•  55
    Husserl’s Identification of Meaning and Noema
    The Monist 59 (1): 115-132. 1975.
    This essay is a study of Edmund Husserl’s conception of meaning. In this first section we indicate its importance for his conception of phenomenology. In Section 2 we see that Husserl’s conception of linguistic meaning, of its nature as “ideal” and its role in mediating reference, is almost exactly that of his contemporary Gottlob Frege. In Sections 3 and 4 we further argue that, for Husserl, linguistic meaning and noematic Sinn are one and the same. For, according to Husserl, every linguistic m…Read more
  •  252
    What's the meaning of 'this'?
    Noûs 16 (2): 181-208. 1982.
    "This is a sea urchin", I declare while strolling the beach with a friend. What do I refer to by uttering the demonstrative pronoun "this"? The object immediately before me, of course. As it happens on this occasion, the object in the sand at my feet. I may point at it to aid my hearer - or I may not. BUt now , if the meaning of the term is distinguished from the referent, what is the meaning of this, or of my utterance of this? I think we can distinguish the meaning of this, or of its utterance…Read more
  • Book reviews (review)
    with Gary Watson and Mike W. Martin
    Topoi 1 (1-2): 58-67. 1982.
  •  21
    The Several Factors of Consciousness
    Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3): 291-302. 2016.
    : In prior essays I have sketched a “modal model” of consciousness. That model “factors” out several distinct forms of awareness in the phenomenological structure of a typical act of consciousness. Here we consider implications of the model à propos of contemporary theories of consciousness. In particular, we distinguish phenomenality from other features of awareness in a conscious experience: “what it is like” to have an experience involves several different factors. Further, we should see thes…Read more
  •  26
    The Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking
    In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. 2011.
  •  60
    The realism in perception
    Noûs 16 (1): 42-55. 1982.
    Initially, Realism is related to perception and its intentionality, And perception is analyzed as a form of acquaintance, Or intuition, A direct cognitive relation to its object. Then several commitments to realism are detailed in the phenomenological content of everyday perception. At issue is internal, As opposed to external, Realism, In a sense defined. The demonstrative content of perception (i see "this object (visually before me)") contains a commitment to a causal relation between the per…Read more
  •  51
    The ins and outs of perception
    Philosophical Studies 49 (March): 187-211. 1986.
  •  73
    Three facets of consciousness
    Axiomathes 12 (1-2): 55-85. 2001.
    Over the past century phenomenology has ably analyzed the basic structuresof consciousness as we experience it. Yet recent philosophy of mind, lookingto brain activity and computational function, has found it difficult to makeroom for the structures of subjectivity and intentionality that phenomenologyhas appraised. In order to understand consciousness as something that is bothsubjective and grounded in neural activity, we need to delve into phenomenologyand ontology. I draw a fundamental distin…Read more
  •  16
    The Circle of Acquaintance. Perception, Consciousness and Empathy
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 994-997. 1989.
  •  45
    The cogito circa ad 2000
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (3). 1993.
    What are we to make of the cogito (cogito ergo sum) today, as the walls of Cartesian philosophy crumble around us? The enduring foundation of the cogito is consciousness. It is in virtue of a particular phenomenological structure that an experience is conscious rather than unconscious. Drawing on an analysis of that structure, the cogito is given a new explication that synthesizes phenomenological, epistemological, logical, and ontological elements. What, then, is the structure of conscious thin…Read more
  •  57
    The body, merleau-ponty claimed, carries a unique form of intentionality that is not reducible to the intentionality of thought. i propose to separate several different forms of intentionality concerning such ``bodily intentionality'': awareness of one's body and bodily movement; purposive action; and perception of one's environment in acting. these different forms of awareness are interdependent in specific ways. no one form of intentionality--cognitive or practical--is an absolute foundation f…Read more
  •  23
    Thoughts
    Philosophical Papers 19 (November): 163-189. 1990.
    No abstract
  •  2
    Review: Robert S. Tragesser, Phenomenology and Logic (review)
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 46 (1): 166-167. 1981.
  •  9
    Réponses à mes critiques
    Philosophiques 36 (2): 619-645. 2009.
  •  12
    This chapter, which is concerned with the phenomenology of perception, especially the role of content and context in the intentionality of perception, tries to provide an account of the structure of perceptual experience and its intentional relation to its objects. In particular, it presents an analysis of consciousness and intentionality in perception. Perceptual experience is sensuous and paradigmatically intentional. The intentional character of a visual experience of an object is different t…Read more
  •  14
    “Pure” logic, ontology, and phenomenology
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 2 21-44. 2003.
  •  10
    Précis de Husserl
    Philosophiques 36 (2): 579-582. 2009.
  •  4
    Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (review)
    Philosophical Topics 12 (2): 288-294. 1981.
  •  64
    Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience from the first-person point of view. Husserl used principles of formal ontology even as he bracketed the natural-cultural world in describing our experience, and Heidegger pursued fundamental ontology in his variety of phenomenology describing our own modes of existence. I shall address the role of ontology in phenomenology, and vice versa. Our account of what exists depends on our account of what and how we experience. But, moreover, our unders…Read more
  •  123
    Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (edited book)
    Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005.
    Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionali…Read more
  •  65
    Philosophy and the mirror of nature
    Philosophical Topics 12 (2): 288-294. 1981.
  •  11
    Ontological Phenomenology
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 7 243-251. 2000.
    Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience from the first-person point of view. Husserl used principles of formal ontology even as he bracketed the natural-cultural world in describing our experience, and Heidegger pursued fundamental ontology in his variety of phenomenology describing our own modes of existence. I shall address the role of ontology in phenomenology, and vice versa. Our account of what exists depends on our account of what and how we experience. But, moreover, our unders…Read more