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A persons first metaphysicsIn Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker, Routledge. 2020.
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93Composition as identity: pushing forwardSynthese 198 (Suppl 18): 4595-4607. 2019.In this paper, I present the thesis of Composition as Identity as I think it should be understood, and reply to some objections to it. My aim is not to argue that CAI is true, but to show how CAI can be true, and push the debate forward in the direction I think it must and should go in light of some new objections.
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263Panpsychism, The Combination Problem, and Plural Collective PropertiesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2): 383-394. 2019.I develop and defend a version of panpsychism that avoids the combination problem by appealing to plural collective properties.
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174Divine FoundationalismPhilosophy Compass 13 (10). 2018.Divine Foundationalism is the thesis that God is the source of all things (apart from God hirself). I clarify and defend the thesis, before I consider the main arguments for and against it.
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55Against Hamri’s argument for the ultimate ground of beingInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (2): 233-236. 2018.In this paper, I reply to Hamri's new kind of cosmological argument for the ultimate ground of being by blocking the argument in more than one place.
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80Divine necessityPhilosophy Compass 12 (11). 2017.Divine necessity is the thesis that God must exist. In this paper, I give a brief survey of what the thesis is more exactly, the main arguments for it, and the main arguments against it.
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247The Logic of the TrinitySophia 50 (3): 363-374. 2011.Roughly, the problem of the Trinity is the problem of how God can be one and yet be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which are three, not one. That one thing is identical with three distinct things seems to violate traditional laws of identity. I propose a solution to this problem according to which it is just an ordinary claim of one-many identity. For example, one pair of shoes is identical with two shoes; and my one body is identical with its six limbs of arms, legs, head, and torso.…Read more
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911Normativity all the way down: from normative realism to pannormismSynthese 195 (9): 4107-4124. 2018.In this paper, I provide an argument for pannormism, the view according to which there are normative properties all the way down. In particular, I argue for what I call the trickling down principle, which says that if there is a metaphysically basic normative property, then, if whatever instantiates it has a ground, that ground instantiates it as well.
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270An argument against the necessity of unrestricted compositionAnalysis 69 (1): 27-31. 2009.Many metaphysicians accept the view that, necessarily, any collection of things composes some further thing. Necessarily, my arms, legs, head, and torso compose my body; necessarily, my arms, my heart, and the table compose something y; necessarily, my heart and the sun compose something z; and so on. 1 Though there have been a few recent attempts to argue against the necessity of this principle of unrestricted composition the consensus is that if it is true, it is necessarily true. 2In what fol…Read more
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897From Hume's Dictum Via Submergence to Composition as Identity or Mereological NihilismPacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1): 336-355. 2014.I show that a particular version of Hume's Dictum together with the falsity of Composition as Identity entails an incoherency, so either that version of Hume's Dictum is false or Composition as Identity is true. I conditionally defend the particular version of Hume's Dictum in play, and hence conditionally conclude that Composition as Identity is true. I end by suggesting an alternative way out for a persistent foe of Composition as Identity, namely mereological nihilism.
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186Andrew Schumann . Logic in Religious Discourse. Ontos, 2010European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2): 466-469. 2011.
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292Monism, Emergence, and Plural LogicErkenntnis 76 (2): 211-223. 2012.In this paper I argue that we need to take irreducibly plural logic more seriously in metaphysical debates due to the fact that the verdict of many metaphysical debates hangs on it. I give two examples. The main example I focus on is the debate recently revived by Jonathan Schaffer over the fundamental cardinality of the world. I show how the three main arguments provided by Schaffer are unsound in virtue of an employment of plural logic. The second example I give is a more general issue about t…Read more
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1160Indefinitely Descending GroundIn Ricki Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.), Reality and its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality, Oxford University Press. pp. 167-181. 2018.In this paper I argue against grounding being necessarily well-founded, and provide some reasons to think it's actually not well-founded.
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160Anselmian Theism and Indefinitely Extensible PerfectionPhilosophical Quarterly 62 (249): 671-683. 2012.The Anselmian Thesis is the thesis that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought. In this paper, I argue that such a notion of God is incoherent due to greatness being indefinitely extensible: roughly, for any great being that can be, there is another one that is greater, so there cannot be a being than which nothing greater can be. Someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best, because there is no perfect creature, and that it is always possible to produce one which wo…Read more
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590Composition as Identity and Plural Cantor's TheoremLogic and Logical Philosophy 25 (3). 2016.I argue that Composition as Identity blocks the plural version of Cantor's Theorem, and that therefore the plural version of Cantor's Theorem can no longer be uncritically appealed to. As an example, I show how this result blocks a recent argument by Hawthorne and Uzquiano.
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354Must there be a top level?Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235): 193-201. 2009.I first explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it is a proper part. I then explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it both is and has a proper part. Given two well recognized assumptions, I argue that both notions represent genuine metaphysical possibilities. Finally I consider, but dismiss, some possible objections.
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1029Unrestricted Composition as IdentityIn Donald Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity, Oxford University Press. pp. 143-65. 2014.In this paper I argue that composition as identity entails unrestricted composition. I also briefly consider a new take on the special composition question.
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146Composition as Identity: A Study in Ontology and Philosophical LogicDissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 2009.In this work I first develop, motivate, and defend the view that mereological composition, the relation between an object and all its parts collectively, is a relation of identity. I argue that this view implies and hence can explain the logical necessity of classical mereology, the formal study of the part-whole relation. I then critically discuss four contemporary views of the same kind. Finally, I employ my thesis in a recent discussion of whether the world is fundamentally one in number.
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1037Commentary on "Parts of Classes"Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 19. 2011.In this short piece I provide an interpretation of David Lewis' thesis of Composition as Identity.
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182The necessity of universalism versus the possibility of junky worlds: A rejoinderAnalysis 70 (2): 296-298. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
Einar Duenger Bohn
University Of Agder
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University Of AgderDepartment Of Religion, Philosophy And HistoryProfessor
Kristiansand, Vest-Agder, Norway
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