facts exist at…Read more
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32John MacFarlane, Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 362 pp., £30 , ISBN 9780199682751 (review)Dialectica 71 (2): 322-332. 2017.
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616Review of John MacFarlane. (2014). Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications. Oxford, Oxford University Press (review)Dialectica. forthcoming.
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517Evolutionary debunking: the Milvian Bridge destabilizedSynthese 196 (7): 2695-2713. 2019.Recent literature has paid attention to a demarcation problem for evolutionary debunking arguments. This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief justified, or debunk it as unjustified. I examine the so-called ‘Milvian Bridge principle’ A new science of religion, Routledge, New York, 2012; Sloan, McKenny, Eggelson Darwin in the 21st century: nature, humanity, and God, University Press, Notre Dame, 2015)), which of…Read more
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658MetaepistemologyInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016.An Introduction to basic metaepistemological debates and positions.
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |