Douglas W. Portmore is Professor of Philosophy in the School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies at Arizona State University. Starting 2024, he'll be the Editor of Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political and Legal Philosophy. His research focuses mainly on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two, but he has also written on well-being, posthumous harm, moral responsibility, and the non-identity problem. His latest book entitled, Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options, came out with Oxford University Press in June of 2019. The book concerns what is, perhaps, the least controversial normative…
Douglas W. Portmore is Professor of Philosophy in the School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies at Arizona State University. Starting 2024, he'll be the Editor of Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political and Legal Philosophy. His research focuses mainly on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two, but he has also written on well-being, posthumous harm, moral responsibility, and the non-identity problem. His latest book entitled, Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options, came out with Oxford University Press in June of 2019. The book concerns what is, perhaps, the least controversial normative principle concerning action: you ought to perform your best option—that is, the option that is most highly favored by your reasons. The book sets aside substantive questions such as whether we have reason to promote our own good, promote the general good, abide by Kant’s categorical imperative, all of these, or none of these. Instead, it focuses on other issues, such as: What are our options? Which options do we assess directly in terms of how good they are and which do we assess in terms of their relations to other options? What do we hold fixed when assessing how good an option is? Do we, for instance, hold fixed the agent's present desires, beliefs, and intentions?