-
Property dualists shouldn't be nominalists about propertiesInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.Substance dualism is the view that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substances: physical and mental. By contrast, according to property dualism there is only one kind of substance (physical) but two fundamentally different kinds of properties: physical and mental. Property nominalism is the view that there are neither repeatable nor non-repeatable fundamentally predicable entities (i.e. neither universals nor tropes) and that things being a certain way or being related in a certain…Read more
-
Pregnant ThinkersPhilosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.Do pregnant mothers have fetuses as parts? According to the “parthood view” they do, while according to the “containment view” they don’t. This paper raises a novel puzzle about pregnancy: if mothers have their fetuses as parts, then wherever there is a pregnant mother, there is also a smaller thinking being that has every part of the mother except for those that overlap with the fetus. This problem resembles a familiar overpopulation puzzle from the personal identity literature, known as the “T…Read more
-
ModalityIn Michael J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, Routledge. pp. 348-360. 2020.
-
Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest (eds.): Reality and Its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 17. 2019.
Tel Aviv, Israel
Areas of Specialization
11 more
Areas of Interest
17 more