•  110
    The Limits of Partial Doxasticism
    Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.
    Doxasticism is the thesis that intention is or involves belief in the forthcoming action (Velleman, Harman). Supporters claim that it is only by accepting that thesis that we can explain a wide array of important phenomena, including the special knowledge we have of intentional action, the roles intention plays in facilitating coordination, and the norms of rationality for intention. Others argue that the thesis is subject to counterexample (Davidson, Bratman). Yet some others contend that the t…Read more
  •  73
    Planning on a Prior Intention
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (3): 229-265. 2020.
    Intention plays a central role in coordinating action. It does so, it is commonly thought, by allowing one to plan further actions for the future on the basis of the belief that it will be executed. Doxasticists about intention (Harman, Velleman) conclude from this that accounting for this role of intention requires accepting the thesis that intention involves belief. Conativists (Bratman, Brunero, Mele) reject that conclusion. I argue that Doxasticists are right in calling attention to the exis…Read more
  •  229
    Reasons for Reliance
    Ethics 126 (2): 311-338. 2016.
    Philosophers have in general offered only a partial view of the normative grounds of reliance. Some maintain that either one of evidence or of pragmatic considerations has a normative bearing on reliance, but are silent about whether the other kind of consideration has such a bearing on it as well. Others assert that both kinds of considerations have a normative bearing on reliance, but sidestep the question of what their relative normative bearing is. My aim in this article is to offer a more s…Read more
  •  604
    Reductive Views of Shared Intention
    In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, Routledge. 2017.
    This is a survey article on reductive views of shared intention.
  •  337
    A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention
    Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2). 2016.
    In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations …Read more
  •  354
    Shared agency is of central importance in our lives in many ways. We enjoy engaging in certain joint activities with others. We also engage in joint activities to achieve complex goals. Current approaches propose that we understand shared agency in terms of the more basic phenomenon of shared intention. However, they have presented two antagonistic views about the nature of this phenomenon. Some have argued that shared intention should be understood as being primarily a structure of attitudes of…Read more
  •  503
    Intending, Settling, and Relying
    In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 4., Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74. 2017.
    Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the phenomena of “being settled on” and of “settling” a course of action. For many, this connection supports an important constraint on intention: one may only intend what one takes one’s so intending as settling. Traditionally, this has been understood as a doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one’s intention as settling is what one believes one’s s…Read more
  •  213
    What is reliance?
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2): 163-183. 2014.
    In this article I attempt to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about reliance in a systematic way. I argue that reliance is a cognitive attitude that has a tighter connection to the guidance of our thought and action than ordinary belief does. My main thesis is that reliance has a ‘constitutive aim’: namely, it aims at guiding our thought and action in a way that is sensible from the standpoint of practical or theoretical ends. This helps explain why reliance is, in contrast to belief,…Read more