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Existence and predicationIn Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Logic and ontology, New York University Press. pp. 159--174. 1973.
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16An Invitation to Formal Reasoning: The Logic of TermsRoutledge. 2017.An Invitation to Formal Reasoning introduces the discipline of formal logic by means of a powerful new system formulated by Fred Sommers. This system, term logic, is different in a number of ways from the standard system employed in modern logic; most striking is its greater simplicity and naturalness. Based on a radically different theory of logical syntax than the one Frege used when initiating modern mathematical logic in the 19th Century, term logic borrows insights from Aristotle's syllogis…Read more
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14Das "Physikalische Modell" und die "Metaphysiche Wirklichkeit"; Versuch Einer Metaphänomenologie (review)Journal of Philosophy 50 (11): 332-334. 1953.
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The Logic of Natural LanguageRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (3): 367-368. 1983.
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15Leibniz's program for the development of logicIn R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Reidel. pp. 589--615. 1976.
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32Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life (edited book)Wadsworth. 2010.VICE AND VIRTUE IN EVERYDAY LIFE has been a popular choice in college ethics course study for more than two decades because it is well-liked by both college instructors and students. Course instructors appreciate it for its philosophical breadth and seriousness while college students and other readers welcome the engaging topics and readings. VICE AND VIRTUE IN EVERYDAY LIFE provides students with a lively selection of classical and contemporary readings on pressing matters of personal and socia…Read more
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42An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (London: Hutchinson University Library. 1959. Pp. 179.) (review)Philosophy 36 (138): 374-. 1961.
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12The logical and the extra-logicalIn R. S. Cohen & Marx W. Wartofsky (eds.), Methodological and historical essays in the natural and social sciences, Reidel. pp. 235--252. 1974.
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32On Concepts of Truth in Natural LanguagesReview of Metaphysics 23 (2). 1969.The purpose Tarski speaks of is "to do justice to our intuitions which adhere to the classical Aristotelian conception of truth." Tarski takes this to be some form of correspondence theory. He has earlier considered and rejected an even less satisfactory formula of this sort: 'a sentence is true if it corresponds to reality'. His own semantic conception of truth is meant to be a more precise variant doing justice to the correspondence standpoint. In this spirit I shall presently suggest a revise…Read more
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48Vice & virtue in everyday life: introductory readings in ethics (edited book)Harcourt College Publishers. 1997." Vice and virtue in everyday life is a bestseller in college ethics because students find the readings both personally engaging and intellectually challenging. Under the guidance of classical and modern writers on morality, students using this textbook come to grips with moral issues of everyday life. They discover that some currently fashionable approaches to morality, such as egoism and relativism, have long histories. They also become aquainted with the debates and criticisms of various mora…Read more
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49Ratiocination: An empirical accountRatio 21 (2). 2008.Modern thinkers regard logic as a purely formal discipline like number theory, and not to be confused with any empirical discipline such as cognitive psychology, which may seek to characterize how people actually reason. Opposed to this is the traditional view that even a formal logic can be cognitively veridical – descriptive of procedures people actually follow in arriving at their deductive judgments (logic as Laws of Thought). In a cognitively veridical logic, any formal proof that a deducti…Read more
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51The world, the facts, and primary logicNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (2): 169-182. 1993.
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145Dissonant beliefsAnalysis 69 (2): 267-274. 2009.1. Philosophers tend to talk of belief as a ‘propositional attitude.’ As Fodor says:" The standard story about believing is that it's a two place relation, viz., a relation between a person and a proposition. My story is that believing is never an unmediated relation between a person and a proposition. In particular nobody grasps a proposition except insofar as he is appropriately related to some vehicle that expresses the proposition. " Fodor's story – that belief is a three-place relation betw…Read more
Waltham, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |