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Knowledge, algorithmic predictions, and actionAsian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 1-17. 2024.I discuss the epistemic status of algorithmic predictions in the legal realm. My main claim is that algorithmic predictions do not give us knowledge, not even probabilistic knowledge. The situation, however, is relevantly different from the one in which we find ourselves at the time of assessing statistical evidence in general, and it is rather related to the fact that algorithmic fairness in legal contexts is essentially undetermined. In the light of this, we have to settle for justified belief…Read more
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8A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective KnowledgeRevista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 35 (1): 177-183. 2009.
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68Confirmational Holism and Theory Choice: Arrow Meets DuhemMind 129 (513): 71-111. 2020.In a recent paper Samir Okasha has suggested an application of Arrow’s impossibility theorem to theory choice. When epistemic virtues are interpreted as ‘voters’ in charge of ranking competing theories, and there are more than two theories at stake, the final ordering is bound to coincide with the one proposed by one of the voters, provided a number of seemingly reasonable conditions are in place. In a similar spirit, Jacob Stegenga has shown that Arrow’s theorem applies to the amalgamation of e…Read more
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25Ungrounded Payoffs: A Tale of Perfect Love and HateJournal of Philosophy 119 (6): 293-323. 2022.I explore a game-theoretic analysis of social interactions in which each agent’s well-being depends crucially on the well-being of another agent. As a result of this, payoffs are interdependent and cannot be fixed, and hence the overall assessment of strategies becomes ungrounded. A paradigmatic example of this general phenomenon occurs when both players are ‘reflective altruists’, in a sense to be explained. I argue that ungroundedness cannot be captured by standard games with incomplete inform…Read more
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29El conocimiento grupal de agentes epistémicamente responsablesVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3): 460-482. 2015.Este trabajo examina el concepto de conocimiento grupal. Por un lado, se observa que a menudo nos vemos compelidos a atribuir a los agentes grupales actitudes epistémicas que difieren de las de sus miembros individuales; por otro lado, también notamos que los agentes idealmente responsables están sometidos a una “presión deflacionaria” para anclar tales actitudes en individuos concretos. En vistas de ello, argumento que los grupos epistémicamente esponsables deben concebirse como entidades dinám…Read more
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50In search of the best explanation about the nature of the Gene: Avery on pneumococcal transformationStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 39 (1): 65-79. 2008.In this paper I present a model of rational belief change, and I show how to use it to obtain a better insight into the debate about the nature of pneumococcal transformation, genes and DNA that took place in the forties, as a result of Oswald T. Avery’s work. The model offers a particular elaboration of the concept of inference to the best explanation, along decision theoretic lines. Within this framework, I distinguish different senses in which Avery’s team can be said to have proceeded with c…Read more
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24¿Cuándo preguntar "¿por qué?"?: Observaciones sobre la dinámica de las preguntas y respuestas en una investigación científicaAnálisis Filosófico 27 (2): 101-117. 2007.En este trabajo argumento a favor de la idea de que una explicación científica es una respuesta a una pregunta, aunque no necesariamente a una pregunta-por-qué. Esto no quiere decir que las preguntas-por-qué no sean elementos fundamentales de toda investigación científica: su importancia radica en que son capaces de organizar y sistematizar un conjunto dado de creencias. Para justificar esta afirmación, comienzo por identificar tres estadios básicos en los cuales pueden surgir preguntas-por-qué,…Read more
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96Lost in translation: unknowable propositions in probabilistic frameworksSynthese 194 (10): 3955-3977. 2017.Some propositions are structurally unknowable for certain agents. Let me call them ‘Moorean propositions’. The structural unknowability of Moorean propositions is normally taken to pave the way towards proving a familiar paradox from epistemic logic—the so-called ‘Knowability Paradox’, or ‘Fitch’s Paradox’—which purports to show that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are in fact known. The present paper explores how to translate Moorean statements into a probabilistic language. A succe…Read more
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7How DNA became an important moleculeIn Oscar Nudler (ed.), Controversy Spaces: A Model of Scientific and Philosophical Change, John Benjamins. pp. 14. 2011.
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73A Model for Structural Changes of BeliefStudia Logica 88 (3): 431-451. 2008.The paper suggests a way of modeling belief changes within the tradition of formal belief revision theories. The present model extends the scope of traditional proposals, such as AGM, so as to take care of “structural belief changes” – a type of radical shifts that is best illustrated with, but not limited to, instances of scientific discovery; we obtain AGM expansions and contractions as limiting cases. The representation strategy relies on a non-standard use of a semantic machinery. More preci…Read more
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19In search of the best explanation about the nature of the gene: Avery on pneumococcal transformationStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 39 (1): 65-79. 2008.
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23Conocimiento y entendimiento: discusiones sobre el concepto de valor epistémicoDianoia 56 (66): 165-177. 2011.En este trabajo se ofrece un comentario al artículo de Miguel Ángel Fernández sobre el veritismo y el valor del entendimiento publicado en Diánoia 65. En primer lugar, se observa que el veritismo descansa en una definición de valor epistémico que amenaza con trivializar toda la discusión. Luego se procede a examinar los argumentos de Fernández con cierto detalle. In this paper I comment on M.Á. Fernández's paper on veritism and the value of understanding. I begin by observing that veritism relie…Read more
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435Normas, virtudes y valores epistémicos: Ensayos de epistemología contemporánea (review)Análisis Filosófico 32 (1): 105-108. 2012.RESEÑAS. Margarita M. Valdés y Miguel Ángel Fernández (compiladores), Normas, virtudes y valores epistémicos. Ensayos de epistemología contemporánea, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, México, 2011, 550 pp.
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10How DNA became an important molecule Controversies at the origins of molecular biologyIn Oscar Nudler (ed.), Controversy Spaces: A Model of Scientific and Philosophical Change, John Benjamins. pp. 10--135. 2011.
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217Belief and contextual acceptanceSynthese 177 (1): 41-66. 2010.I develop a strategy for representing epistemic states and epistemic changes that seeks to be sensitive to the difference between voluntary and involuntary aspects of our epistemic life, as well as to the role of pragmatic factors in epistemology. The model relies on a particular understanding of the distinction between full belief and acceptance , which makes room for the idea that our reasoning on both practical and theoretical matters typically proceeds in a contextual way. Within this framew…Read more
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22EpistemologyIn Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte & Otávio Bueno (eds.), A Companion to Latin American Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. 2009.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Porchat Pereira and the Neo‐Pyrrhonian School Knowledge and Skepticism: The Legacy of Ezequiel de Olaso Luis Villoro and the Beginnings of Systematic Studies in Analytic Epistemology Current Analytic Epistemology in Latin America Acknowledgments References Further Reading.
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19How to be a Pragmatist without Surrendering to NaturalismContemporary Pragmatism 11 (1): 27-42. 2014.
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Creer, inferir y aceptar: una defensa de la inferencia a la mejor explicación apta para incrédulosRevista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 28 (2): 201-230. 2002.
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76Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary accountSynthese 195 (9): 3737-3753. 2018.According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for…Read more
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155A Defense of Temperate Epistemic TransparencyJournal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6): 923-955. 2012.Epistemic transparency tells us that, if an agent S knows a given proposition p , then S knows that she knows that p . This idea is usually encoded in the so-called KK principle of epistemic logic. The paper develops an argument in favor of a moderate version of KK , which I dub quasi-transparency , as a normative rather than a descriptive principle. In the second Section I put forward the suggestion that epistemic transparency is not a demand of ideal rationality, but of ideal epistemic respons…Read more