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"Introduction"In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
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21Parfit's Case against SubjectivismIn Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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3Bridging the gap: Children's developing inferences about objects' labels and insides from causality-at-a-distanceIn B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society., Cognitive Science Society. pp. 64--70. 2008.
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10. Tara Smith, Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist Tara Smith, Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist (pp. 394-397) (review)In John Hawthorne (ed.), Ethics, Wiley Periodicals. 2004.
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261Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desireAnalysis 61 (1): 44-53. 2001.The authors argue against direction of fit accounts of the distinction between belief and desire.
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17Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 9 (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2023.This is Volume 9 of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. It contains papers on democracy, the law, political liberalism, voting, social experimentation, state neutrality, equality and incentives, self-ownership, drugs and prostitution, and Lincoln. Chapters include: “Challenging Democratic Commitments: On Liberal Arguments for Instrumentalism About Democracy” (Daniel Viehoff); “Emotional Abuse and the Law” (Elizabeth Brake); “Practical Political Liberalism” (Caleb Perl); “Beyond the Voting De…Read more
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21Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 7 (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2021.This is the seventh volume of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. The series aims to publish some of the best contemporary work in the vibrant field of political philosophy and its closely related subfields, including jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war theory.
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189A robust hybrid theory of well-beingPhilosophical Studies 178 (9): 2829-2851. 2020.This paper articulates and defends a novel hybrid account of well-being. We will call our view a Robust Hybrid. We call it robust because it grants a broad and not subservient role to both objective and subjective values. In this paper we assume, we think plausibly but without argument, that there is a significant objective component to well-being. Here we clarify what it takes for an account of well-being to have a subjective component. Roughly, we argue, it must allow that favoring attitudes t…Read more
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18Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, vol. 6 (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2020.This is the sixth volume of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. The series aims to publish some of the best contemporary work in the vibrant field of political philosophy and its closely related subfields, including jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war theory
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70Parfit's Case against Subjectivism 1Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6. 2011.Derek Parfit, in On What Matters, argues that all subjective accounts of normative reasons for action are false. This chapter focuses on his “Agony Argument.” The first premise of the Agony Argument is that we necessarily have current reasons to avoid our own future agony. Its second premise is that subjective accounts cannot vindicate this fact. So, the argument concludes, subjective accounts must be rejected. This chapter accepts the first premise of this argument and that it is valid. The mai…Read more
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5Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 6 (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2020.This is the sixth volume of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. The series aims to publish some of the best contemporary work in the vibrant field of political philosophy and its closely related subfields, including jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war theory
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314The Point of Self-OwnershipIn David Schmidtz & Carmen Pavel (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Freedom, Oup Usa. pp. 124-40. 2016.I examine what the point of self-ownership might best be thought to be.
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1149The Ethics of Eating MeatPhilosophic Exchange 46 (1). 2017.I explore the ethical issues involved in eating meat.
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329How to be a SubjectivistIn Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, Routledge. 2020.Subjectivism, desires, reasons, well-being, ethics
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512"Understanding the Demandingness Objection"In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism, Oup Usa. 2020.This paper examines possible interpretations of the Demandingness Objection as it is supposed to work against Consequentialist ethical theories.
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143The Case for Stance Dependent ReasonsJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (2). 2019.Many philosophers maintain that neither one’s reasons for action nor well-being are ever grounded in facts about what we desire or favor. Yet our reasons to eat a flavor of ice cream we like rather than one we do not seem an obvious counter-example. I argue that there is no getting around such examples and that therefore a fully stance independent account of the grounding of our reasons is implausible. At least in matters of mere taste our “stance” plays a normative role in grounding reasons.
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4Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 5 (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2019.This is the fifth volume of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. The series aims to publish some of the best contemporary work in the vibrant field of political philosophy and its closely related subfields, including jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war theory.
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3Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, vol. 2 (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2016.This is the second volume of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Since its revival in the 1970s political philosophy has been a vibrant field in philosophy, one that intersects with jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war theory. OSPP aims to publish some of the best contemporary work in political philosophy and these closely related subfields. The papers in this volume address a range of central topics and represent cutting edge wo…Read more
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17Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 3 (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2017.This is the third volume of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. The series aims to publish some of the best contemporary work in the vibrant field of political philosophy and its closely related subfields, including jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war theory.
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53Morality, Normativity, and Society, David Copp. Oxford University Press, 1995, xii + 262 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 14 (2): 349. 1998.
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630Pain for objectivists: The case of matters of mere tasteEthical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4). 2005.Can we adequately account for our reasons of mere taste without holding that our desires ground such reasons? Recently, Scanlon and Parfit have argued that we can, pointing to pleasure and pain as the grounds of such reasons. In this paper I take issue with each of their accounts. I conclude that we do not yet have a plausible rival to a desire-based understanding of the grounds of such reasons.
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1IntroductionIn David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
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496Advice for Non-analytical NaturalistsIn Martina Herrmann (ed.), Reading Parfit, Springer Netherlands. pp. 153-171. 1998.We argue that Parfit's "Triviality Objection" against some naturalistic views of normativity is not compelling. We think that once one accepts, as one should, that identity statements can be informative in virtue of their pragmatics and not only in virtue of their semantics, Parfit's case against naturalism can be overcome.
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184Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon’s Rationalistic Moral PsychologySocial Theory and Practice 28 (2): 243-76. 2002.
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252The Limits of the Explanatory Power of DevelopmentalismJournal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4): 517-527. 2010.Richard Kraut's neo-Aristotelian account of well-being, Developmentalism, aspires to explain not only which things are good for us but why those things are good for us. The key move in attempting to make good on this second aspiration involves his claim that our ordinary intuitions about what is good for a person can be successfully explained and systematized by the idea that what benefi ts a living thing develops properly that living thing's potentialities, capacities, and faculties. I argue th…Read more
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |