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36Cryonics: Traps and transformationsBioethics 38 (4): 351-355. 2024.Cryonics is the practice of cryopreserving the bodies or brains of legally dead individuals with the hope that these individuals will be reanimated in the future. A standard argument for cryonics says that cryonics is prudentially justified despite uncertainty about its success because at worst it will leave you no worse off than you otherwise would have been had you not chosen cryonics, and at best it will leave you much better off than you otherwise would have been. Thus, it is a good, no-risk…Read more
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167Deepfake Pornography and the Ethics of Non-Veridical RepresentationsPhilosophy and Technology 36 (3): 1-22. 2023.We investigate the question of whether (and if so why) creating or distributing deepfake pornography of someone without their consent is inherently objectionable. We argue that nonconsensually distributing deepfake pornography of a living person on the internet is inherently pro tanto wrong in virtue of the fact that nonconsensually distributing intentionally non-veridical representations about someone violates their right that their social identity not be tampered with, a right which is grounde…Read more
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238The Badness of Death for Sociable CattleJournal of Value Inquiry 1-20. forthcoming.I argue that death can be (and sometimes is) bad for cattle because it destroys relationships that are valuable for cattle for their own sake. The argument relies on an analogy between valuable human relationships and relationships cattle form with conspecifics. I suggest that the reasons we have for thinking that certain rich and meaningful human relationships are valuable for their own sake should also lead us to think that certain cattle relationships are valuable for their own sake. And just…Read more
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124Life and Death Without the PresentThe Journal of Ethics 26 (2): 193-207. 2021.In this paper, I explore the connection between certain metaphysical views of time and emotional attitudes concerning one’s own death and mortality. I argue that one metaphysical view of time, B-theory, offers consolation to mortals in the face of death relative to commonsense and another metaphysical view of time, A-theory. Consolation comes from three places. First, B-theory implies that time does not really pass, and as a result one has less reason to worry about one’s time growing short. Sec…Read more
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190Review of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 6 (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (6): 678-681. 2021.
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27Moral luck in team‐based health careNursing Philosophy 22 (1). 2021.Clinicians regularly work as teams and perform joint actions that have a great deal of moral significance. As a result, clinicians regularly share moral responsibility for the actions of their teams and other clinicians. In this paper, we argue that clinicians are exceptionally susceptible to a special type of moral luck, called interpersonal moral luck, because their moral statuses are often affected by the actions of other clinicians in a way that is not fully within their control. We then arg…Read more
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371Interpersonal Moral Luck and Normative EntanglementErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6 601-616. 2019.I introduce an underdiscussed type of moral luck, which I call interpersonal moral luck. Interpersonal moral luck characteristically occurs when the actions of other moral agents, qua morally evaluable actions, affect an agent’s moral status in a way that is outside of that agent’s capacity to control. I suggest that interpersonal moral luck is common in collective contexts involving shared responsibility and has interesting distinctive features. I also suggest that many philosophers are already…Read more
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81Joint action without robust theory of mindSynthese 198 (6): 5009-5026. 2021.Intuitively, even very young children can act jointly. For instance, a child and her parent can build a simple tower together. According to developmental psychologists, young children develop theory of mind by, among other things, participating in joint actions like this. Yet many leading philosophical accounts of joint action presuppose that participants have a robust theory of mind. In this article, I examine two philosophical accounts of joint action designed to circumvent this presupposition…Read more
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California Polytechnic State University, San Luis ObispoDepartment of PhilosophyAssistant Professor
San Luis Obispo County, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Moral Luck |
Agency |
The Badness of Death |
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Social Philosophy |
Time |
The Badness of Death |