-
6Wann immer wir etwas sehen, horen, fuhlen oder riechen, erscheint uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es, dass jemandem etwas erscheint? Was ist der mentale Zustand, in dem sich jemand befindet, wenn ihm etwas erscheint (der Zustand des Erscheinens)? Diese nur scheinbar harmlose Frage steht im Zentrum der vorliegenden Untersuchung. Die Antwort, die verteidigt wird, lautet: Zustande des Erscheinens sind ihrem Wesen nach transparent. D. h. in einem Zustand des Erscheinens sind dem Subjekt dieses Zustande…Read more
-
89Against modal dualismEuropean Journal of Philosophy 30 (2): 608-622. 2021.Modal dualism is the claim that there is a space of epistemically possible worlds that exceeds the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In the present paper, I argue that modal dualism is false. I do so via an argument that differs from most previous arguments against modal dualism in that it does not rely on controversial semantic or epistemological assumptions like descriptivism, internalism or modal rationalism. The point of my argument is, instead, that modal dualism is internally incons…Read more
-
27Correction to: Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and IntrospectionActa Analytica 1-1. forthcoming.
-
99John R. Searle: Thinking about the Real World (edited book)ontos/de Gruyter. 2010.John R. Searle is one of the world's leading philosophers. During his long and outstanding career, he has made groundbreaking and lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, to the philosophy of mind, as well as to the nature, structure, and functioning of social reality. This volume documents the 13th Münster Lectures on Philosophy with John R. Searle. It includes not only 11 critical papers on Searle's philosophy and Searle's replies to the papers, but also an original article by John…Read more
-
52Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and IntrospectionActa Analytica 36 (1): 63-85. 2020.Perceptual disjunctivism, as I regard it in this paper, is the view that veridical perceptions and hallucinations, while indistinguishable via introspection, are states of fundamentally different kinds. This fundamental difference can be spelled out in various ways. According to the view I will be concerned with, it is a fundamental difference in the personal-level structure of both states. Against this version of disjunctivism, I will raise a new challenge. It is a variant of what can be seen a…Read more
-
73Against Foundationalism about Persistence-ConditionsKriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (1): 1-26. 2018.In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions. The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object’s physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments – the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions – which show that this view is untenable. These…Read more
-
47Descriptivism Without QuotationTopoi 39 (2): 367-379. 2020.Current descriptivist accounts of proper names entail two claims: that the expressions we know as different proper names are the bearers of different meanings and that the descriptions corresponding to these meanings contain quotations of the expressions whose meanings they are taken to be. While is the source of a number of intractable problems, descriptivists feel committed to it because it is the only available option to adhere to, which they use to take as a matter of course. In the present …Read more
-
7Das Wesen des Erscheinens: Eine Untersuchung über Phänomenales Bewusstsein und die Intentionalität der ErfahrungDissertation, Münster. 2014.Wann immer wir etwas sehen, hören, fühlen oder riechen, erscheint uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es, dass jemandem etwas erscheint? Was ist der mentale Zustand, in dem sich jemand befindet, wenn ihm etwas erscheint (der Zustand des Erscheinens)? Diese nur scheinbar harmlose Frage steht im Zentrum der vorliegenden Untersuchung. Die Antwort, die verteidigt wird, lautet: Zustände des Erscheinens sind ihrem Wesen nach transparent. D. h. in einem Zustand des Erscheinens sind dem Subjekt dieses Zustande…Read more
-
The apriorists returnIn Marie I. Kaiser & Ansgar Seide (eds.), Philip Kitcher – Pragmatic Naturalism., Ontos. pp. 15--129. 2013.
-
1121The Argument from Pain: A New Argument for Indirect RealismGrazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 93 (1). 2016.The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from pain. The argument is akin to a well-known traditional argument to the same end, the argument from hallucination. Like the latter, it contains one premise stating an analogy between veridical perceptions and certain other states and one premise stating that those states are states of acquaintance with sense-data. The crucial difference is that the states that are said to be analogous to veridical per…Read more
-
Johannes Gutenberg University MainzAssistant Professor
-
University of HeidelbergRegular Faculty
Heidelberg, Baden-Württemberg, Germany
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy |
Phenomenology |