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35What causes failure to apply the Pigeonhole Principle in simple reasoning problems?Thinking and Reasoning 23 (2): 184-189. 2017.The Pigeonhole Principle states that if n items are sorted into m categories and if n > m, then at least one category must contain more than one item. For instance, if 22 pigeons are put into 17 pigeonholes, at least one pigeonhole must contain more than one pigeon. This principle seems intuitive, yet when told about a city with 220,000 inhabitants none of whom has more than 170,000 hairs on their head, many people think that it is merely likely that two inhabitants have the exact same number of…Read more
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45Argumentation: its adaptiveness and efficacyBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2): 94-111. 2011.Having defended the usefulness of our definition of reasoning, we stress that reasoning is not only for convincing but also for evaluating arguments, and that as such it has an epistemic function. We defend the evidence supporting the theory against several challenges: People are good informal arguers, they reason better in groups, and they have a confirmation bias. Finally, we consider possible extensions, first in terms of process-level theories of reasoning, and second in the effects of reaso…Read more
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71Weird people, yes, but also weird experimentsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 84-85. 2010.Henrich et al.’s article fleshes out in a very useful and timely manner comments often heard but rarely published about the extraordinary cultural imbalance in the recruitment of participants in psychology experiments and the doubt this casts on generalization of findings from these “weird” samples to humans in general. The authors mention that one of the concerns they have met in defending their views has been of a methodological nature: “the observed variation across populations may be due to …Read more
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53Partner choice, fairness, and the extension of moralityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1): 102-122. 2013.Our discussion of the commentaries begins, at the evolutionary level, with issues raised by our account of the evolution of morality in terms of partner-choice mutualism. We then turn to the cognitive level and the characterization and workings of fairness. In a final section, we discuss the degree to which our fairness-based approach to morality extends to norms that are commonly considered moral even though they are distinct from fairness.
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604Partner choice, fairness, and the extension of moralityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1): 102-122. 2013.Our discussion of the commentaries begins, at the evolutionary level, with issues raised by our account of the evolution of morality in terms of partner-choice mutualism. We then turn to the cognitive level and the characterization and workings of fairness. In a final section, we discuss the degree to which our fairness-based approach to morality extends to norms that are commonly considered moral even though they are distinct from fairness.
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41. Reason on TrialIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 15-33. 2017.
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617. Reasoning about Moral and Political TopicsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 299-314. 2017.
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49. Reasoning: Intuition and ReflectionIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 148-174. 2017.
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4ReferencesIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 357-382. 2017.
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2. Psychologists’ TravailsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 34-48. 2017.
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412. Quality Control: How We Evaluate ArgumentsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 222-236. 2017.
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NotesIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 337-356. 2017.
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80Moral Reputation: An Evolutionary and Cognitive PerspectiveMind and Language 27 (5): 495-518. 2012.From an evolutionary point of view, the function of moral behaviour may be to secure a good reputation as a co-operator. The best way to do so may be to obey genuine moral motivations. Still, one's moral reputation maybe something too important to be entrusted just to one's moral sense. A robust concern for one's reputation is likely to have evolved too. Here we explore some of the complex relationships between morality and reputation both from an evolutionary and a cognitive point of view.
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66. MetarepresentationsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 90-106. 2017.
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816. Is Human Reason Universal?In Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 277-298. 2017.
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17IndexIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 387-400. 2017.
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57. How We Use ReasonsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 109-127. 2017.
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334Epistemic VigilanceMind and Language 25 (4): 359-393. 2010.Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguist…Read more
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5AcknowledgmentsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 383-384. 2017.
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49Why a modular approach to reason?Mind and Language 33 (5): 533-541. 2018.In their reviews, Chater and Oaksford, Dutilh Novaes, and Sterelny are critical of our modularist approach to reason. In this response, we clarify our claim that reason is one of many cognitive modules that produce intuitive inferences each in its domain; the reason module producing intuitions about reasons. We argue that in‐principle objections to the idea of massive modularity based on Fodor's peculiar approach are not effective against other interpretations that have led to insightful uses of…Read more
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2011. Why Is Reasoning Biased?In Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 205-221. 2017.
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52The Enigma of Reason (edited book)Harvard University Press. 2017.Reason, we are told, is what makes us human, the source of our knowledge and wisdom. If reason is so useful, why didn't it also evolve in other animals? If reason is that reliable, why do we produce so much thoroughly reasoned nonsense? In their groundbreaking account of the evolution and workings of reason, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber set out to solve this double enigma. Reason, they argue with a compelling mix of real-life and experimental evidence, is not geared to solitary use, to arriving …Read more
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313. The Dark Side of ReasonIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 237-250. 2017.
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715. The Bright Side of ReasonIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 262-274. 2017.
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518. Solitary Geniuses?In Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 315-327. 2017.
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810. Reason: What Is It For?In Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 175-202. 2017.
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64. ModularityIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 68-75. 2017.
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6Introduction: A Double EnigmaIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 1-12. 2017.