Cindy Friedman

This paper considers ethical concerns with regard to replacing human relations with humanoid robots. Many have written about the impact that certain types of relations with robots may have on us, and why we should be concerned about robots replacing human relations. There has, however, been no consideration of this issue from an African philosophical perspective. Ubuntu philosophy provides a novel perspective on how relations with robots may impact our own moral character and moral development. This paper first discusses what humanoid robots are, why and how humans tend to anthropomorphise them, and what the literature says about robots crowding out human relations. It then explains the ideal of becoming “fully human”, which pertains to being particularly moral in character. In ubuntu philosophy, we are not only biologically human, but must strive to become better, more moral versions of ourselves, to become fully human. We can become fully human by having other regarding traits or characteristics within the context of interdependent, or humane, relationships (such as by exhibiting human equality, reciprocity, or solidarity). This concept of becoming fully human is important in ubuntu philosophy. Having explained that idea, the main argument of the paper is then put forward: that treating humanoid robots as if they are human is morally concerning if they crowd out human relations, because such relations prevent us from becoming fully human. This is because we cannot experience human equality, solidarity, and reciprocity with robots, which can be seen to characterise interdependent, or humane, relations with human beings.

The paper argues that we should grant negative rights to humanoid robots. These are rights that relate to non-interference e.g., freedom from violence, or freedom from discrimination. Doing so will prevent moral degradation to our human society. The consideration of robot moral status has seen a progression towards the consideration of robot rights. This is a controversial debate, with many scholars seeing the consideration of robot rights in black and white. It is, however, valuable to take a nuanced approach. This paper highlights the value of taking a nuanced approach by arguing that we should consider negative rights for humanoid robots. Where a lot of discussion about robot rights centres around the possibility of robot consciousness which would warrant robots being protected by rights for their own moral sakes, the paper takes a human-centred approach. It argues that we should, at least, grant negative rights to humanoid robots for the sake of human beings and not necessarily only for the sake of robots. This is because, given the human-likeness of humanoid robots, we relate to them in a human-like way. Should we, in the context of these relations, treat these robots immorally, there is concern that we may damage our own moral fibre or, more collectively, society’s moral fibre. Thus, inhibiting the immoral treatment of robots, protects the moral fibre of society, thereby preventing moral degradation in our human society.