David Cernin

This paper focuses on the discipline of history, its methods, subject, and output. A brief overview of contemporary analytic philosophy of history is provided, followed by critical discussion of historical realism. It is argued that the insistence on the idea that historians inquire into the real past and that they refer to the actual past entities, events, or agents is widely open to sceptical objections. The concept of an abstract historical chronicle of past events which are explained or retold by historians is identified as misleading. The idea of historical antirealism is then introduced. It is argued that in the centre of historian’s attention are present phenomena that are identified as historical evidence and require historical explanation. Historical explanation consists of constituting an historical past—a fictional model that accounts for present data. The identification process of historical evidence and the discursive nature of historical enterprise are analysed and accompanied by several concrete examples. According to historical antirealism, historians are not interested in the real past, but in the present empirical data. In their pursuit of historical knowledge, they produce fictional models—an historical past. Lastly, several common caveats against historical antirealism are addressed. The historical antirealism is presented as a viable fictionalist account of the historical inquiry that is capable of avoiding sceptical attacks on historical method and it is argued that antirealism allows history to retain its worth as a distinctive kind of scientific discipline.

This paper examines the methodological propositions of Quentin Skinner, whose influence on intellectual history, including the history and philosophy of science (HPS), cannot be disregarded. It is well known that Skinner’s method is based on John L. Austin’s theory of speech acts. Nonetheless, the very idea of applying ordinary language philosophy to the subject matter of history rests on other assumptions that form Skinner’s philosophy of historiography. The paper focuses on reconstructing this philosophy of historiography and especially on R. G. Collingwood as a primary source of inspiration. This famous British philosopher, historian, and archaeologist authored many inspirational texts concerning the historical craft. The complex and sometimes contradictory structure of his posthumously published texts requires careful interpretation, and many philosophers see Collingwood as an obscure thinker. The paper argues that even though Skinner openly denounces Collingwood’s central concept of re-enactment, his philosophy of historiography is deeply influenced by a specific understanding of Collingwood’s legacy.

Autonomy of history and historiography may rest on a claim that their method is substantially different from methods of other historical sciences and science itself. History, therefore, becomes subject of specific kind of research. But that does not mean that we cannot use terms of philosophy of science to describe actual practice of historians. The aim of philosophy of historiography, according to its proponents, should be explanation of how historians of different kinds reach their conclusions. In doing so we may discover that line which separates history from science is rather blurry. This paper is trying to argue that anti-realist model of inquiry from philosophy of science may be the best way to explain methods of history and their development, although it may pose some new difficulties.

Knowledge of philosophy is commonly imparted in various philosophy courses, and the teaching process may take multiple forms, ranging from a historical overview to interdisciplinary approaches. However, the theoreticians of education across different subjects and disciplines often turn to philosophy, and they adopt some philosophical assumptions about their field to set up warranted goals and methods of teaching, delineate subject matter, and identify skills they hope to impart. Due to this process involving lengthy theoretical discussions and intellectual exchanges, teachers pass on specific philosophical attitudes even if they are not explicitly teaching philosophy. This paper examines an intersection between history education and philosophy in particular. The focus is on philosophical theories of history that history educators directly address. The paper navigates a specific roadmap portraying the development of the philosophical approaches to the knowledge of the past, discusses diverging traditions, and shows their potential contribution to reaching educational goals.

Jaká je role historie v době post-faktické? Může nám filosofie historie pomoci bránit se proti cílenému zneužívání historických narativů na ideologickém základě? Tento článek zkoumá filosofické reflexe historie a jejich vztah k ideologiím. Je ukázáno, že na počátku této filosofické disciplíny filosofové jako Karl Popper nebo C. G. Hempel usilovali o eliminaci politického a ideologického zabarvení historie. Avšak narativistické bádání Haydena Whita naznačuje, že takový cíl je nedosažitelný. Antirealistická filosofie historie, zastoupena L. J. Goldsteinem, dokonce odmítá reálnou minulost jako cíl historického bádání a zdůrazňuje situovanost historiků ve vztahu k důkazům. Představená verze historického antirealismu chápe historii jako současné zkoumání, které sdílí řadu rysů s kritickým myšlením a zaměřuje se především na zkoumání empirických dat, jež vyžadují postulaci nepřístupné minulosti. Tato podobnost by měla být zdůrazněna skrze výuku historie jako zkoumání, nikoliv jako pouhého příběhu.