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644Reflections on Mirror ManPhilosophical Studies 178 (12): 4227-4237. 2021.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne have recently presented a thought experiment—Mirror Man—designed to refute internalist theories of belief and content. We distinguish five ways in which the case can be interpreted and argue that on none does it refute internalism.
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51Learning from What Color Experiences Are Good ForThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 27 49-58. 2020.Color is an incredibly controversial topic. Here is a sample of views taken seriously: colors are dispositions to look coloured; colors are physical properties of surfaces or of light; colors are properties of certain mental states, which get projected onto the surfaces of objects or onto reflected or transmitted light; colors are an illusion; colors are sui generis. One hopes to break the impasse by finding a compelling starting point—one drawing on obvious points that are common ground—which n…Read more
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123Understanding self‐ascriptionMind and Language 35 (2): 141-155. 2020.David Lewis argues that believing something is self‐ascribing a property rather than holding true a proposition. But what is self‐ascription? Is it some new mysterious primitive? Is Lewis saying that every belief you have is about you? Several recent authors have suggested that, in the light of these questions, Lewis's theory should be rejected, despite its enormous influence. But this neglects the fact that Lewis makes two relevant proposals about belief: one about belief de se , another about …Read more
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21Review of Irrationality (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3): 635-636. 1990.NA
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71Review symposium : Sir Karl Popper and sir John Eccles. The self and its brain. New York: Springer verlag, 1977. Pp. XVI + 597. $17.90. Unpacking some dualities inherent in a mind/brain dualism Karl H.Pribram psychology, Stanford university (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 10 (3): 295-308. 1980.
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324Three theses about dispositionsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3): 251-257. 1982.I. Causal Thesis: Dispositions have a causal basis. II. Distinctness Thesis: Dispositions are distinct from their causal basis. III. Impotence Thesis: Dispositions are not causally active.
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13XIII*—Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation1Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1): 253-268. 1995.Frank Jackson; XIII*—Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 253–268, ht.
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93Where the Tickle defence goes wrongAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (3). 1983.This Article does not have an abstract
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302Why We Need A - IntensionsPhilosophical Studies 118 (1-2): 257-277. 2004.I think recent discussions of content and reference have not paid enough attention to the role of language as a convention-governed system of communication. With this as a background theme, I explain the role of A-intensions in elucidating one important notion of content and correlative notions of reference.
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95What Physicalists Have to Say about the Knowledge ArgumentGrazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4): 511-524. 2016.Suppose that, for one reason or another, the knowledge argument fails as a refutation of physicalism. Even so, it remains the case that there is a pressing question for physicalists raised by the argument. Does Mary acquire old information or misinformation when she leaves the black and white room? Answering this question requires physicalists to address the tricky question of the informational content of colour experiences – what information do colour experiences deliver by virtue of being the …Read more
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148Weakness of willMind 93 (369): 1-18. 1984.I think that clear sense can be made of weakness of will in terms of agents' acting against the dictates of their reason; and that this can be done without becoming enmeshed in the faculties of the mind, and without denying what is right about Humean views about reason and desire. My starting point is, in fact, a Humean position about reason and desire.
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13VIII*—Conditionals and PossibiliaProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 125-138. 1981.Frank Jackson; VIII*—Conditionals and Possibilia, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 125–138, https://doi.org/10.10.
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38Two theories of indicative conditionals: Reply to Brian EllisAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1). 1984.This Article does not have an abstract
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10Three Questions About Consciousness Review of Consciousness And Experience by William G. Lycan (review)PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 3. 1997.
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21The story of 'Fred'In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2006.
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74The puzzle about conditionalsThink 2 (6): 19-23. 2004.Frank Jackson introduces a seemingly intractable mystery concerning ‘if…then…’ statements
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447The knowledge argument, diaphanousness, representationalismIn Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 52--64. 2006.
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423Thought experiments and possibilitiesAnalysis 69 (1): 100-109. 2009.1. Reflecting on possible cases can be very valuable in differing ways. Sometimes it makes clear a consequence of a theory, a consequence that then plays an important role in debates about the theory. Utilitarians who favour maximising average happiness confront utilitarians who favour maximising total happiness with possible cases where there are enormously many sentient beings whose lives are barely worth living. Sometimes reflecting on possible cases serves to clarify a doctrine. Classical ve…Read more
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31The epistemological objection to opaque teleological theories of contentIn Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics, Oxford University Press. pp. 85--99. 2006.
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87The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytical Functionalism David Braddon-MitchellPhilosophical Topics 26 (1-2): 39-70. 1999.
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93The Case for a Priori PhysicalismIn Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophy-Science -Scientific Philosophy, Main Lectures and Colloquia of GAP 5, Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy, Mentis. 2005.
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185The Argument from the Persistence of Moral DisagreementIn Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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