•  10
    Sorites Paradox
    with Dominic Hyde
    In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, . 2018.
  •  14
    Deeper into Pictures: An Essay on Pictorial Representation
    with Flint Schier
    Philosophical Review 98 (4): 576. 1989.
  •  38
    The Meaning of Music
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1): 360-377. 1991.
  •  35
    Transvaluationism: Comments on Horgan
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1): 127-132. 1995.
  •  177
    On the persistence of phenomenology
    In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. 1995.
    In Thomas Metzinger, Conscious Experience, Schoningh Verlag. 1995. [ online ]
  •  211
    accounts in general, contrary to what he seems to think. Stanley’s discussion concerns the dynamic or ‘forced march’ version of the sorites, viz. the version framed in terms of the judgments that would be made by a competent speaker who proceeds step by step along a sorites series for a vague predicate ‘F’. According to Stanley, the contextualist treatment of the paradox is based on the idea that the speaker shifts the content of the predicate whenever necessary to make it the case that each suc…Read more
  •  7
    Commentary: Transvaluationism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement): 127-127. 1994.
  •  40
    Responses to Discussants
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2): 483-501. 2015.
  •  11
    Language, Music and Mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3): 734-737. 1993.
  •  92
    Even zombies can be surprised: A reply to Graham and Horgan
    Philosophical Studies 122 (2): 189-202. 2005.
    In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” , George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the socalled Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look
  •  62
    Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience
    with Peter Kivy, Jerrold Levinson, and Malcolm Budd
    Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177): 503-518. 1994.
  •  32
    In Unruly Words, Diana Raffman advances a new theory of vagueness which, unlike previous accounts, is genuinely semantic while preserving bivalence. According to this new approach, called the multiple range theory, vagueness consists essentially in a term's being applicable in multiple arbitrarily different, but equally competent, ways, even when contextual factors are fixed.
  •  60
    Précis of Unruly Words: A Study of Vague Language
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2): 452-456. 2015.
  •  94
    Indiscriminability and phenomenal continua
    Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1): 309-322. 2012.
  •  97
    Can we do without concepts? (review)
    Philosophical Studies 149 (3). 2010.
  •  95
    Some Thoughts About Thinking About Consciousness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1): 163-170. 2005.
    David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness tells a skillful, inventive, and plausible story about why, given that the phenomenal character of conscious experience is an unproblematically physical property, we continue to suffer from “intuitions of dualism”. According to Papineau, we are misled by the peculiar structure of the phenomenal concepts we use to introspect upon that phenomenal character. Roughly: unlike physical concepts, phenomenal concepts exemplify the kind of experience they are…Read more
  •  33
    Philosophers of music (and also music theorists) have recognized for a long time that research in the sciences, especially psychology, might have import for their own work. (Langer 1941 and Meyer 1956 are good examples.) However, while scientists had been interested in music as a subject of research (e.g., Helmholtz 1912, Seashore 1938), the discipline known as psychology of music, or more broadly cognitive science of music, came into its own only around 1980 with the publication of several land…Read more
  •  39
    First-person authority and the internal reality of beliefs
    In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the internal reality of beliefs. First-person authority (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford University Press. 1998.
  • The thesis develops a cognitivist account of the supposed ineffability of musical experience. It is contended that, when the ineffability is viewed as adhering to a certain kind of perceptual knowledge of a musical signal, its nature can be illuminated by the adoption of a recent cognitivist theory of perception in conjunction with a generative grammar for tonal music . On this two-headed view, music perception consists in a rule-governed process of computing a series of increasingly abstract me…Read more
  •  145
    Vagueness and context-relativity
    Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3). 1996.
    This paper develops the treatment of vague predicates begun in my "Vagueness Without Paradox" (Philosophical Review 103, 1 [1994]). In particular, I show how my account of vague words dissolves an "eternal" version of the sorites paradox, i.e., a version in which the paradox is generated independently of any particular run of judgments of the items in a sorites series. In so doing I refine the notion of an internal contest, introduced in the earlier paper, and draw a distinction within the class…Read more
  •  64
    Relativism, Retraction, and Evidence
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1): 171-178. 2016.
  •  125
    Is twelve-tone music artistically defective?
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 27 (1). 2003.
    Worries about the artistic integrity (for lack of a better term) of twelve-tone music are not new. Critics, philosophers, musicians, even composers them- selves have assailed the idiom with a fervor usually reserved for individual artists or works. Just why it is supposed to be defective is not entirely clear, however. I want to revisit these questions by way of putting some insights from music history and theory together with some insights from the philosophy and psychology of music. To find out…Read more
  •  118
    Demoting higher-order vagueness
    In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press. pp. 509--22. 2009.
    Higher-order vagueness is widely thought to be a feature of vague predicates that any adequate theory of vagueness must accommodate. It takes a variety of forms. Perhaps the most familiar is the supposed existence, or at least possibility, of higher-order borderline cases—borderline borderline cases, borderline borderline borderline cases, and so forth. A second form of higherorder vagueness, what I will call ‘prescriptive’ higher-order vagueness, is thought to characterize complex predicates co…Read more
  •  47
    Language, Music and Mind
    Philosophical Review 106 (4): 641. 1997.
    The central point of Raffman’s discussion is to distinguish the perception, knowledge, and effability of the standard chromatic “categorical” pitch events from what she calls “nuance” pitch events—events whose individuation is more fine-grained than C-events, and which seem to resist reliable, psychologically available categorization. Thus, two pitches a quarter-tone apart may be classified as the same C-event, even though they are different N-events. Experimental evidence suggests that whereas …Read more
  •  40
    Toward a cognitive theory of musical ineffability
    Review of Metaphysics 41 (4): 685-706. 1988.
    DESPITE CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES OF IDEOLOGY, objective, and style, these theorists join in giving voice to what is perhaps the most deeply rooted conviction in modern aesthetics: that aesthetic experience is, in some essential respect, ineffable. In apprehending a work of art we come to know something we cannot put into words.
  • Marcus, Ruth Barcan
    with G. Schumm
    In Donald Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Simon and Schuster Macmillan. pp. 322--323. 1996.
  •  100
    Representationalist solutions to the qualia problem are motivated by two fundamental ideas: first, that having an experience consists in tokening a mental representation1; second, that all one is aware of in having an experience is the intentional content of that representation. In particular, one is not aware of any intrinsic features of the representational vehicle itself. For example, when you visually experience a red object, you are aware only of the redness of the object, not any redness o…Read more