Daniel Haggerty

In this work, I discuss moral magnetism, or how to take the to-be-doneness of some evaluative experience seriously as making sense. On the account I propose, moral magnetism is not part of nature. Nor does it reduce to individual psychological states or occurrences, dispositions, or motivational structures. Instead, it involves what is to be expected, where expectation is embedded in a situation. Sometimes this involves mental states and motives, but it does not involve them necessarily. ;Ethical subjectivism would reduce moral magnetism to narrow content, and account for the phenomenon perhaps in terms of a projection error. Against arguing this way, I discuss external constraints on emotions and psychic feelings. On the account I propose, some evaluatively important emotional content is wide content. Thus not only is it important to understand moral magnetism for its own sake as an aspect of evaluative experience, it is also important for overcoming debates over realism and subjectivism, and over internalisms and externalisms in ethics and philosophy of mind. ;The dissertation places interpersonal relations and social activities, and the emotions they involve, at the center of both ethics and metaethics. It also expands the discussion of what counts as reasons by bringing considerations from metapsychology to bear upon aspects of moral magnetism

In this paper, we argue for the value of two complementary pedagogical tools for teaching moral emotions: (1) taxonomies and (2) normative case studies. The paper proceeds in four parts. Section One discusses our motivations for teaching moral emotions. Section Two introduces envy as the central example we use to demonstrate the value of developing a scaffolded approach to teaching moral emotions that moves from taxonomy to normative case studies. Specifically, we engage with Sara Protasi’s The Philosophy of Envy (2021). We start by focusing on how an instructor could use Protasi’s taxonomy of envy effectively in the classroom. Then, Section Three engages with Rebecca M. Taylor’s recent work on normative case studies. We build on one of Protasi’s cases to demonstrate how instructors can design normative case studies to speak directly to the experiences of their students and we suggest a sample assignment. Finally, Section Four concludes by reinforcing the complementary relationship between taxonomies and normative case studies for teaching moral emotions.

In this paper, I explore risks and responsibilities associated with speaking for others. I argue that, contrary to the recent philosophical literature on the subject, speaking for others is not always epistemically or politically illegitimate. Moreover, epistemological justification is not the only important consideration when trying to determine if we should speak for others. Ethical justification also matters and can override epistemological worries. Indeed, sometimes we should speak for others though we cannot know their experience. I identify and evaluate five kinds of speaking for others. I end by exploring some of the implications of my analysisfor social justice for women and girls internationally.

In this paper, I explore risks and responsibilities associated with speaking for others. I argue that, contrary to the recent philosophical literature on the subject, speaking for others is not always epistemically or politically illegitimate. Moreover, epistemological justification is not the only important consideration when trying to determine if we should speak for others. Ethical justification also matters and can override epistemological worries. Indeed, sometimes we should speak for others though we cannot know their experience. I identify and evaluate five kinds of speaking for others. I end by exploring some of the implications of my analysisfor social justice for women and girls internationally.

In this paper, I explore risks and responsibilities associated with speaking for others. I argue that, contrary to the recent philosophical literature on the subject, speaking for others is not always epistemically or politically illegitimate. Moreover, epistemological justification is not the only important consideration when trying to determine if we should speak for others. Ethical justification also matters and can override epistemological worries. Indeed, sometimes we should speak for others though we cannot know their experience. I identify and evaluate five kinds of speaking for others. I end by exploring some of the implications of my analysisfor social justice for women and girls internationally.