Dena Shottenkirk

Henry Molaison, aged eighty-two, died at the end of 2008, and just after noon on exactly the first anniversary of his death, December 2, 2009, scientists began slicing his brain into 2,500 tissue samples. Known primarily in his lifetime as only H.M., he left his brain to science so that it could be dissected and digitally mapped – a gift much beloved by many scientists. An amnesiac in life, H.M. first rose to prominence in 1962 when Dr. Brenda Milner, a pioneer in the field of neuropsychology, demonstrated that though H.M. was severely amnesic and could not remember past activities, he could nevertheless learn certain habits. The experiment involved the now famous mirror drawing. This article, written by a philosopher/artist and a neuroscientist/neuroaesthetician, argues that artists are unable to verbally articulate thoughts about their own art practice for reasons similar to why H.M. could not. All memories are not stored in the same part of the brain. Different categories of memories i.e., semantic memory or procedural memory, are stored in different parts of the brain. We argue that the procedural memory is not readily accessible to semantic memory.

This volume addresses key questions related to how content in thought is derived from perceptual experience. It includes chapters that focus on single issues on perception and cognition, as well as others that relate these issues to an important social construct that involves both perceptual experience and cognitive activities: aesthetics. While the volume includes many diverse views, several prominent themes unite the individual essays: a challenge to the notion of the discreet, and non-temporal, unit of perception, a challenge to the traditional divide between perception and cognition, and a challenge to the traditional divide between unconscious and conscious intentionality. Additionally, the chapters discuss the content of perceptual experience, the value of traditional notions of content, disjunctivism, adverbialism, and phenomenal experience. The final section of essays dealing with perception and cognition in aesthetics features work in experimental aesthetics and unique perspectives from artists and gallerists working outside of philosophy. Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics is a timely volume that offers a range of unique perspectives on debates in philosophy of mind surrounding perception and cognition. It will also appeal to scholars working in aesthetics and art theory who are interested in the ways these debates influence our understanding of art. ists and gallerists working outside of philosophy. Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics is a timely volume that offers a range of unique perspectives on debates in philosophy of mind surrounding perception and cognition. It will also appeal to scholars working in aesthetics and art theory who are interested in the ways these debates influence our understanding of art.

The question regarding how to characterize aesthetics has been revived with the publication of Bence Nanay’s _Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception_. This paper takes seriously Dustin Stokes’ criticisms of Nanay’s book regarding Nanay’s inability to distinguish between ordinary expert visual tasks (e.g., sorting for sock color or ornithology) and aesthetic experience. Using empirical research on gist perception and its reliance on low-level features in visual experience, I develop a theory that distinguishes expert visual tasks and aesthetic experiences by differentiating two different kinds of distributed attention over properties. I argue that expert visual tasks are instances of property attribution in a mode of conscious attention, while aesthetics is a kind of distributed attention that significantly relies on the reiteration of gist-like lowlevel features. Gist, often referred to in visual science as “preattentive” mode, gives us a model to understand the perceptual processes that are specific to aesthetics. This comports with our common-sense definition of aesthetics as both distinguishable from ordinary expert visual tasks and an experience that makes prominent sensory aspects of visual experience.

What makes an artwork bring on the demands of censorship? Is it when it offends a majority of people, a significant minority, or just a few? And is it censorship when the work is denied all venues of exhibition or is it also censorship when it is denied public grants and/or exhibitions dependent on public funds i.e. in museums, but granted the right of private exhibition i.e. in commercial galleries?The article "Censorship, 'Decency' and Dollars" by Dena Shottenkirk deals with the thorny and difficult issues surrounding art censorship, and the political and aesthetic consequences of them. J.S. Mill's harm/offense distinction is sometimes used in such discussions regarding paternalism, but, even setting aside Mill's back-pedaling on public decency concerns, the harm/offense distinction is not the clear-cut one we'd often want in dealing with contemporary culture. How much of modernism's avant-garde would exist without tweaking the boundaries of harm and offense, and how dependent are our free speech rights on such cultural expressions? While hoping to defend the rights of perverse expression and - at the same time-democracy everywhere, the line drawn on what-gets-shown and who-gets-to-decide are tempestuous issues indeed.

Nelson Goodman’s disparate writings are often discussed and written about only within their own particular discipline, such that the epistemology is discussed in contrast to others’ epistemology, the aesthetics is contrasted with more traditional aesthetics, and the ontology and logic is viewed in opposition to both other contemporary philosophers and to his historical predecessors. This book argues that that is not an adequate way to view Goodman. The book is divided into three sections: The Metaphysics, The Epistemology, The Aesthetics. I demonstrate, firstly, the dependency of his epistemology and aesthetics on his early metaphysical and ontological writings, and secondly, that it is the very application of those metaphysical and ontological positions to the rest of his philosophical writings that is the source of much of which fails to be completely satisfactory in his aesthetics. They are sequential sections within each providing the ground rules for the next section and, furthermore, providing the reasons for limitations on the terms available to the subsequent section(s). Thus the Metaphysics is an explication of Gooodman’s basic nominalist ontology and logic, and it is upon those principles that he builds his epistemology. It is the sum of both the metaphysics and the epistemology, with the nominalist principle as the guiding force, which constructs the aesthetics. At the end of each section, the consequent limitations imposed on his terms and concepts available to him are explicated, such that, by the end of the book, I am able to delineate the constraints imposed upon the aesthetics by both the metaphysics and the epistemology.

This volume addresses key questions related to how content in thought is derived from perceptual experience. It includes chapters that focus on single issues on perception and cognition, as well as others that relate these issues to an important social construct that involves both perceptual experience and cognitive activities: aesthetics. While the volume includes many diverse views, several prominent themes unite the individual essays: a challenge to the notion of the discreet, and non-temporal, unit of perception, a challenge to the traditional divide between perception and cognition, and a challenge to the traditional divide between unconscious and conscious intentionality. Additionally, the chapters discuss the content of perceptual experience, the value of traditional notions of content, disjunctivism, adverbialism, and phenomenal experience. The final section of essays dealing with perception and cognition in aesthetics features work in experimental aesthetics and unique perspectives from artists and gallerists working outside of philosophy. Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics is a timely volume that offers a range of unique perspectives on debates in philosophy of mind surrounding perception and cognition. It will also appeal to scholars working in aesthetics and art theory who are interested in the ways these debates influence our understanding of art. ists and gallerists working outside of philosophy. Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics is a timely volume that offers a range of unique perspectives on debates in philosophy of mind surrounding perception and cognition. It will also appeal to scholars working in aesthetics and art theory who are interested in the ways these debates influence our understanding of art.

This is a book about the culture wars, particularly those in the U.S. To gain a more complete view of what they are and what is at stake, I examine the relationships between funding, censorship, and democracy by looking closely at particular examples where the government at least wanted to refuse funding (it sometimes in fact succeeded) and to then look at the issues that arise. The main examples I have chosen is Andres Serrano, whose Piss Christ helped many people’s blood pressure rise, and who, along with Robert Mapplethorpe, caused the late 1980s and early 1990s outcry over the National Endowment for the Arts. These are the instances that started the so-called culture wars more than two decades ago and it is in this form that they still exist today. This book is an attempt to rationally and completely examine the issues at hand and to finally set to rest the contentions that underlie the debates, not just in their current specific form in the United States, but in general. These are the philosophical issues, which include not only the obvious political concerns around demands for liberty, free speech, and the compromises inherent in social organizations, but the epistemological issues at the heart of art. What is it that we learn from art and why is the presence of culture so often beloved and a deprivation of it bereaved?