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Filipa Melo Lopes

University of Edinburgh
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 More details
  • University of Edinburgh
    Department of Philosophy
    Lecturer
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2019
Homepage
0000-0002-8487-3161
Areas of Specialization
Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
  • All publications (4)
  •  84
    Sugar Babies: When “Feminism” Looks Like Online Misogyny
    Blog of the APA 2022. 2022.
    Varieties of FeminismFeminist Perspectives on Phenomena, MiscFeminism: SexualityFeminism: Sex Work a…Read more
    Varieties of FeminismFeminist Perspectives on Phenomena, MiscFeminism: SexualityFeminism: Sex Work and ProstitutionFeminism: LoveSimone de Beauvoir
  •  1704
    What Do Incels Want? Explaining Incel Violence Using Beauvoirian Otherness
    Hypatia. forthcoming.
    In recent years, online ‘involuntary celibate’ or ‘incel’ communities have been linked to various deadly attacks targeting women. Why do these men react to romantic rejection with, not just disappointment, but murderous rage? Feminists have claimed this is because incels desire women as objects or, alternatively, because they feel entitled to women’s attention. I argue that both of these explanatory models are insufficient. They fail to account for incels’ distinctive ambivalence towards women —…Read more
    In recent years, online ‘involuntary celibate’ or ‘incel’ communities have been linked to various deadly attacks targeting women. Why do these men react to romantic rejection with, not just disappointment, but murderous rage? Feminists have claimed this is because incels desire women as objects or, alternatively, because they feel entitled to women’s attention. I argue that both of these explanatory models are insufficient. They fail to account for incels’ distinctive ambivalence towards women — for their oscillation between obsessive desire and violent hatred. I propose instead that what incels want is a Beauvoirian “Other”. For Beauvoir, when men conceive of women as Others, they represent them as simultaneously human subjects and embodiments of the natural world. Women function then as sui generis entities through which men can experience themselves as praiseworthy heroes, regardless of the quality of their actions. I go on to give an illustrative analysis of Elliot Rodger’s autobiographical manifesto, “My Twisted World”. I show how this Beauvoirian model sheds light on Rodger’s racist and classist attitudes and gives us a better understanding of his ambivalence towards women. It therefore constitutes a powerful and overlooked theoretical alternative to accounts centered on objectification and entitlement.
    Feminist Perspectives on Phenomena, MiscFeminism: ViolenceFeminism: TerrorismSimone de BeauvoirPheno…Read more
    Feminist Perspectives on Phenomena, MiscFeminism: ViolenceFeminism: TerrorismSimone de BeauvoirPhenomenologyCelibacySexual ObjectificationMaleness and MasculinityFeminist PhenomenologyAlienation
  •  1402
    ‘Half Victim, Half Accomplice’: Cat Person and Narcissism
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 701-729. 2021.
    At the end of 2017, Kristen Roupenian’s short story, Cat Person, went viral. Published at the height of the #MeToo movement, it depicted a ‘toxic date’ and a disturbing sexual encounter between Margot, a college student, and Robert, an older man she meets at work. The story was widely viewed as a relatable denunciation of women’s powerlessness and routine victimization. In this paper, I push against this common reading. I propose an alternative feminist interpretation through the lens of Simone …Read more
    At the end of 2017, Kristen Roupenian’s short story, Cat Person, went viral. Published at the height of the #MeToo movement, it depicted a ‘toxic date’ and a disturbing sexual encounter between Margot, a college student, and Robert, an older man she meets at work. The story was widely viewed as a relatable denunciation of women’s powerlessness and routine victimization. In this paper, I push against this common reading. I propose an alternative feminist interpretation through the lens of Simone de Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism: a form of alienation that consists in making oneself both the subject and the ultimate project of one’s life. Framing Margot as a narcissist casts her as engaging, not in subtly coerced, undesired sex, but rather in sex that is desired in a tragically alienated way. I argue that Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism is an important tool for feminists today – well beyond the interpretation of Cat Person. It presses us to see systematic subordination not just as something done to women, but also as something women do to themselves. This in turn highlights the neglected role of self-transformation as a key aspect of feminist political resistance.
    Feminism: OppressionFeminism: SexualitySexual ConsentSimone de BeauvoirAutonomy and Moral PsychologyRead more
    Feminism: OppressionFeminism: SexualitySexual ConsentSimone de BeauvoirAutonomy and Moral PsychologyFeminist PhenomenologyCoercionAlienation
  •  476
    Perpetuating the patriarchy: misogyny and (post-)feminist backlash
    Philosophical Studies 176 (9): 2517-2538. 2019.
    How are patriarchal regimes perpetuated and reproduced? Kate Manne’s recent work on misogyny aims to provide an answer to this central question. According to her, misogyny is a property of social environments where women perceived as violating patriarchal norms are ‘kept down’ through hostile reactions coming from men, other women and social structures. In this paper, I argue that Manne’s approach is problematically incomplete. I do so by examining a recent puzzling social phenomenon which I cal…Read more
    How are patriarchal regimes perpetuated and reproduced? Kate Manne’s recent work on misogyny aims to provide an answer to this central question. According to her, misogyny is a property of social environments where women perceived as violating patriarchal norms are ‘kept down’ through hostile reactions coming from men, other women and social structures. In this paper, I argue that Manne’s approach is problematically incomplete. I do so by examining a recent puzzling social phenomenon which I call (post-)feminist backlash: the rise of women-led movements reinstating patriarchal practices in the name of feminism. I focus on the example of ‘raunch feminist’ CAKE parties and argue that their pro-patriarchal dimension cannot be adequately explained by misogyny. I propose instead a different story that emphasizes the continued centrality of gender distinctions in our social normative life, even as gendered social meanings become increasingly contested. This triggers meaning vertigo, a distinct form of social anxiety and the reactionary impulse at the heart of (post)-feminist backlash. Meaning vertigo both complicates the answer to Manne’s main question—“why is misogyny still a thing?”—and suggests the need and opportunity for a different kind of feminist political intervention.
    Feminism: OppressionGender and OppressionPhilosophy of Sexuality, MiscVarieties of Feminism, MiscCon…Read more
    Feminism: OppressionGender and OppressionPhilosophy of Sexuality, MiscVarieties of Feminism, MiscConceptions of GenderFeminism and PowerSexual Ethics, MiscFeminism: SexualitySexual Objectification
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