Diogo Carneiro

Portuguese: Thomas Nagel propõe uma conceção de objetividade que ele designada por “a perspetiva de lado nenhum”. Dependendo da área de conhecimento à qual será aplicada, esta perspetiva tem como requisito diferentes níveis de distanciamento de posições subjetivas. Todavia, de acordo com Jonathan Dancy e Alan Thomas, Nagel propõe dois modelos diferentes de objetificação, em vez de apenas um. Partindo das inter- pretações destes autores, mas acabando por divergir deles, proponho que estes dois modelos de objetificação são, na verdade, semelhantes. O elemento fundamental para chegar a esta conclusão está no significado que “reflexão crítica” tem em cada um dos modelos. Neste artigo, argumento que “reflexão crítica” tem apenas um significado: distanciamento. Consequentemente, concluirei que a conceção de objetividade proposta por Nagel terá que ser entendida como excluindo perspetivas subjetivas. Mais especificamente, concluirei que esta conceção requer distanciamento absoluto de perspetivas subjetivas, independentemente da área de conhecimento em consideração. /////// English: Thomas Nagel defends a conception of objectivity as the view from nowhere. This view, ideally, would require different degrees of detachment from subjective positions, depending on the area of knowledge to which it would be applied. However, in doing this, and according to Jonathan Dancy and Alan Thomas, Nagel formulates two different models of objectification. Starting from these authors’ interpretations, but essentially diverging from them, I argue that the two models of objectification are, in fact, similar. The key element to reach this conclusion is the meaning of “critical reflection” in each one of the models. Given my argument that “critical reflection” has only one meaning – detachment –, Nagel’s conception of objectivity cannot include subjective perspectives in it; in fact, it requires absolute detachment from those subjective perspectives, independently of the area of knowledge being considered.

What is it to be objective in our evaluations of claims of social justice? What should be that standard that determines what is the correct use of reason regarding what is just? As an answer to these questions, in this dissertation I propose an alternative conception of objectivity: objectivity as trans-positionality. My argument is the following: in order for our evaluations of justice to be objective, there are normative reasons of justice conditioned by one’s social, historical, cultural, and biological contingencies that we need to consider. My proposal is that objectivity comes from our capacity to consider some of these reasons to be relevant across positions: reasons are objective across positions when we can take them to be trans-positional, by engaging in a process of scrutiny involving all the reasons we need to consider at the positional level. In other words, objectivity as trans-positionality corresponds to the process of scrutiny that will allow us to move from what is normative and objective at the positional level to what is normative and objective at the trans-positional level. Those reasons that can survive trans-positional scrutiny will be trans-positionally objective reasons. But in order to be objective in the sense just described, we need to know how we achieve objective evaluations. Namely, I argue, we are to participate in the exercise of trans-positional scrutiny by engaging with other positions — rather than detaching from them. That means that we need to engage in forms of scrutiny that involve getting to know and understand as best as possible the positions and reasons we are scrutinising. My argument will be that we should do this by 1) using diverse forms of communication with others while including as many positions as possible in that exercise; and 2) trying to know and understand other positions via imaginative perspectivetaking.

Nesta comunicação exploro aquele que deve ser o objecto e o âmbito de uma teoria de justiça. Da resposta a estas duas questões depende a possibilidade de definir princípios de justiça que concebam uma sociedade justa. Assim, tenho em consideração as propostas sobre o objecto e o âmbito da justiça presentes nas teorias de Nozick (libertária), de Rawls (igualitária) e de Walzer (comunitária) e avalio topicamente cada uma das posições. Concluo tentando responder à questão: qual deve ser o objecto e o âmbito de uma teoria de justiça?