My current project is a monograph on knowledge-first epistemology that I'm writing with Julien Dutant. (Working title, 'What is rational belief?') Highlights include: a knowledge-first theory of rational belief that solves various paradoxes of belief, a novel theory of defeat according to which defeaters are indicators of ignorance (i.e., evidence that were we to believe we wouldn't know), an argument that rational belief should be understood in terms of expected epistemic desirability, arguments that knowledge is necessary for epistemic desirability, discussions of the connections between belief, credence, and emotion.
More generally, I'm …
My current project is a monograph on knowledge-first epistemology that I'm writing with Julien Dutant. (Working title, 'What is rational belief?') Highlights include: a knowledge-first theory of rational belief that solves various paradoxes of belief, a novel theory of defeat according to which defeaters are indicators of ignorance (i.e., evidence that were we to believe we wouldn't know), an argument that rational belief should be understood in terms of expected epistemic desirability, arguments that knowledge is necessary for epistemic desirability, discussions of the connections between belief, credence, and emotion.
More generally, I'm working on issues in epistemology and ethical theory with particular interests in connections between the practical and theoretical. Increasingly interested in number scepticism and the ways that non-consequentialists should think about uncertainty and duty.