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858Motivational Internalism and ExternalismIn Timothy O. Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 293-300. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: References.
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267Interpretative explanationsIn Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave-macmillan. 2009.
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205The Humean theory of motivation rejectedPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1): 103-122. 2008.In this paper I will argue that the latter group [of Non-Humeans] is correct. My argument focuses on practical deliberation and has two parts. I will discuss two different problems that arise for the Humean Theory and suggest that while taken individually each problem appears to have a solution, for each problem the solution Humeans offer precludes solving the other problem. I will suggest that to see these difficulties we must take seriously the thought that we can only understand an agent’s re…Read more
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145Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of ActionMIT Press. 1995.Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At least since Hu…Read more
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111Why "oughts" are not facts (or what the tortoise and Achilles taught mrs. Ganderhoot and me about practical reason)Mind 104 (416): 713-723. 1995.
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109Reasons and purposes: human rationality and the teleological explanation of actionOxford University Press. 2003.People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact that the…Read more
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73Review of Three Faces of Desire by Timothy Schroeder (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1): 249-260. 2010.
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66Direction of FitIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.The difference between cognitive and conative mental states, such as beliefs and desires, has sometimes been held to be that they have different “directions of fit” between the mind and the world – mind-to-world for beliefs and world-to-mind for desires (see Desire). Some philosophers have pursued the idea that if this thought can be given a plausible explanation it can be used to ground Hume's claim that “reason is the slave of the passions,” i.e., that no moral or other “practical” belief, e.g…Read more
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47Doing Things for Reasons (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2): 495-497. 2004.The area of philosophy blandly labeled ‘practical reason’ is in reality something of a minefield of conflicting theories, problematic distinctions and difficult problems. There are Humean ‘desire-belief’ theories in conflict with Kantian views that deny the importance of desires. There are said to be important distinctions between internal and external reasons, and justifying and motivating reasons, as well as internalist and externalist accounts of reasons. And there are the problems of akrasia…Read more
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36Rationality and Character TraitsPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1): 261. 2007.
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33Comments on Sergio Tenenbaum: Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical ReasonDialogue 48 (2): 387. 2009.
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32Review of Larry May, Marilyn Friedman and Andy Clark: Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. (review)Ethics 107 (2): 349-351. 1997.
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31Review of Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (11). 2010.
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25Action explanations: Causes and purposesIn Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition, Mit Press. pp. 251--264. 2001.
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24IntentionalityIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |