-
11Introduction: Social Ontology, Culture and InstitutionsTopoi 35 (1): 267-270. 2016.status: published.
-
2From conceivability to possibility: the normative accountIn E. Weber & T. DeMey (eds.), Modal Epistemology, Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie Van Belgie Vor Wetenschappen En Kunsten. pp. 23--32. 2004.
-
10Faultless disagreement and self-expressionIn Jesus M. Larrazabal & Larraitz Zubeldia (eds.), Meaning, Content and Argument, University of the Basque Country Press. pp. 249--267. 2009.
-
Davidson, DonaldIn Maarten Doorman & Heleen Pott (eds.), Filosofen van deze tijd, Bert Bakker. pp. 195--209. 2000.
-
Superveniëntie, duplicaten en causale werkzaamheid van het mentaleAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 92 (4): 277-292. 2000.
-
Indexicaliteit en dynamische intentiesAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 93 (3): 165-180. 2001.
-
1De onverklaarbaarheid van identiteitAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 98 (2): 128-145. 2006.
-
Faultless disagreement and the knowledge account of assertionLogique Et Analyse 52 (208): 389-407. 2009.
-
8The Organism-Centered Approach to Cultural EvolutionTopoi 35 (1): 283-290. 2016.In this paper, we distinguish two different approaches to cultural evolution. One approach is meme-centered, the other organism-centered. We argue that in situations in which the meme- and organism-centered approaches are competing alternatives, the organism-centered approach is in many ways superior. Furthermore, the organism-centered approach can go a long way toward understanding the evolution of institutions. Although the organism-centered approach is preferable for a broad class of situatio…Read more
-
1With the help of key normative concepts borrowed from social epistemology and work on epistemic duties and norms of justification we want to clarify what is at the core of learning mediated through testimony. In socially networked professional contexts, assessment of the epistemic reliability of networked information is important: justification of knowledge acquired via the word of others has an intrinsic social and normative dimension. Whereas the former has been largely taken into account in t…Read more
-
10Is there a philosophy of information?Topoi 35 (1): 161-171. 2016.In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other areas already…Read more
-
3Comments on Roversi 'Acting within and outside an institution'Methode: Analytic Perspectives 4 (6): 213-221. 2015.In his stimulating contribution, Corrado Roversi uses speech act theory to propose a more nuanced and shaded account of how agents can relate themselves to institutions than H. Hart’s binary distinction between the internal and external point of view. Although we agree on the central importance of Hart in charting recent work in social ontology, we propose to recast Roversi’s contribution in terms of the various ways in which an agent’s commitment to an institution can corrode or strengthen an i…Read more
-
14Judgments of taste as strategic moves in a coordination gameInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.Recent work on evaluative discourse and judgements of personal taste in particular has focused on active interpersonal disagreements. I explore the communicative import of judgements of taste: why we issue them, why we sometimes get involved in disputes about taste, and what acceptance or rejection of such judgements consists of. The view developed here – that the core use of such judgements lies in seeking to align our attitudes in view of a shared project – makes it plausible that the use of a…Read more
-
6Externalism, Content, and Causal HistoriesDialectica 48 (3-4): 267-286. 1994.SummaryExternalism in philosophy of mind is usually taken to be faced with the following difficulty: from the fact that meanings are externally individuated, it follows that the subjective character of mental states and events becomes problematic. On the basis of a well‐founded approach to similar problems in the philosophy of action, I propose a solution based on two connected issues: we should think of mental states not as beliefs, but as states of knowledge, and thought experiments, designed …Read more
-
17Intentionality Versus Constructive EmpiricismErkenntnis 76 (1): 91-100. 2012.By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism—B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of science—is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive Empiricism than the other
-
38Institutions and the Artworld – A Critical NoteJournal of Social Ontology 4 (1): 53-66. 2018.Contemporary theories of institutions as clusters of stable solutions to recurrent coordination problems can illuminate and explain some unresolved difficulties and problems adhering to institutional definitions of art initiated by George Dickie and Arthur Danto. Their account of what confers upon objects their institutional character does not fit well with current work on institutions and social ontology. The claim that “the artworld” confers the status of “art” onto objects remains utterly mys…Read more
-
46What is money? An alternative to Searle's institutional factsEconomics and Philosophy 27 (1): 1-22. 2011.In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle develops a theory of institutional facts and objects, of which money, borders and property are presented as prime examples. These objects are the result of us collectively intending certain natural objects to have a certain status, i.e. to ‘count as’ being certain social objects. This view renders such objects irreducible to natural objects. In this paper we propose a radically different approach that is more compatible with standard economic th…Read more
-
24The Incentivized Action View of Institutional Facts as an Alternative to the Searlean View: A Response to Butchard and D’AmicoPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (1): 44-55. 2016.In our earlier work, we argued, contra Searle, that institutional facts can be understood in terms of non-institutional facts about actions and incentives. Butchard and D’Amico claim that we have misinterpreted Searle, that our main argument against him has no merit and that our positive view cannot account for institutional facts created via joint action. We deny all three charges.
-
21Developing the incentivized action view of institutional realitySynthese 191 (8). 2014.Contemporary discussion concerning institutions focus on, and mostly accept, the Searlean view that institutional objects, i.e. money, borders and the like, exist in virtue of the fact that we collectively represent them as existing. A dissenting note has been sounded by Smit et al. (Econ Philos 27:1–22, 2011), who proposed the incentivized action view of institutional objects. On the incentivized action view, understanding a specific institution is a matter of understanding the specific actions…Read more
-
14How to Do Things Without Words - A Theory of DeclarationsPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (3): 235-254. 2017.Declarations like “this meeting is adjourned” make certain facts the case by representing them as being the case. Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the mechanism whereby the utterance of a declaration can bring about a new state of affairs. In this paper, we use the incentivization account of institutional facts to address this issue. We argue that declarations can serve to bring about new states of affairs as their utterance have game theoretical import, typically in virtue of …Read more
-
3Kritiek van de interpreterende rede: grondslagen van Donald Davidsons filosofische projectUniversitaire Pers. 1996.In zijn jongste boek, Kritiek van de interpreterende rede, bekijkt Filip Buekens de centrale thema's in de taalfilosofie van Davidson. Vertrekkend vanuit de stelling dat spreken en verstaan een vorm van rationeel handelen is, wordt onderzocht hoe een theorie voor een taal (in de vorm van een Tarskiaanse waarheidstheorie) wordt geconstrueerd vanuit het standpunt van een 'radicale interpretator' die inzicht wil krijgen in het talig handelen van personen. In een uitgebreide vergelijking met de filo…Read more
-
Proceedings of Information, Indexicality and Consciousness: A Conference on John Perry (edited book)Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University. 2001.
-
6Saying 'Yes' and 'No' in Matters of Personal TasteLogique Et Analyse 60 (239). 2017.This paper examines the communicative function of public pronouncements about what is tasty, agreeable or attractive, followed by an equally public endorsement or rejection. The typical and expected reaction to contributions like ‘This is tasty’ or ‘Roller coasters are fun’ in a conversational setting is not ‘how come?’ or ‘How do you know that?’, but a reply that reveals one’s own attitude towards an object or state of affairs. Judgements of taste are explored in the context of a cooperative vi…Read more
-
10Faultless Disagreement, Assertions and the Affective-Expressive Dimension of Judgments of TastePhilosophia 39 (4): 637-655. 2011.Contextualists and assessment relativists neglect the expressive dimension of assertoric discourse that seems to give rise to faultless disagreement. Discourse that generates the intuition makes public an attitudinal conflict, and the affective -expressive dimension of the contributing utterances accounts for it. The FD-phenomenon is an effect of a public dispute generated by a sequence of expressing opposite attitudes towards a salient object or state of affairs, where the protagonists are maki…Read more
-
Veldhuis, H., Geen begrip voor de ander. De kritiek van E. Levinas op de westerse filosofie, in het bijzonder op het denken van Husserl en Heidegger (review)Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 53 (2): 383. 1991.
-
2De lege blik. Antwoord op Van de Vijver en VanderbeekenAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 99 217-229. 2007.