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5Free at last! Free at last! Thank evolution, free at last!Artificial Intelligence 169 (2): 165-173. 2005.
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2Using regression-match graphs to control search in planningArtificial Intelligence 109 (1-2): 111-159. 1999.
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11Planning: What it is, what it could be, an introduction to the special issue on planning and schedulingArtificial Intelligence 76 (1-2): 1-16. 1995.
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2Building large knowledge-based systems: Representation and inference in the cyc projectArtificial Intelligence 61 (1): 53-63. 1993.
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45What matters to a machineIn M. Anderson S. Anderson (ed.), Machine Ethics, Cambridge Univ. Press. pp. 88--114. 2011.
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54Review of Aristotle's Laptop: The Discovery of Our Informational Mind by Igor Aleksander and Helen Morton (review)International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (1): 45-48. 2014.Drew McDermott, Int. J. Mach. Conscious., 06, 45 (2014). DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400071.
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25Dodging the explanatory gap–or bridging itBehavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 518-518. 2007.Assuming our understanding of the brain continues to advance, we will at some point have a computational theory of how access consciousness works. Block's supposed additional kind of consciousness will not appear in this theory, and continued belief in it will be difficult to sustain. Appeals to to experience such-and-such will carry little weight when we cannot locate a subject for whom it might be like something
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266Artificial intelligence and consciousnessIn Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, Cambridge University Press. pp. 117--150. 2007.
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549Logic is useful as a neutral formalism for expressing the contents of mental representations. It can be used to extract crisp conclusions regarding the higher-order theory of phenomenal consciousness developed in (McDermott 2001, 20007). A key aspect of conscious perceptions is their connection to the distinction between appearance and reality. Perceptions must often be corrected. To do so requires that the logic of perception be able to represent the logical structure of judgment events, that i…Read more
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23A vehicle with no wheelsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 161-161. 1999.O'Brien & Opie's theory fails to address the issue of consciousness and introspection. They take for granted that once something is experienced, it can be commented on. But introspection requires neural structures that, according to their theory, have nothing to do with experience as such. That makes the tight coupling between the two in humans a mystery.
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40Erratum: "What does a Sloman want?"International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (2): 385-385. 2010.
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55Response to The Singularity by David ChalmersJournal of Consciousness Studies 19 (1-2): 1-2. 2012.
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117Artificial intelligence meets natural stupidityIn J. Haugel (ed.), Mind Design, Mit Press. pp. 5-18. 1981.
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13Mind and Mechanism (edited book)Yale University. 2001.An exploration of the mind-body problem from the perspective of artificial intelligence.
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21Optimization and connectionism are two different thingsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3): 483-484. 1989.
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Yale UniversityRegular Faculty
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |