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2Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13, Oxford University Press. 2018.According to many, that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is a truism of normative discourse. This chapter argues that those committed to more specific moral, aesthetic, and epistemic supervenience theses should also hold (NS*): As a matter of conceptual necessity, whenever something has a normative property, it has a base property or collection of base properties that metaphysically necessitates the normative one. My main aim is to show that none of the available arguments establish…Read more
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35Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13. 2018.According to many, that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is a truism of normative discourse. This chapter argues that those committed to more specific moral, aesthetic, and epistemic supervenience theses should also hold : As a matter of conceptual necessity, whenever something has a normative property, it has a base property or collection of base properties that metaphysically necessitates the normative one. The main aim in this chapter is to show that none of the available argumen…Read more
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52Thick ConceptsPhilosophy Compass 8 (8): 677-688. 2013.In ethics, aesthetics and increasingly in epistemology, a distinction is drawn between thick and thin evaluative concepts. A common characterisation of the distinction is that thin concepts have only evaluative content, whereas thick concepts combine evaluative and descriptive content. Because of this combination, it is again commonly thought that thick concepts have various distinctive powers including the power to undermine the distinction between fact and value. This paper discusses the accur…Read more
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24Depending on the ThickAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1): 197-220. 2017.The claim that the normative depends on the non-normative is just as entrenched in metanormative theory as the claim that the normative supervenes on the non-normative. It is widely held to be a genuine truism, a conceptual truth that operates as a constraint on competence with normative concepts. Call it the dependence constraint. I argue that this status is unwarranted. While it is true that the normative is dependent, it is not a genuine truism, or a conceptual truth, that it depends on the n…Read more
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'The Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalism and the Fact-Value Distinction'In Neil Sinclair (ed.), The Naturalistic Fallacy, Cambridge University Press. 2018.
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20Shapelessness and the thickEthics 121 (3): 489-520. 2011.This article aims to clarify the view that thick concepts are irreducibly thick. I do this by putting the disentangling argument in its place and then setting out what nonreductivists about the thick are committed to. To distinguish the view from possible reductive accounts, defenders of irreducible thickness are, I argue, committed to the claim that evaluative concepts and properties are nonevaluatively shapeless. This in turn requires a commitment to (radical) holism and particularism. Nonredu…Read more
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15Constructivism in Practical Philosophy By James Lenman and Yonatan ShemmerAnalysis 73 (4): 814-816. 2013.
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99Explanatory Indispensability Arguments in Metaethics and Philosophy of MathematicsIn Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability, Oxford University Press Uk. 2016.
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1Thick ConceptsIn Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 211-225. 2017.
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7Review: Pekka Väyrynen, The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics (review)Ethics 125 (3). 2015.
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2'It's evaluation, only thicker'In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts, Oxford University Press. 2013.
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Thick epistemic conceptsIn Conor Mchugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology, Oxford University Press. 2018.