Donal Khosrowi

AI assistants are increasingly used for navigating and analysing the contents of major archives. Applying Retrieval Augmented Generation to existing large language models, these tools draw on indexes of the relevant archives to answer, in natural language, users’ questions. In addition to being powerful finding aids, archival AI assistants are also presented as being capable of providing useful, automated answers to questions about the past. This article argues that such tools and how they are marketed result in major conceptual disruptions and uncertainties, placing pressure on our understanding of a range of roles, forms of information, and outputs involved in the production of historical knowledge. In particular, we argue that these tools may obscure well-established beliefs that ‘sources’ and ‘archives’ are not unmediated, clearly navigable, or necessarily comprehensive, and that the processes by which these are used to write ‘history’ are by no means straightforward or instantaneous. With the aim of mitigating these misunderstandings, the article makes suggestions for how deployers could more carefully frame and describe the intended use of archival AI assistants (especially for public users), to ensure that their benefits for accessibility are exploited while also avoiding misconceptions and safeguarding rigorous historical practice.

This paper investigates how intuitions about scientific discovery using artificial intelligence can be used to improve our understanding of scientific discovery more generally. Traditional accounts of discovery have been agent-centred: they place emphasis on identifying a specific agent who is responsible for conducting all, or at least the important part, of a discovery process. We argue that these accounts experience difficulties capturing scientific discovery involving AI and that similar issues arise for human discovery. We propose an alternative, collective-centred view as superior for understanding discovery, with and without AI. This view maintains that discovery is performed by a collective of agents and entities, each making contributions that differ in significance and character, and that attributing credit for discovery depends on various finer-grained properties of the contributions made. Detailing its conceptual resources, we argue that this view is considerably more compelling than its agent-centred alternative. Considering and responding to several theoretical and practical challenges, we point to concrete avenues for further developing the view we propose.