Donald Bungum

Eleonore Stump has argued that the fulfilment of union between God and human beings requires a mode of relatedness that can be compared to joint attention, a phenomenon studied in contemporary experimental psychology. Stump’s account of union, however, is challenged by the fact that mother Teresa, despite her apparent manifestation of the love of God to others, herself experienced an interior ”dark night of the soul’ during which God seemed to be absent and to have rejected her completely. The dark night of the soul poses a problem for Stump’s account, since, if anyone had a union of divine love with God, it would seem that mother Teresa did. Nevertheless, I argue that the isolation and abandonment of mother Teresa’s dark night are contrary to the conditions assumed to be required for joint attention with God. As an alternative to Stump’s account, I suggest that the dark night of the soul might be better understood by reference to a combination of joint attention and blindsight, according to which interpersonal closeness might be realized through a consistent pattern of external actions without, however, a direct awareness of one person by the other.

This perceptive and engaging work proposes a new approach to philosophical theology. Rather than beginning with the metaphysics or epistemology of religion, Wynn proposes to begin with the nature of spiritual goods and the ways in which they are pursued, understood, and handed on within spiritual traditions. Wynn advances his discussion while relying heavily on Aquinas’s Thomistic notion of infused virtue. The result is a fresh take on the “hybrid” nature of spiritual goods, which order human beings to both God and the world. There are certainly some serious objections to the positions offered in this book, but the proposals are consistently insightful and interesting. In this review, I will focus on two key spiritual goods discussed by Wynn: (i) spiritual progress and (ii) faith.

The problem of eternal separation is the problem of explaining how someone could be happy in heaven while knowing that his beloved is in hell. Some argue that this problem is insoluble, while others try to solve it through the lover, the beloved, or the love between them. I argue that the problem of eternal separation is really three problems, namely, of suffering, separation, and regret. I show that no existing reply solves these problems simultaneously. I then present a new approach through theodicy. I argue that, if we reflect on what it would take to defeat the suffering from losing one’s beloved to hell, a regress emerges, and an adequate solution to the problem of eternal separation is a solution to this regress. I articulate five replies to the regress and evaluate their prospects. The upshot is a roadmap to defending the traditional Christian view of heaven and hell.