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25Review of Larry May, Marilyn Friedman and Andy Clark: Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. (review)Ethics 107 (2): 349-351. 1997.
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1Why and How? Teleological and Causal Concepts in Action ExplanationIn Gunnar Schumann (ed.), Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches, Routledge. pp. 59-77. 2019.This paper argues that both teleological and causal concepts are required for explanations of intentional actions. It argues against ‘causalism’, the idea that action explanations are essentially causal. This requires analyzing Mele’s Q-Signals-from-Mars argument that having a purpose and behaving so as to achieve it aren’t sufficient to explain an intentional action. Though Mele’s example shows that external causal interference can defeat the claim that an intentional action has been performe…Read more
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Deliberation and DesireIn Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire, Oxford University Press. pp. 305-324. 2017.There is a tension between deliberation and desire when both are relevant to explaining the same action. A common way of understanding this situation, as contained in a standard version of the practical syllogism, is problematic. This paper attempts to resolve the tension by explaining what 'motivation by what one wants' comes to when deliberation is involved.
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14Rationality and Character TraitsPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1): 261. 2007.
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25Action explanations: Causes and purposesIn Bertram F. Malle, Louis J. Moses & Dare A. Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition, Mit Press. pp. 251--264. 2001.
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209The Humean theory of motivation rejectedPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1): 103-122. 2008.In this paper I will argue that the latter group [of Non-Humeans] is correct. My argument focuses on practical deliberation and has two parts. I will discuss two different problems that arise for the Humean Theory and suggest that while taken individually each problem appears to have a solution, for each problem the solution Humeans offer precludes solving the other problem. I will suggest that to see these difficulties we must take seriously the thought that we can only understand an agent’s re…Read more
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271Interpretative explanationsIn Constantine Sandis (ed.), New essays on the explanation of action, Palgrave-macmillan. 2009.
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147Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of ActionMIT Press. 1995.Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At least since Hu…Read more
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24Review of Joshua Gert: Normative Bedrock: Resopnse-Dependence, Rationality, and ReasonsNotre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013 (05.24). 2013.
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73Review of Three Faces of Desire by Timothy Schroeder (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1): 249-260. 2010.
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21The Humean Theory of Motivation Rejected1Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1): 103-122. 2008.
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66Direction of FitIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.The difference between cognitive and conative mental states, such as beliefs and desires, has sometimes been held to be that they have different “directions of fit” between the mind and the world – mind-to-world for beliefs and world-to-mind for desires (see Desire). Some philosophers have pursued the idea that if this thought can be given a plausible explanation it can be used to ground Hume's claim that “reason is the slave of the passions,” i.e., that no moral or other “practical” belief, e.g…Read more
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112Why "oughts" are not facts (or what the tortoise and Achilles taught mrs. Ganderhoot and me about practical reason)Mind 104 (416): 713-723. 1995.
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12How not to reply to a moral scepticAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (3). 1983.This Article does not have an abstract
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21The Notion of "Incitement"Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (2). 1974.The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question of how it is that a person who incites another to do something can be held morally responsible for this second person's acts. Professor bruce franklin's dismissal from stanford university is taken as the main example and it is argued that though those incited act 'because' of what the incitor does, This 'because' is not explainable on the standard models of physical causation, Coercion or hypnosis. It is closer to the truth to think of the…Read more
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114Reasons and purposes: human rationality and the teleological explanation of actionOxford University Press. 2003.People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact that the…Read more
Newark, Delaware, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |