Erik Wingrove-Haugland

Rather than referring to “minorities,” “members of minority groups” or “underrepresented minorities,” we should refer to such individuals as “minoritized.” Using “minoritized” makes it clear that being minoritized is about power and equity not numbers, connects racial oppression to the oppression of women, and gives us an easy way to conceive of intersectionality as being a minoritized member of a minoritized group. The term “minoritized” reveals the fact that white males and other dominant groups minoritize members of subordinated groups rather than obscuring this agency, describes microaggressions better than the term ‘microaggressions,’ and helps explain the need for solidarity within minoritized groups. It gives us a powerful way to promote racial justice by appealing to the common experience of being excluded. While using “minoritized” risks creating a false equivalence that sees all instances of being minoritized as equal and discounting unique forms of oppression by subsuming them under a single term, using this term carefully can ensure that its advantages outweigh these risks.

This dissertation examines the ecophilosophical implications of the thought of John Dewey and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and argues that an ecophilosophy informed by these two philosophers can avoid many of the problems that traditional approaches to ecophilosophy have encountered. ;Part One discusses the limitations of traditional environmentalism and the resultant development of ecological ideologies such as deep ecology, social ecology, and bioregionalism. It argues that all of these ecological ideologies need to be supported by an ecophilosophy. It examines traditional approaches to ethics, such as utilitarianism and deontological ethics, and shows how these approaches cannot generate such an ecophilosophy. It discusses ecophilosophical attempts to create such an ecophilosophy, with a particular focus on the "Land Ethic" of Aldo Leopold, and shows that these approaches must be rooted in a philosophical tradition which overcomes the subject/object dichotomy. ;Drawing particularly on Dewey's concept of experience, and of the social and natural roots of experience, Part Two demonstrates that the philosophy of John Dewey can support an ecophilosophy which is consistent with the ecological awareness that has led to the development of ecological ideologies. Part Three shows that the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is also consistent with this ecological awareness; it shows that Merleau-Ponty's conception of perception, and of the connection between self and world which is implied by perception, can support an ecophilosophy based on the unity of self and world. ;Part Four reviews the important ecophilosophical implications developed in the previous two parts. It shows that an ecophilosophy informed by the thought of Dewey and Merleau-Ponty can avoid problems with non-anthropocentrism, intrinsic value, and the subjective or objective nature of values, which traditional approaches to ecophilosophy encounter. It argues that, by beginning with everyday experience, an ecophilosophy informed by the writings of Dewey and Merleau-Ponty will be more accessible than most contemporary ecophilosophies