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6Review of Knowledge and Civilization, by Barry Allen (review)Essays in Philosophy 6 (1): 290-291. 2005.
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10Review of Confusion: A Study in the Theory of Knowledge, by Joseph L. Camp, Jr (review)Essays in Philosophy 6 (2): 439-440. 2005.
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24Russell and Analytic PhilosophyA. D. Irvine and G. A. Wedeking, editors Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 1993, xv + 424 pp., $115 (review)Dialogue 36 (2): 413-416. 1997.
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20“Yielding ground to none”: Normative perspectives on African philosophy and its curriculaSouth African Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 383-400. 2016.
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31The Nature of Meaningfulness (review)Dialogue 41 (1): 204-205. 2002.Robert Shope states at the outset of The Nature of Meaningfulness that his goal is "to present a unified view of meaningfulness". As the book unfolds, the unity in his view turns out to be subtle and complex, and to take in many distinct topics. His discussion is dense with arguments and counterexamples, and engages with many other contemporary analytic philosophers' writings on each topic. Readers are justified, I think, in treating the book as a collection of quite independent essays on variou…Read more
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Elijah Millgram, ed., Varieties of Practical Reasoning (review)Philosophy in Review 22 345-347. 2002.
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Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times (review)Philosophy in Review 21 36-39. 2001.
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Some Descriptional Theories of First-Person ThoughtsDissertation, Brown University. 1990.In this dissertation I investigate the nature of first-person thoughts, i.e., thoughts typically expressed in English with sentences containing 'I'. ;Led by McTaggart and Castaneda, many philosophers have advanced various arguments and putative counter-examples designed to show that no theory of first-person thoughts can be correct which holds that the reference of a first-person thought to its subject is mediated by descriptive content of that thought. I thoroughly review classical and contempo…Read more
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42Knowledge, true belief, and virtuous fallibilismEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2): 14-24. 2010.
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3Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 21 (1): 36-39. 2001.
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37Propositional Identity and Logical NecessityAustralasian Journal of Logic 2 1-11. 2004.In two early papers, Max Cresswell constructed two formal logics of propositional identity, pcr and fcr, which he observed to be respectively deductively equivalent to modal logics s4 and s5. Cresswell argued informally that these equivalences respectively “give . . . evidence” for the correctness of s4 and s5 as logics of broadly logical necessity. In this paper, I describe weaker propositional identity logics than pcr that accommodate core intuitions about identity and I argue that Cresswell’s…Read more
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50Dummett, Michael, "Frege and Other Philosphers" (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 33 (n/a): 479-480. 1993.
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24Review of “Confusion: A Study in the Theory of Knowledge” (review)Essays in Philosophy 6 (2): 10. 2005.
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John E. Hare, God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, and Human Autonomy Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 22 (3): 191-192. 2002.
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115Close enough to referenceSynthese 95 (3). 1993.This paper proposes a response to the duplication objection to the descriptive theory of singular mental reference. This objection involves hypothetical cases in each of which there are a pair of qualitatively indistinguishable objects and a thought that apparently refers to only one of the pair, despite the descriptive indistinguishability of the two objects. I identify a concept of reference-likeness or closeness to reference, which is related to the concept of genuine singular reference as th…Read more
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34The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3): 366-368. 1999.
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44Points of View (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2): 488-491. 2000.This sophisticated, difficult, and puzzling book consolidates and continues the exploration of our finitude pursued in Adrian Moore’s earlier book The Infinite and in a number of previous and intervening articles by him. One of Moore’s purposes in Points of View is to defend an affirmative answer to the question “Are absolute representations possible?” Moore takes this question to be an expression of an essential connection between current concerns about language and mind, and what he regards as…Read more
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1Elijah Millgram, ed., Varieties of Practical Reasoning Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 22 (5): 345-347. 2002.
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33Knowledge and True Belief in Early Analytic PhilosophySouth African Journal of Philosophy 31 (3): 576-599. 2012.I argue that the sufficiency of true belief for knowledge was accepted by some principal figures in the early history of analytic philosophy, including Russell, Schlick, McTaggart, and Moore, among others
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66Confidence in unwarranted knowledgeErkenntnis 65 (2). 2006.Epistemic minimalism affirms that mere true belief is sufficient for propositional knowledge. I construct a taxonomy of some specific forms of minimalism and locate within that taxonomy the distinct positions of various advocates of minimalism, including Alvin Goldman, Jaakko Hintikka, Crispin Sartwell, Wolfgang Lenzen, Franz von Kutschera, and others. I weigh generic minimalism against William Lycan’s objection that minimalism is incompatible with plausible principles about relations between kn…Read more
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8Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 21 (3): 226-228. 2001.
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3Ruth Garrett Millikan, Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 25 (3): 198-200. 2005.
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52First-person belief and empirical certaintyPacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1): 118-136. 2010.This is a critical exposition and limited defence of a theory of first- person belief transiently held by Roderick Chisholm after giving up the early haecceity theory of Person and Object and before adopting the late self-attribution theory of The First Person. I reconstruct that 'middle' theory as involving what I call a 'hard-core' approach to de re belief and I rebut objections concerning epistemic supervenience and abnormal consciousness. In my rebuttals, I sketch a variant of the middle the…Read more