Filippo Forcignanò

This paper discusses Aristotle’s statement (Metaph. A 9, 991a8-9) that both Anaxagoras and Eudoxus claimed that things are the result of a mixture of original elements, in relation to Plato’s metaphysics. Eudoxus used this immanentistic thesis to reform one central component of Plato’s Theory of Form, that is the “participation”. The first part of the paper analyzes some Anaxagorean aspects in Plato’s metaphysics, showing that Plato shares with Anaxagoras the “Transmission Theory of Causality” (as called by Dancy), but he refuses its immanentistic version. The second part interprets Hip. Maj. 301b2-301c2 as a refusal of a immantestic interpretation of verbs like prosgivgnomai and kosmei'tai. It is also rejected Morgan’s thesis according to which Hippias supports an aware mereological metaphysical theory. The third part contests that Phaed. 100-106 is a defense of an immanentistic metaphysics abandoned by Plato in his later works. The meaning of the expression to; ejn hJmi'n does not include a mereological approach to the causality. In Plato’s metaphysics there is no strong contradiction between transcendence and immanence. The fourth part shows that the Parmenides refuses any immanentistic version of the relationship between Forms and things. Lastly, I will argue that from a Platonic point of view the only acceptable version is the separated interpretation of Transmission Theory of Causality.

It is widely believed that Plato promoted a version of the "one over many" argument such that there would be Forms of all things. Among these Forms are also included those of artefacts. Aristotle denies, however, that Plato would accept such Forms. The ancient Platonic tradition is unusually unanimous in denying the existence of Forms of artefacts. This paper supports three main points: (a) through a careful examination of some Platonic texts (in particular Resp. 596a) it is possible to assert that he has never encouraged a version of the "one over many" that justifies the existence of Forms of all things; (b) the reduction ad unum defended by Plato can not be considered identical to Aristotle's version of "one over many" argument; (c) there are some good textual and speculative reasons to deny the existence of Forms of artefacta. It is finally discussed a recent proposal by David Sedley, according to which Plato, in his mature works, accepted only Form of what has opposed properties and of artefacts (but not of natural things).

The aim of the paper is to discuss Parm. 132b3-c11, i.e. the "conceptualist" argument, in relation to the "Third Man" argument and to the whole dialogue. I deny that the "Third Man" is a conceptualist argument, as recently proposed by Helmig, and I maintain that it is consistent with the problematic text of Phaedr. 249b6-c4. I argue that the passage of the Parmenides actually contains two arguments, not just one, and that the first of them proposes an intentional (not relational) conception of the Form-thought link. More in general, I contest that the Parmenides promotes an explicit conceptualist argument in order to reject it, although it is rejected the possibility that forms are not real entities. Finally, I defend the suggestion that the passage is controversial with Antisthenes.