-
410Causal descriptivismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1). 1987.This Article does not have an abstract
-
299Descriptivism, Pretense, and the Frege-Russell ProblemsPhilosophical Review 113 (1): 1-30. 2004.Contrary to frequent declarations that descriptivism as a theory of how names refer is dead and gone, such a descriptivism is, to all appearances, alive and well. Or rather, a descendent of that doctrine is alive and well. This new version—neo-descriptivism, for short—is supposedly immune from the usual arguments against descriptivism, in large part because it avoids classical descriptivism’s emphasis on salient, first-come-to-mind properties and holds instead that a name’s reference-fixing cont…Read more
-
296Make-believe and fictional referenceJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (2): 207-214. 1994.
-
288Was meinong only pretending?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3): 499-527. 1992.In this paper I argue against the usual interpretation of\nMeinong's argument for nonexistent objects, an\ninterpretation according to which Meinong imported\nnonexistent objects like "the golden mountain" to account\ndirectly for the truth of statements like the golden\nmountain is golden'. I claim instead (using evidence from\nMeinong's "On Assumptions") that his argument really\ninvolves an ineliminable appeal to the notion of pretense.\nThis appeal nearly convinced Meinong at one stage that …Read more
-
266Quantum MolinismEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (3): 167-194. 2022.In this paper we consider the possibility of a Quantum Molinism : such a view applies an analogue of the Molinistic account of free will‘s compatibility with God’s foreknowledge to God’s knowledge of (supposedly) indeterministic events at a quantum level. W e ask how (and why) a providential God could care for and know about a world with this kind of indeterminacy. We consider various formulations of such a Quantum Molinism, and after rejecting a number of options arrive at one seemingly coheren…Read more
-
245Fictionalism in MetaphysicsPhilosophy Compass 6 (11): 786-803. 2011.This is a survey of contemporary work on ‘fictionalism in metaphysics’, a term that is taken to signify both the place of fictionalism as a distinctive anti‐realist metaphysics in which usefulness rather than truth is the norm of acceptance, and the fact that philosophers have given fictionalist treatments of a range of specifically metaphysical notions
-
198Theory-dependence, warranted reference, and the epistemic dimensions of realismEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2): 173-191. 2011.The question of the role of theory in the determination of reference of theoretical terms continues to be a controversial one. In the present paper I assess a number of responses to this question (including variations on David Lewis’s appeal to Ramsification), before describing an alternative, epistemically oriented account of the reference-determination of such terms. The paper concludes by discussing some implications of the account for our understanding of both realism and such competitors of…Read more
-
142Belief about Nothing in ParticularIn Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Clarendon Press. pp. 178. 2005.
-
136Millian descriptivismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4). 2004.Mill is a detractor of the view that proper names have meanings, defending in its place the view that names are nothing more than (meaningless) marks. Because of this, Mill is often regarded as someone who anticipated the theory of direct reference for names: the view that the only contribution a name makes to propositions expressed through its use is the name's referent. In this paper I argue that the association is unfair. With some gentle interpretation, Mill can be portrayed as someone who i…Read more
-
134A-intensions and communicationPhilosophical Studies 118 (1-2): 279-298. 2004.In his 'Why We Need A-Intensions', Frank Jackson argues that "representational content [is] how things are represented to be by a sentence in the communicative role it possesses in virtue of what it means," a type of content Jackson takes to be broadly descriptive. I think Jackson overstates his case. Even if we agree that such representational properties play a crucial reference-fixing role, it is much harder to argue the case for a crucial communicative role. I articulate my doubts about Jacks…Read more
-
112Much ado about nothing: Priest and the reinvention of noneism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1). 2008.
-
112Rationality and epistemic paradoxSynthese 94 (3). 1993.This paper provides a new solution to the epistemic paradox of belief-instability, a problem of rational choice which has recently received considerable attention (versions of the problem have been discussed by — among others — Tyler Burge, Earl Conee, and Roy Sorensen). The problem involves an ideally rational agent who has good reason to believe the truth of something of the form:[Ap] p if and only if it is not the case that I accept or believe p.
-
106The Nonexistent, by Anthony Everett: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, viii + 246, £40 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1): 185-187. 2015.
-
102Is the brain a quantum computer?Cognitive Science 30 (3): 593-603. 2006.We argue that computation via quantum mechanical processes is irrelevant to explaining how brains produce thought, contrary to the ongoing speculations of many theorists. First, quantum effects do not have the temporal properties required for neural information processing. Second, there are substantial physical obstacles to any organic instantiation of quantum computation. Third, there is no psychological evidence that such mental phenomena as consciousness and mathematical thinking require expl…Read more
-
101Theoretical terms and the causal view of referenceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (2). 1985.This Article does not have an abstract
-
99The semantics of 'things in themselves': A deflationary accountPhilosophical Quarterly 51 (203): 165-181. 2001.Kant's distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear, or appearances, is commonly attacked on the ground that it delivers a radical and incoherent ‘two world’ picture of what there is. I attempt to deflect this attack by questioning these terms of dismissal. Distinctions of the kind Kant draws on are in fact legion, and they make perfectly good sense. The way to make sense of them, however, is not by buying into a profligate ontology but by using some rather different tools …Read more
-
96The problem of 'Jonah': How not to argue for the causal theory of referencePhilosophical Studies 43 (2). 1983.
-
92Quantified negative existentialsDialectica 57 (2). 2003.This paper suggests that quantified negative existentials about fiction—statements of the form “There are some / many / etc. Fs in work W who don't exist”—offer a serious challenge to the theorist of fiction: more serious, in a number of ways, that singular negative existentials. I argue that the temptation to think that only a realist semantics of such statements is plausible should be resisted. There are numerous quantified negative existentials found in other areas that seem equally “true” bu…Read more
-
89Fear and IntegrityCanadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1): 31-49. 2008.I'll begin this paper with an autobiographical example — an instance of a common enough kind of case involving agents who are faced with making a choice they strongly care about, but who have tendencies that incline them towards choosing an option they prefer not to choose. Later in the paper, I apply some of the general lessons learned from this case to a philosophically more familiar example of a hard-to-make choice, and to the well-known problem the example generates for the idea of rational …Read more
-
86Imaginative motivationUtilitas 21 (2): 181-196. 2009.This article argues for a certain picture of the rational formation of conditional intentions, in particular deterrent intentions, that stands in sharp contrast to accounts on which rational agents are often not able to form such intentions because of what these enjoin should their conditions be realized. By considering the case of worthwhile but hard-to-form deterrent intentions (the threat to leave a cheating partner, say), the article argues that rational agents may be able to form such inten…Read more
-
86On Pretending that Things Do Not Exist: Evans, Existence, and ExistentialsDialogue 42 (2): 235-. 2003.Attempts to analyze negative existential statements face the following familiar problem. If a negative existential statement—say, “Hamlet does not exist” or “the golden mountain does not exist”—is true, its subject term must lack an object of reference. But, absent such an object, it seems that nothing true or false can be said about “it.” In particular, if there is no Hamlet to talk about, we surely cannot truthfully say that “he” does not exist. Hence, the truth of true negative existentials—a…Read more
-
83Characterization and existence in modal meinongianismGrazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1): 23-34. 2012.
-
80On an argument against existentialismPhilosophical Studies 55 (2). 1989.EXISTENTIALISM IN PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC IS THE DOCTRINE THAT STATES OF AFFAIRS, PROPOSITIONS AND PROPERTIES INVOLVING OBJECTS INCLUDE THESE OBJECTS AS DIRECT CONSTITUENTS IN AT LEAST THE SENSE THAT THE NONEXISTENCE IN A WORLD w OF SOCRATES, SAY, IMPLIES THE NONEXISTENCE IN w OF SOCRATES' BEING SNUB-NOSED. JOHN POLLOCK HAS RECENTLY ARGUED (IN "THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL SEMANTICS") THAT SUCH AN EXISTENTIALISM HARBOURS AN INCONSISTENCY. THE PRESENT PAPER REBUTS POLLOCK'S ARGUMENT BY ARGUING TH…Read more
-
77Philosophical explanations and sceptical intuitionsPhilosophical Quarterly 36 (144): 391-395. 1986.
-
University of AucklandDepartment of Philosophy
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |