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4Exchange between Donald Davidson and WV Quine following Davidson's lectureTheoria 60 (3): 226-231. 1994.
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3Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1997.This landmark collection of essays by six renowned philosophers explores the implications of the contentious realism/antirealism debate for epistemology. The essays examine issues such as whether epistemology needs to be realist, the bearing of a realist conception of truth on epistemology, and realism and antirealism in terms of a pragmatist conception of epistemic justification. Richard Rorty's essay provides a critical commentary on the other five.
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3A Nice Derangment of Epithaphs, w: E. LeporeIn Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Blackwell. 1986.
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11What Metaphors MeanIn Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy, Broadview Press. pp. 453-465. 2013.
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3The logical Form of Action Statements."In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action, University of Pittsburgh Press. 1967.
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2Indeterminism and antirealismIn Christopher B. Kulp (ed.), Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 109--122. 1997.
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11The problem of objectivityTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (2): 203-220. 1995.Since Descartes, epistemology has been based on first person knowledge. We must begin, according to the usual story, with what is most certain: knowledge of our own sensations and thoughts. In one way or another we then progress, if we can, to knowledge of an objective external world. There is then the final, tenuous, step to knowledge of other minds. I shall argue for a total revision of this picture. All propositional thought, whether positive or skeptical, whether of the inner or of the outer…Read more
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78Ações, razões e causasCritica. 2012.Qual é a relação entre uma razão e uma ação quando a razão explica a ação, dando a razão do agente para fazer o que fez? Podemos chamar tais explicações de racionalizações, e dizer que a razão racionaliza a ação. Neste artigo quero defender a posição antiga — e de senso comum — de que a racionalização é uma espécie de explicação causal b. A defesa sem dúvida exige alguma reelaboração, mas não parece necessário abandonar a posição, como muitos autores recentes insistem.
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120Course Outline: § Main Goals: 1. To construct a theory of meaning (a semantics) as Tarski does with a theory of truth. 2. To argue that the meaning of a sentence is nothing but its truth conditions. 3. To argue that a characterization of a truth predicate describes the required kind of structure, and provides a clear and testable criterion of an adequate semantics for a natural language.
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211On the Very idea of a Conceptual SchemeIn Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation, Oxford University Press. pp. 183-198. 1984.
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48The only thing worth saying about the author, in my view, is what he has given to be public, all the rest being the generalized personal, which is mere confusion and finally dust
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31The individuation of eventsIn Carl G. Hempel, Donald Davidson & Nicholas Rescher (eds.), Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel, D. Reidel. pp. 216-34. 1970.
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19Theories of meaning and learnable languagesIn Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (ed.), Proceedings of the International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, North-holland. pp. 383-394. 1965.
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3The logical form of action sentencesIn Nicholas Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action, University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 81--95. 1967.
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647Thinking causesIn Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation, Oxford University Press. pp. 1993--3. 1995.
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1Problems in the explanation of actionIn John Jamieson Carswell Smart, Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart, Blackwell. 1987.
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1Mental EventsIn Lawrence Foster & Joe William Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory, Humanities Press. 1970.
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Reply to JJC SmartIn Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson: actions and events, Oxford University Press. pp. 244--47. 1985.
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1Replies to essaysIn Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson: actions and events, Oxford University Press. 1985.
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1Replies to Essays X-XIIn Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson: actions and events, Oxford University Press. pp. 242--252. 1985.
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Reply to Harry LewisIn Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson: actions and events, Oxford University Press. pp. 242--244. 1985.
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27Psychology as philosophyIn Stuart C. Brown (ed.), Philosophy Of Psychology, : Macmillan. pp. 41-52. 1974.This essay develops the relation, implicit in Essay 11, of intentional action to behaviour described in purely physical terms; Davidson repeats from Essay 3 that an action counts as intentional if the agent caused it, and asks to which degree a study of action thus conceived permits being scientific. Davidson stresses the central importance of a normative concept of rationality in attributing reasons to agents ; because this concept has no echo in physical theory, any explanatory schema governed…Read more
Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics |
Normative Ethics |