Fraser Logan

From 1874–1888 Nietzsche commits himself to the “scheme” of Schopenhauer as Educator, and in this early text he endorses honesty (Ehrlichkeit), a deeply interpersonal virtue by means of which he counteracts the harmful effects of dissimulation (Verstellung). Despite its lifelong importance to Nietzsche, Ehrlichkeit has been widely neglected by scholars. Nietzsche’s practice of Ehrlichkeit is partially inspired by Diogenes’s outspokenness (parrhēsia), and he becomes simpler (einfacher) and more honest (ehrlicher) over time by writing spontaneously and confessionally, in defiance of scholarly conventions. In his middle-period writings Nietzsche criticises Ehrlichkeit by means of Ehrlichkeit, and I formulate a “preservative” notion of self-overcoming to describe this self-critical mechanism. His commitment to Ehrlichkeit increases over time, and his autobiography, Ecce Homo, is the book of Ehrlichkeit par excellence. Nietzsche’s priority is to practise, not merely analyse, Ehrlichkeit, and with this in mind I provide a Nietzschean critique of Nietzsche scholarship. Nietzsche also introduces, in 1880, a stricter type of honesty (Redlichkeit) whose purpose is to recognise obscure truths, particularly those overlooked by the occasionally naïve Ehrlichkeit. I explain the development of Redlichkeit in Nietzsche’s writings and its links to cruelty (Grausamkeit), the avoidance of relevance fallacies, and the passion for knowledge (die Leidenschaft der Erkenntniss). Throughout Book IV of The Gay Science Nietzsche associates Redlichkeit with naturalistic metaphors, such as new suns, as a way of justifying his irrepressible passion for knowledge and further combatting the harmful effects of dissimulation.

Nietzsche commits himself to a practice of honesty (Ehrlichkeit) in Schopenhauer as Educator. This article argues that this practice is an adaptation of Diogenes’s parrhēsia, the Cynic virtue of outspokenness, and that Nietzsche’s commitment to Ehrlichkeit increases from 1874 to 1888. The article emphasizes the interpersonal dimensions of Ehrlichkeit and parrhēsia and the author resists the widespread tendency to conflate Nietzsche and Diogenes in terms of shamelessness. The article demonstrates that, using Diogenes as an exemplar, Nietzsche gradually renounces the scholarly pretense of hiding the personal significance of his opinions behind needlessly theoretical language. This development culminates in his explosive autobiography, Ecce Homo, which the author interprets, against the grain of Nietzsche scholarship, as the book of Ehrlichkeit, not Redlichkeit, par excellence.