• Volition. Time to act : the dynamics of agentive experiences
    In Patrick Haggard & Baruch Eitam (eds.), The Sense of Agency, Oxford University Press Usa. 2015.
  •  17
    The purpose of this article is to explore the role commitments may play in shaping our sense of joint agency. First, we propose that commitments may contribute to the generation of the sense of joint agency by stabilizing expectations and improving predictability. Second, we argue that commitments have a normative element that may bolster an agent's sense of control over the joint action and help counterbalance the potentially disruptive effects of asymmetries among agents. Finally, we discuss h…Read more
  • Addressing joint action challenges in HRI: Insights from psychology and philosophy
    with Victor Fernandez Castro, Kathleen Belhassein, Amandine Mayima, Aurélie Clodic, Michèle Guidetti, Rachid Alami, and Hélène Cochet
    Acta Psychologica 222 (103476). 2022.
    The vast expansion of research in human-robot interactions (HRI) these last decades has been accompanied by the design of increasingly skilled robots for engaging in joint actions with humans. However, these advances have encountered significant challenges to ensure fluent interactions and sustain human motivation through the different steps of joint action. After exploring current literature on joint action in HRI, leading to a more precise definition of these challenges, the present article pr…Read more
  •  170
    Intentions: The Dynamic Hierarchical Model Revisited
    WIREs Cognitive Science 10 (2). 2019.
    Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and glob…Read more
  •  121
    Self-control as hybrid skill
    In Surrounding self-control, Oxford University Press. pp. 81-100. 2020.
    One of the main obstacles to the realization of intentions for future actions and to the successful pursuit of long-term goals is lack of self-control. But, what does it mean to engage in self-controlled behaviour? On a motivational construal of self-control, self-control involves resisting our competing temptations, impulses, and urges in order to do what we deem to be best. The conflict we face is between our better judgments or intentions and “hot” motivational forces that drive or compel us …Read more
  •  109
    Editorial: “Skilled Action Control”
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3): 469-480. 2021.
  •  323
    The objective of this paper is to characterize the rich interplay between automatic and cognitive control processes that we propose is the hallmark of skill, in contrast to habit, and what accounts for its flexibility. We argue that this interplay isn't entirely hierarchical and static, but rather heterarchical and dynamic. We further argue that it crucially depends on the acquisition of detailed and well-structured action representations and internal models, as well as the concomitant developme…Read more
  •  4
    Commitments in Human-Robot Interaction
    with Víctor Fernandez Castro, Aurélie Clodic, and Rachid Alami
    AI-HRI 2019 Proceedings. 2019.
    An important tradition in philosophy holds that in order to successfully perform a joint action, the participants must be capable of establishing commitments on joint goals and shared plans. This suggests that social robotics should endow robots with similar competences for commitment management in order to achieve the objective of performing joint tasks in human-robot interactions. In this paper, we examine two philosophical approaches to commitments. These approaches, we argue, emphasize diffe…Read more
  • Key Elements for Human-Robot Joint Action
    with Raja Chatila, Rachid Alami, and Aurélie Clodic
    In Raul Hakli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, Springer. 2017.
  •  63
    This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this …Read more
  •  14
    Agents' pivotality and reward fairness modulate sense of agency in cooperative joint action
    with Solène Le Bars, Alexandre Devaux, Tena Nevidal, and Valérian Chambon
    Cognition 195 (C): 104117. 2020.
  •  23
    The sense of agency in human-human vs human-robot joint action
    with Ouriel Grynszpan, Aïsha Sahaï, Nasmeh Hamidi, Bruno Berberian, Lucas Roche, and Ludovic Saint-Bauzel
    Consciousness and Cognition 75 102820. 2019.
  •  40
    Alterations of agency in hypnosis: A new predictive coding model
    with Jean-Rémy Martin
    Psychological Review 126 (1): 133-152. 2019.
  •  28
    Action co-representation and the sense of agency during a joint Simon task: Comparing human and machine co-agents
    with Aïsha Sahaï, Andrea Desantis, Ouriel Grynszpan, and Bruno Berberian
    Consciousness and Cognition 67 44-55. 2019.
  •  31
    Solution Thinking and Team Reasoning: How Different Are They?
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (6): 585-593. 2018.
    In his book, Understanding Institutions, Francesco Guala discusses two solutions to the problem of mindreading for coordination, the solution thinking approach proposed by Adam Morton and the team reasoning approach developed by Michael Bacharach, Robert Sugden, and Natalie Gold. I argue that the family resemblance between the two approaches is even stronger than Guala thinks.
  •  359
    Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions
    with Tim Bayne
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1): 1-11. 2004.
    A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framew…Read more
  •  216
    Do we see with microscopes?
    The Monist 78 (2): 171-188. 1995.
    Trying to understand better the role played by epistemic artifacts in our quest for reliable knowledge, it is interesting to compare their contribution with the one made by the epistemic organs or systems with which we are naturally endowed. This comparative approach may yield the further benefit of an improved understanding of the nature and epistemic functions of our natural epistemic equipment. In this paper, I shall concern myself with comparing the role of a family of instruments, microscop…Read more
  •  25
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in which …Read more
  •  8
    Cet article examine un problème particulier posé par une approche naturaliste et représentationnaliste de la perception: lui est-il ou non possible de rendre compte d'une caractéristique que Husserl considérait comme constitutive de la perception, à savoir le fait que l'objet dans la perception est comme donné en personne (leibhaftig). La première section donne un bref aperçu des motivations qui sont à l'origine de l'intérêt actuellement suscité dans les sciences cognitives par l'intentionnalité…Read more
  •  86
    Dretske has recently offered a representational theory of perceptual experience - considered as paradigmatic of the qualitative and phenomenal aspects of our mental life. This theory belongs, as do his previous works, to a naturalistic approach to mental representation
  •  1
    Monothematic delusions, empiricism, and framework beliefs
    with Tim Bayne
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1): 1. 2004.
  •  141
    Levels of perceptual content
    Philsophical Studies 100 (3): 237-54. 2000.
    My main thesis is this paper is that, although Dretske's distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. I argue that what is needed in order to give a more accurate account of perceptual phenomena is not a twofold distinction of the kind advocated by Dretske but a threefold distincti…Read more
  •  25
    Acta Analytica 12 105-112. 1997.
    Holophobia can be defined as the 'neurotic' fear that semantic holism, if not instantly extirpated by the most radical means, might be a deadly threat to intentional realism. I contend that Fodor exaggerates the threat that meaning holism poses to intentional realism and to a viable account of narrow content in terms of conceptual roles. He particular, he overestimates the relevance for intentional psychology of Quine's demonstration that a substantial analytic/synthetic distinction is out of re…Read more
  •  36
    Attitudes propositionnelles, intentionnalité et évolution
    Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 100 (3). 1995.
    La question du statut ontologique des attitudes propositionnelles et, corrélativement, celle de l'efficacité causale des contenus mentaux sont parmi les principaux problèmes actuellement débattus en philosophie de la psychologie. La théorie des systèmes intentionnels de Dennett, tout en accordant une valeur prédictive aux attributions d'attitudes propositionnelles, refuse aux croyances et désirs droit d'entrée dans une ontologie scientifique. Le but de cet article est de proposer une analyse cri…Read more
  •  311
    Out of nowhere: Thought insertion, ownership and context-integration
    with Jean-Remy Martin
    Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1): 111-122. 2013.
    We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a fail- ure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in partic- ular contextual information concerning the different causal factors that may be implicated in their production. Loss of unity of cons…Read more
  •  524
    Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question o…Read more
  •  69
    It is widely assumed, both in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences, that perception essentially involves a relative or egocentric frame of reference. Levinson has explicitly challenged this assumption, arguing instead in favour of the 'neo-Whorfian' hypothesis that the frame of reference dominant in a given language infiltrates spatial representations in non-linguistic, and in particular perceptual, modalities. Our aim in this paper is to assess Levinson's neo-Whorfian hypothesis at the phil…Read more