•  26
    Kritik über Jedan (2000): Willensfreiheit bei Aristoteles?
    Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 7 (1): 243-249. 2002.
  •  5
    Aristotle's Political Virtues
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3 154-161. 1998.
    This paper argues that Aristotle conceives happiness not primarily as an exercise of virtue in private or with friends, but as the exercise of virtue in governing an ideal state. The best states are knit together so tightly that the interests of one person are the same as the interests of all. Hence, a person who acts for his or her own good must also act for the good of all fellow citizens. It follows that discussions of Aristotle’s altruism and egoism are misconceived.
  •  1
    Poetry, History, and Dialectic
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3 146-153. 1998.
    Twice in the Poetics, Aristotle contrasts poetry with history. Whatever its didactic value, the contrast has not seemed to readers of special philosophical interest. The aim of this paper is to show that this contrast is philosophically significant not just for our understanding of tragedy but also for the light it sheds on Aristotle’s overall methodology. I shall show how he uses the method sketched in the Topics to define tragedy and explain why the same method will not define history. In part…Read more
  • Uses the problem of the one and the many as a lens through which to examine the Central Books of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
  •  2
    Aristotle's Physics: A Guided Study (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 50 (3): 687-688. 1997.
    Joe Sachs has a refreshing and unusual view of Aristotle's Physics: he thinks that it is a physics. In contrast, most recent writers have seen the work as an exposition of the way nature is spoken and thought about, as metaphysics, or as an anticipation of modern physics. The reason the work is often misunderstood, Sachs maintains, is that translators render it into meaningless terms rooted in medieval Latin translations. Aristotle's own "philosophic vocabulary is... incapable of dogmatic use" b…Read more
  •  26
    Colloquium 2 The Metaphysics of the Syllogism
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 33 (1): 31-60. 2018.
    This paper addresses a central metaphysical issue that has not been recognized: what kind of entity is a syllogism? I argue that the syllogism cannot be merely a mental entity. Some counterpart must exist in nature. A careful examination of the Posterior Analytics’s distinction between the syllogism of the fact and the syllogism of the reasoned fact shows that we must set aside contemporary logic to appreciate Aristotle’s logic, enables us to understand the validity of the scientific syllogism t…Read more
  •  10
    Heraclitus and the Possibility of Metaphysics
    Review of Metaphysics 70 (3). 2017.
    Heraclitus is famous for affirming contradictions, though most readers do not regard the content of his fragments as contradictory. Examining fragments 1 and 50, this article argues that Heraclitus aims to assert a special class of contradictions, the intrinsic conflict between the content of any universal metaphysical claim and the assertion or reception of that claim. Such contradictions undermine the possibility of metaphysics as a science that knows all things. Second, the article argues tha…Read more
  •  8
    A Tale of Two Metaphysics: Alison Stone's Environmental Hegel
    Hegel Bulletin 26 (1-2): 1-12. 2005.
  •  8
    Hegel and the Problem of the Differentia
    Proceedings of the Hegel Society of America 10 191-202. 1990.
  • Unity in Aristotle's "Metaphysics"
    Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada). 1980.
    Since unity is always explained through something else, it is not primary; it is not the highest cause. Further, secondary unities are not understood through a primary "one"; rather, all ones are understood through being, actuality, etc. Hence, unlike being, unity is not a . In order that "one" function as it does in the Metaphysics it cannot be a . In the second part of the fourth chapter, I discuss Aristotle's definition of "one", and I argue that "one" is analogically defined. ;The final thre…Read more
  • Telos
    In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 1999.
  •  51
  •  8
    Form and Reason: Essays in Metaphysics
    State University of New York Press. 1993.
    Many of the essays have been presented, in early or shorter versions, at various conferences. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
  •  19
    Self-Relation in Hegel’s Science of Logic
    Philosophy Research Archives 7 89-133. 1981.
    This paper uses self-relation to reconstruct Hegel's reasoning in the Logic. In the sphere of "being," selfrelation is self-predication, and the predicate is the active, participial form of the category. Examining the first three and the last category in this sphere, I explain how Hegel argues that each category is itself engaged in the activity that it signifies. However, this self-predication adds new content to the category transforming it into a new category. Ultimately, this process leads t…Read more
  •  30
    Aristotle on the Convertibility of One and Being
    New Scholasticism 59 (2): 213-227. 1985.
  •  54
    Ackrill, Aristotle and Analytic Philosophy
    Ancient Philosophy 2 (2): 142-151. 1982.
  •  10
    The Logic of Art
    Proceedings of the Hegel Society of America 14 187-202. 2000.
  •  69
    Humor, Dialectic, and Human Nature in Plato
    Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2): 319-330. 2011.
    Drawing principally on the Symposium, this paper argues that humor in Plato’s dialogues serves two serious purposes. First, Plato uses puns and other devices to disarm the reader’s defenses and thereby allow her to consider philosophical ideas that she would otherwise dismiss. Second, insofar as human beings can only be understood through unchanging forms that we fail to attain, our lives are discontinuous and only partly intelligible. Since, though, the discontinuity between expectation and act…Read more
  •  67
    Spinoza on the Political Value of Freedom of Religion
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 21 (2): 167-182. 2004.
    The last chapter of Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise (TTP) is a brief for freedom of religion. In our enthusiasm for Spinoza's conclusion it is easy to overlook the blatant contradiction between this thesis and the central claim of the immediately preceding chapter that "right over matters of religion is vested entirely in the sovereign." There Spinoza emphasizes the necessity that there be but one sovereign in the state and the threat that autonomous religious authorities would pose to …Read more
  •  31
    Der unbewegte beweger Des aristoteles
    Ancient Philosophy 11 (2): 439-444. 1991.
  •  64
    Aristotle’s Rethinking of Philosophy
    Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 2 107-114. 2008.
    For Aristotle and other Greek thinkers, philosophy is itself a rethinking. There are other branches of knowledge, like medicine and mathematics, that each grasp some particular subject matter. Since philosophy or, as it has come to be called, metaphysics is the highest science, its job is to grasp somehow all the other sciences and all their subjects. If the science of a subject requires a type of thinking proper to the subject, then the science of that science requires a rethinking of this and …Read more
  •  41
    Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H
    Review of Metaphysics 46 (3): 625-627. 1993.
    Loux sets the stage with a discussion of ousia in the Categories. There, he claims, Aristotle maintained that "basic subjects" are ontologically fundamental, and the essence of each such subject is its species. Loux thinks that Aristotle was tacitly committed to the "intersection" of these two, which he terms the "unanalyzability principle": An ousia's falling under its species is a "primitive... fact about it... not susceptible of further ontological analysis".
  •  11
  •  12
    Metaphysics Z 4-5: An Argument from Addition
    Ancient Philosophy 6 (n/a): 91-122. 1986.
  •  49
    Klein on Aristotle on Number
    New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 11 271-281. 2011.
    Jacob Klein raises two important questions about Aristotle’s account of number: (1) How does the intellect come to grasp a sensible as an intelligible unit? (2) What makes a collection of these intelligible units into one number? His answer to both questions is “abstraction.” First, we abstract (or, better, disregard) a thing’s sensible characteristics to grasp it as a noetic unit. Second, after counting like things, we again disregard their other characteristics and grasp the group as a noetic …Read more