Enrique Aramendia Muneta

In Consciousness Studies it is common to distinguish between subjective character and qualitative character. It is also non unusual to maintain that both can be analyzed independently. This is called the “division of conceptual labor”. This idea, however, does not match with our intuitive insight that subjective character is multiple. Here I identify the idea of the division of conceptual labor as a version of the myth of the self, and I push forward two arguments against it. After that, I will propose an alternative characterization of subjectivity on conscious experience. My main conclusion is that, in order to define the subjective character, we do need the qualitative character. The self needs the other.

Se comparan las teorías de Marr y Berkeley sobre la visión a partir de las cualidades de Descartes. La descripción de tres niveles de Marr, donde la conciencia está ausente, contrasta con el nivel único de Berkeley construido sobre la conciencia y la experiencia carece de importancia en los momentos esquemáticos y cobra protagonismo en el último paso del proceso de la visión de Marr mediante la noción de marcación. Bajo la premisa de que las descripciones puramente sincrónicas han de ser forzosamente incompletas, se reformula el problema de Molyneux y se reivindica el papel explicativo de la conciencia