Duncan Richter

This paper aims at explaining and defending some of Cora Diamond's thinking about the role of a kind of guides to thinking about ethics. Aids to thinking of this type can take a very general form but can also be applied in context‐sensitive ways. Maria Balaska has raised the question whether Diamond manages to avoid relativism. Oskari Kuusela also criticises Diamond, focussing on whether talk of human equality can be said to correspond to reality. I will consider these objections in turn and try to show that Diamond is not committed either intentionally or otherwise to relativism.

This paper aims to identify the main points that Peter Winch makes, or reminders that he offers, about understanding ourselves and others. It would no doubt be possible to construct a theory out of these ideas, but I try to avoid giving the impression that Winch does so. Instead, the most Wittgensteinian approach to the subject is, as Winch does, to describe, remind and thereby clarify, without putting forward any kind of questionable hypothesis. Winch's work brings out the fact that understanding people is importantly connected to both wisdom and practical being in tune with others, but identical with neither.

How, if at all, can we do moral philosophy in the light of the radical critique made by Elizabeth Anscombe in "Modern Moral Philosophy"? Among the principal theses of this essay is that ethical thinking suffers from a widespread appeal to incoherent uses of terms such as 'obligation,' 'ought,' 'right' and 'wrong.' I first explain and evaluate her thesis and the argument for it, and I then confront the challenge it poses: what ways are there of doing moral philosophy that avoid the kind of incoherence to which she has drawn our attention? The only way to show how it is possible for us to think about ethics is to demonstrate how to do so, using actual cases. The dissertation thus combines the critical study of central theoretical issues about ethics with concrete examination of serious practical issues . ;The first chapter deals directly with Anscombe's paper. In the next two, I examine the approaches to ethics recommended by other philosophers in the Wittgansteinian tradition to which Anscombe belongs: Sabina Lovibond, Renford Bambrough and Cora Diamond. A critique of Lovibond's Realism and Imagination in Ethics takes up the rest of chapter 2. Chapter 3 deals with Bambrough and Diamond. Drawing on their views, I suggest that moral philosophy should at least begin with an attempt to understand the facts relevant to central moral debates and issues. ;Chapter 4 focuses on the disagreement between the religious view of suicide as perhaps the ultimate sin and the non-religious view that suicide is often justified. I look at R. F. Holland's work as a good example of an attempt to understand the strengths and weaknesses of both sides of the divide. In a somewhat parallel way, chapter 5 is concerned with the abortion debate. Here I look sympathetically at recent attempts by Ronald Dworkin and Warren Quinn to find some ground away from the two familiar poles of the debate. I do not claim that such attempts are always successful, but the effort to understand what they involve is at least worthwhile

In this paper I contrast some widespread ideas about what Wittgenstein said about religious belief with statements Wittgenstein made about his purposes and method in doing philosophy, in order to argue that he did not hold the views commonly attributed to him. These allegedly Wittgensteinian doctrines in fact essentialize religion in a very un-Wittgensteinian way. A truly Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion can only be a personal process, and there can be no part in it for generalized hypotheses or conclusions about religion in general. Why is it that in this case I seem to be missing the entire point?1.

The idea that there is such a thing as Wittgensteinian foundationalism is a provocative one for two reasons. For one thing, Wittgenstein is widely regarded as an anti-foundationalist. For another, the very word `foundationalism' sounds like the name of a theory, and Wittgenstein famously opposed the advancing of theories and theses in philosophy. Nonetheless, in his book Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, Avrum Stroll has argued that Wittgenstein does indeed develop a foundationalist view in his final work, On Certainty. On this basis, Stroll goes on to argue against a number of contemporary views, including forms of relativism and scientism. In what follows I will examine what Stroll calls Wittgenstein's foundationalism (in Section 1) and argue that Stroll's reading of Wittgenstein, though original and interesting, is misguided in important ways and so cannot be used against the views he opposes (in Section 2). Finally, in Section 3, I offer a brief summary of the reading of Wittgenstein that I recommend.

In a debate between tolerance and intolerance one is disinclined to side with intolerance. Nevertheless that, in a sense, is what I want to do in this paper. The particular debate I have in mind is the old one between H.L.A. Hart and Patrick Devlin about the legal enforcement of moral values. It should be noted, though, that the issue has by no means been settled in the minds of many people. The proposed repeal of the British law prohibiting the promotion of homosexuality (a law known as Section 28) “could destroy Scottish society,” according to Mazhar Malik of Glasgow’s Ethnic Community Resource Centre, echoing Devlin’s concern from the 1960s. In what follows I will first sketch and defend, partially, what I take to be Devlin’s communitarian argument and then attempt to explain what is wrong with it and how this should affect our estimation of the proper relation between law and morals. I will argue that at least some private ‘immorality’ can be defended without recourse to the liberal belief in a morally private sphere. In part I I look at the kind of communitarianism that can be found in Devlin’s work, in part II I support this reading of Devlin and expand on it by looking at some important passages from his work, and in part III I consider the reasons why his argument does not support legislation against gay sex, and, in fact, could be used to defend gay rights.

There are intriguing hints in the works of Stanley Cavell and Stephen Mulhall of a possible connection between ethics and Wittgenstein’s remarks on private language, which are concerned with expressions of Empfindungen: feelings or sensations. The point of this paper is to make the case explicitly for seeing such a connection. What the point of that is I will address at the end of the paper. If Mulhall and Cavell both know their Wittgenstein and choose their words carefully, which I will take as given, then the (to me) irresistible inference is that they see a connection between Wittgenstein’s thoughts on ethics and his thoughts on private language. Yet this connection has not, as far as I know, been made explicit. Can it be? Should it be? These are my questions. Even if no one ever intended a connection between the “Lecture on Ethics” and the remarks on private language, those remarks do at least touch on issues raised in the lecture, and it is worth thinking about what the author of those remarks would say about the lecture. So in this paper I summarize the “Lecture on Ethics” (in part I), look at the private language remarks themselves (in part II), and then apply some ideas from these remarks to the “Lecture on Ethics” in part III. My conclusion will be that Wittgenstein’s later remarks are largely consistent with his earlier ones, the main difference being that some of what he first called nonsense he later called secondary meaning. One result of this change is that attempts to express the feelings that Wittgenstein regards as fundamental to ethics, aesthetics, and religion are first treated as doomed to result in nonsense but later as risky. Like cries of pain, they might or might not find a sympathetic audience.