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25Doxastic Revision in Non-Human Animals: The First-Order ModelReview of Philosophy and Psychology 1-22. forthcoming.If we focus on current debates on how creatures revise or correct their beliefs, we can identify two opposing approaches that we propose to call “intellectualism” and “minimalism.” In this paper, we outline a new account of doxastic revision — “the first-order model”— that is neither as cognitively demanding as intellectualism nor as deflationary as minimalism. First-order doxastic revision, we argue, is a personal-level process in which a creature rejects some beliefs and accepts others based o…Read more
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Pensamiento y lenguajeIn Mariela Aguilera, Laura Danón, Carolina Scotto & Elisabeth Camp (eds.), Conceptos, lenguaje y cognición, Editorial Universidad Nacional De Córdoba. 2015.
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2Peirce y lo incognoscible. Respuesta a DamianiTópicos 22 265-276. 2011.El presente artículo responde algunas objeciones que Damiani, en su trabajo “Comunidad, realidad y pragmatismo”, efectúa a un artículo anterior mío sobre lo incognoscible en Peirce: “Lo incognoscible y los límites del sentido”. Señalo que nuestros desacuerdos conciernen principalmente a dos puntos: si tiene sentido sostener que no podemos saber si hay incognoscibles, y si cabe defender la tesis de Peirce sin comprometerse con el idealismo. Al argumentar por una respuesta afirmativa al primer pun…Read more
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40Brandom on Perceptual KnowledgeJournal of Transcendental Philosophy 3 (1): 49-70. 2022.According to Brandom, perceptual knowledge is the product of two distinguishable capacities: the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli, and the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlements and commitments of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this arti…Read more
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25Francisco Pereira, Ver no es creerCritica 54 (161): 95-108. 2022.Francisco Pereira, Ver no es creer, Gedisa, México, 2021, 272 pp.
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52A new case of the Myth of the Given?Theoria 88 (5): 927-942. 2022.For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject's taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in a certain kind of relation with the…Read more
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51Perception as a contentful relationEuropean Journal of Philosophy 30 (2): 740-754. 2022.European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 740-754, June 2022.
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30Naïve realism and seeing aspectsPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1-16. forthcoming.Naïve realism is the view according to which perception is a non-representational relation of conscious awareness to mind-independent objects and properties. According to this approach, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by just the objects, properties, or facts presented to the senses. In this article, I argue that such a conception of the phenomenology of experience faces a clear counter-example, i.e., the experience of seeing aspects. The discussion suggests that, to accomm…Read more
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1Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom’s Normative PragmaticsDisputatio 8 (9). 2019.Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue …Read more
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36Perception as a propositional attitudeTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 35 (2): 155-174. 2020.It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” (2009), Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of “the propositional-attitude thesis”, it does not really follow that experience has propo…Read more
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17Perceiving Mental States: Co-presence and ConstitutionProceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57 29-34. 2018.Recently, some philosophers of mind have called the attention to the idea according to which we can perceive, in many cases, some mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals: the co-presence thesis and the hybrid model. We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections against both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts that allows us to avoid these objections. In a nutshell, our idea is that by perceiving other peo…Read more
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46Two Versions of the Conceptual Content of ExperienceInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1): 36-55. 2020.In ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, McDowell revisits the main themes of Mind and World in order to make two important corrections: first, he does not longer believe that the content of perceptual...
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48Perception as a propositional attitudeTheoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science. forthcoming.It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?”, Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of “the propositional-attitude thesis”, it does not really follow that experience has propositiona…Read more
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14Percepción y mentes animalesRevista de Filosofía 43 (2): 201-221. 2018.En este artículo propongo una variedad de conceptualismo contra la objeción no conceptualista de acuerdo con la cual los enfoques no conceptualistas no serían capaces de explicar apropiadamente la percepción animal. En primer lugar, sintetizo la posición de McDowell sobre las mentes animales. En segundo lugar, señalo algunos problemas conceptuales en ella. En tercer lugar, sugiero una extensión del conceptualismo al reino animal a fin de resolver las inconsistencias de McDowell y de acomodar cie…Read more
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43Sellars on Perceptual KnowledgeTransactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 53 (3): 425. 2017.In Part VIII of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, after criticizing one of the forms that the Myth of the Given adopts, Sellars presents his own conception of epistemic justification. This conception, along with his criticism of the framework of the Given, has had a great impact on the analytic philosophy of the second half of twentieth century, an impact that still persists today.1 In this article, I aim to examine Sellars's theory of epistemic justification in order to highlight two impor…Read more
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76Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s EmpiricismErkenntnis 82 (4): 715-738. 2017.In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection, that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of accepta…Read more
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53Perceptual Experience and Seeing-asNordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (1): 123-144. 2015.According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thes…Read more
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3¿Puede el mundo desempeñar un papel epistémico en la justificación de la creencia?: Rorty, Davidson y Mc Dowell en debateRevista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 30 (1): 37-64. 2004.
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48Objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectivaRevista de Filosofía (Madrid) 34 (2): 29-47. 2009.order to defend Putnam’s conceptual pluralism. Finally, the paper defends the compatibility between conceptual pluralism and the idea of convergence in a final opinion. Consequently, I conclude that objectivity depends on the particular vocabularies employed. This paper examines the concept of objectivity as a point of view without perspective. This sense of objectivity is present (among others) in Williams’ works (particularly in its notion of absolute conception of reality). The structure of t…Read more
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31¿Superación de la epistemología o final de la filosofía?: La crisis de la filosofía en Richard RortyRevista de Filosofía (Madrid) 22 (2): 255-286. 1999.order to defend Putnam’s conceptual pluralism. Finally, the paper defends the compatibility between conceptual pluralism and the idea of convergence in a final opinion. Consequently, I conclude that objectivity depends on the particular vocabularies employed. This paper examines the concept of objectivity as a point of view without perspective. This sense of objectivity is present (among others) in Williams’ works (particularly in its notion of absolute conception of reality). The structure of t…Read more
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Entre el objetivismo y el relativismo: el etnocentrismo liberal de R. RortyAgora 18 (2): 41-63. 1999.
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53Pragmatismo, empirismo y representaciones: Una propuesta acerca del papel epistémico de la experienciaAnálisis Filosófico 28 (2): 281-302. 2008.El empirismo puede ser caracterizado, por un lado, como una teoría acerca de los orígenes del conocimiento empírico; por otro, como una concepción epistémica acerca de la justificación de las creencias empíricas. Actualmente, esta última dimensión del empirismo ha sido criticada por diversos filósofos. Paradigmáticamente, Rorty ha sostenido que la experiencia es únicamente la causa de las creencias, pero no su justificación. La tesis de Rorty es que las creencias se relacionan con el mundo sólo …Read more