Daniel Wolt

There is no clear consensus among scholars about the authenticity of the Magna Moralia. Here I present a new case for thinking that the work was composed by a later Peripatetic, and is not, either directly or indirectly, the work of Aristotle. My argument rests on an analysis of the author’s usage of ἐνέργεια, which is a fruitful way to investigate the date of the work: the term was apparently coined by Aristotle but in later antiquity came to be used in ways inconsistent with Aristotle’s own usage. I argue that in several passages from the Magna Moralia the term is used in this distinctively late sense and that it is not plausible to think that this innovation could have occured in Aristotle’s own lifetime or shortly thereafter.

In Eudemian Ethics 8.3, Aristotle treats a virtue that he calls kalokagathia, ‘nobility-and-goodness’. This virtue appears to be quite important, and he even identifies it with “perfect virtue” (1249a17). This makes it puzzling that the Nicomachean Ethics, a text that largely parallels the Eudemian Ethics, does not discuss kalokagathia at all. I argue that the reason for this difference has to do with the role that the intellectual virtue practical wisdom (phronêsis) plays in these treatises. The Nicomachean Ethics, I argue, makes use of a more expansive conception of phronêsis than does the Eudemian Ethics. Hence, the work that is done by kalokagathia in the Eudemian Ethics -- crucially, accounting for the unity of the virtues -- is done in the Nicomachean Ethics by phronêsis.