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Group moral knowledgeIn Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology, Routledge. 2018.
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12The Epistemology of Groups, by Jennifer LackeyMind 132 (527): 908-917. 2021.On January 4th 1954, six major American tobacco companies ran a full-page advertisement in more than 400 newspapers titled A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smoker.
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47You Complete Me: Posthumous Works and Secondary AgencyJournal of Aesthetic Education 49 (4): 71-86. 2015.Many works are attributed to artists after their death, even when someone else has contributed substantively to the content of the work or when the work left by the artist is deemed incomplete by any standard of completion. Call these works posthumous works.1 Consider, for instance, Garden of Eden, Mysterious Stranger, Silmarillion, Symphony No. 10, Symphony No. 7, Sagrada Familia, the film A.I., Woyzeck, to name just a few. These are examples where..
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2Social ontologyIn Nancy Cartwright & Eleonora Montuschi (eds.), Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction, Oxford University Press. 2014.
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Group moral knowledgeIn Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology, Routledge. 2018.
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36The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility (edited book)Routledge. 2020.The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility comprehensively addresses questions about who is responsible and how blame or praise should be attributed when human agents act together. Such questions include: Do individuals share responsibility for the outcome or are individuals responsible only for their contribution to the act? Are individuals responsible for actions done by their group even when they don't contribute to the outcome? Can a corporation or institution be held morally respon…Read more
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93Advancing the ‘We’ Through NarrativeTopoi 38 (1): 211-219. 2019.Narrative is rarely mentioned in philosophical discussions of collective intentionality and group identity despite the fact that narratives are often thought important for the formation of action intentions and self-identity in individuals. We argue that the concept of the ‘we-narrative’ can solve several problems in regard to defining the status of the we. It provides the typical format for the attribution of joint agency; it contributes to the formation of group identity; and it generates grou…Read more
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92We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared AgencyPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2): 95-110. 2017.The basic approach to understanding shared agency has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have so…Read more
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154Epistemic Reactive AttitudesAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4): 353-366. 2017.Although there have been a number of recent discussions about the emotions that we bring with us to our epistemic endeavors, there has been little, if any, discussion of the emotions we bring with us to epistemic appraisal. This paper focuses on a particular set of emotions, the reactive attitudes. As Peter F. Strawson and others have argued, our reactive attitudes reveal something deep about our moral commitments. A similar argument can be made within the domain of epistemology. Our "epistemic …Read more
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72Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective ResponsibilityPhilosophical Explorations 6 (3): 218-234. 2003.The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes – attitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on – provide the justific…Read more
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182Learning to listen: Epistemic injustice and the childEpisteme 13 (3): 359-377. 2016.In Epistemic Injustice Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in his or her capacity as a knower. Fricker's examples of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit primarily involve gender, race, and class, in which individuals are given less credibility due to prejudicial stereotypes. We argue that children, as a class, are also subject to testimonial injustice and receive less epistemic credibility than they deserv…Read more
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78Groups as AgentsPolity. 2015.In the social sciences and in everyday speech we often talk about groups as if they behaved in the same way as individuals, thinking and acting as a singular being. We say for example that "Google intends to develop an automated car", "the U.S. Government believes that Syria has used chemical weapons on its people", or that "the NRA wants to protect the rights of gun owners". We also often ascribe legal and moral responsibility to groups. But could groups literally intend things? Is there such a…Read more
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44Co‐Authorship, Multiple Authorship, and Posthumous Authorship: A Reply to HickJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (3): 331-334. 2015.
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2Interpreting OrganizationsDissertation, The Ohio State University. 2002.In everyday discourse we often attribute intentional states to groups. These attributions are found not only in colloquial speech but also in the context of legal, moral, and social scientific research. Contemporary accounts of group intentionality have attempted to analyze these ascriptions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group. Although these accounts acknowledge that group intentional ascriptions are something more than mere metaphors, they do not typically acknowledg…Read more
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123Challenging Epistemic IndividualismProtoSociology 16 86-117. 2002.Contemporary analytic epistemology exhibits an individualistic bias. The standard analyses of knowledge found in current epistemological discussions assume that the only epistemic agents worthy of philosophical consideration are individual cognizers. The idea that collectives could be genuine knowers has received little, if any, serious consideration. This individualistic bias seems to be motivated by the view that epistemology is about things that go on inside the head. In this paper I challeng…Read more
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43Rejecting RejectionismProtoSociology 18 389-405. 2003.There is a small, but growing, number of philosophers who acknowledge the existence of plural subjects – collective agents that act in the world and are the appropriate subject of intentional state ascriptions. Among those who believe in collective agency, there are some who wish to limit the types of intentional state ascriptions that can be made to collectives. According to rejectionists, although groups can accept propositions, they cannot believe them. In this paper I argue that, given the c…Read more
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180Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective ResponsibilityPhilosophical Explorations 6 (3): 218-234. 2003.The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in "Freedom and Resentment" (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes - attitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on - provide the justific…Read more
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62Groups as Rational SourcesIn Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes & Marcel Weber (eds.), Collective Epistemology, Ontos. pp. 11-22. 2011.
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48An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousnessIn Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience, John Benjamins. pp. 88--231. 2012.
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28Symposia on Gender, Race and PhilosophyIn David Papineau (ed.), Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 5--1. 2009.
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65We Did It Again: A Reply to LivingstonJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2): 225-230. 2011.
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118We Did It: From Mere Contributors to CoauthorsJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (1): 23-32. 2010.
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150Alignment, Transactive Memory, and Collective Cognitive SystemsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1): 49-64. 2013.Research on linguistic interaction suggests that two or more individuals can sometimes form adaptive and cohesive systems. We describe an “alignment system” as a loosely interconnected set of cognitive processes that facilitate social interactions. As a dynamic, multi-component system, it is responsive to higher-level cognitive states such as shared beliefs and intentions (those involving collective intentionality) but can also give rise to such shared cognitive states via bottom-up processes. A…Read more
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25Comments on Jackman’s “Incompatibility Arguments and Semantic Self-Knowledge”Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (2): 51-54. 2007.
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164Naturalizing joint action: A process-based approachPhilosophical Psychology 25 (3): 385-407. 2012.Numerous philosophical theories of joint agency and its intentional structure have been developed in the past few decades. These theories have offered accounts of joint agency that appeal to higher-level states that are?shared? in some way. These accounts have enhanced our understanding of joint agency, yet there are a number of lower-level cognitive phenomena involved in joint action that philosophers rarely acknowledge. In particular, empirical research in cognitive science has revealed that w…Read more
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