George Agich

RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL ATTENTION TO THE LANGUAGE OF DISEASE HAS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON THE QUESTION OF ITS VALUE-NEUTRALITY OR NON-NEUTRALITY. PROPONENTS OF THE VALUE-NEUTRALITY THESIS SYMBOLICALLY COMBINE POLITICAL AND OTHER CRITICISMS OF MEDICINE IN AN ATTACK ON WHAT THEY SEE AS VALUE-INFECTED USES OF DISEASE LANGUAGE. THE PRESENT ESSAY ARGUES AGAINST TWO THESES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS VIEW: A METHODOLOGICAL THESIS WHICH TENDS TO DIVORCE THE ANALYSIS OF DISEASE LANGUAGE FROM THE CONTEXT OF THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE AND A SUBSTANTIVE THESIS WHICH HOLDS THAT DISEASE LANGUAGE IS EVALUATIVELY NEUTRAL. IN PARTICULAR, THE ESSAY CRITICALLY FOCUSES ON THE VALUE NEUTRAL POSITION ADOPTED BY CHRISTOPHER BOORSE, WHICH HE TERMS A FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF DISEASE. THE ARGUMENT CONCERNS WHETHER OR NOT ONE CAN HAVE VALUE NEUTRAL DESCRIPTION OF DISEASE STATES OR WHETHER DISEASE LANGUAGE ESSENTIALLY INVOLVES VALUES.

The philosophy of medicine and psychiatry has considered the defining of disease, illness, and disorder an important project for over three decades. Within this literature, accounts based on adaptive "functions" have been prominent, particularly in the DSM nosology. In response to this trend, Jerome Wakefield has presented a view of mental disorder as "harmful dysfunction." In this view, "harm" contributes the value-element to disorder concepts, while "dysfunction" implies a value-free foundation as long as the latter is grounded in evolutionary biology. In a critical review of Wakefield's and others' functionalist arguments for disorder concepts, we make four major points. We recommend a shift away from the definition of value-free disorder concepts, instead emphasizing the analysis of the logical features and the value commitments in nosological categories.

The proliferation of ethics committees and ethics consultation services has engendered a discussion of the issue of the expertise of those who provide clinical ethics consultation services. In this paper, I discuss two aspects of this issue: the cognitive dimension or content knowledge that the clinical ethics consultant should possess and the practical dimension or set of dispositions, skills, and traits that are necessary for effective ethics consultation. I argue that the failure to differentiate and fully explicate these dimensions contributes to the confusion over the issue of expertise and fuels, at least partly, the controversies about expertise (or authority) in ethics and the legitimacy of the use of ethical knowledge in clinical ethics consultation.

This paper analyzes one dimension of the frequently alleged contradiction between treating medicine as a business and as a profession, namely the incompatibility between viewing the physician patient relationship in economic and moral terms. The paper explores the utilitarian foundations of economics and the deontological foundations of professional medical ethics as one source for the business/medicine conflict that influences beliefs about the proper understanding of the therapeutic relationship. It, then, focuses on the contrast and distinction between medicine as business and profession by critically analyzing the classic economic view of the moral status of medicine articulated by Kenneth Arrow. The paper concludes with a discussion of some advantages associated with regarding medicine as a business.

Recent philosophical attention to the language of disease has focused primarily on the question of its value-neutrality or non-neutrality. Proponents of the value-neutrality thesis symbolically combine political and other criticisms of medicine in an attack on what they see as value-infected uses of disease language. The present essay argues against two theses associated with this view: a methodological thesis which tends to divorce the analysis of disease language from the context of the practice of medicine and a substantive thesis which holds that disease language is evaluatively neutral. In particular, the essay critically focuses on the value neutral position adopted by Christopher Boorse, which he terms a functional theory of disease. The argument concerns whether or not one can have value neutral description of disease states or whether disease language essentially involves values.

Medicine is a complex social institution which includes biomedical research, clinical practice, and the administration and organization of health care delivery. As such, it is amenable to analysis from a number of disciplines and directions. The present volume is composed of revised papers on the theme of "Responsibility in Health Care" presented at the Eleventh Trans Disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine, which was held in Springfield, illinois on March 16-18, 1981. The collective focus of these essays is the clinical practice of medicine and the themes and issues related to questions of responsibility in that setting. Responsibility has three related dimensions which make it a suitable theme for an inquiry into clinical medicine: (a) an external dimension in legal and political analysis in which the State imposes penalties on individuals and groups and in which officials and governments are held accountable for policies; (b) an internal dimension in moral and ethical analysis in which individuals take into account the consequences of their actions and the criteria which bear upon their choices; and (c) a comprehensive dimension in social and cultural analysis in which values are ordered in the structure of a civilization ([8], p. 5). The title "Responsibility in Health Care" thus signifies a broad inquiry not only into the ethics of individual character and actions, but the moral foundations of the cultural, legal, political, and social context of health care generally.

The realities and myths of long-term care and the challenges it poses for the ethics of autonomy are analyzed in this perceptive work. The book defends the concept of autonomy, but argues that the standard view of autonomy as non-interference and independence has only a limited applicability for long term care. The treatment of actual autonomy stresses the developmental and social nature of human persons and the priority of identification over autonomous choice. The work balances analysis of the ethical concepts associated with autonomy with discussion of the implications of the ethical analysis for long term care. A central chapter involves a phenomenological analysis of four general features of everyday experience (space, time, communication, and affectivity) and explores their practical implications for long term care. This work concludes with a discussion of the advantages associated with a phenomenologically-inspired treatment of actual autonomy for the ethics of long-term care.

The aim of this study was to assess nurses’ and physicians’ ethical dilemmas in clinical practice. Nurses and physicians of the Clinical Hospital Centre Rijeka were surveyed (N = 364). A questionnaire was used to identify recent ethical dilemma, primary ethical issue in the situation, satisfaction with the resolution, perceived usefulness of help, and usage of clinical ethics consultations in practice. Recent ethical dilemmas include professional conduct for nurses (8%), and near-the-end-of-life decisions for physicians (27%). The main ethical issue is limiting life-sustaining therapy (nurses 15%, physicians 24%) and euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (nurses 16%, physicians 9%). The types of help available are similar for nurses and physicians: obtaining complete information about the patient (37% vs. 50%) and clarifying ethical issues (31% vs. 39%). Nurses and physicians experience similar ethical dilemmas in clinical practice. The usage of clinical ethics consultations is low. It is recommended that the individual and team consultations should be introduced in Croatian clinical ethics consultations services

The DSM-IV, like its predecessors, will be a major influence on American psychiatry. As a consequence, continuing analysis of its assumptions is essential. Review of the manuals as well as conceptually-oriented literature on DSM-III, DSM-III-R, and DSM-IV reveals that the authors of these classifications have paid little attention to the explicit and implicit value commitments made by the classifications. The response to DSM criticisms and controversy has often been to incorporate more scientific diversity into the classification, instead of careful inquiry and assessment of the principal values that drive the nosologic process. Implications for psychiatric science and future DSM classifications are discussed

Clinical ethics consultation has developed from local pioneer projects into a field of growing interest among both clinicians and ethicists. What is needed are more systematic studies on the ethical challenges faced in clinical practice and problem solving through ethics consultation from interdisciplinary perspectives. The Thematic Issue covers a range of topics and includes five recent studies from various European countries and the USA, focusing on issues such as the ethical difficulties of end of life decisions, experiences with newly developed or well established ethics consultation services, and the expectations of physicians in various clinical fields who are still unfamiliar with clinical ethics consultation. The papers included illustrate the interface between different socio-cultural contexts and their ways of dealing with clinical ethics consultation. They deepen the dialogue on clinical ethics consultation that has emerged at the European and International level

This paper critically examines the volitional normative model of disease and its underlying nanotechnologic vision of medicine both defended by Robert Freitas. Having provided an account of this vision, we explicate the highlight of the model, which is a concept of disease based on individual values and preferences. The model’s normative positions are then critiqued based on our argument that the epistemic basis of Freitas’s vision of nanotechnologic medicine and, by extension, of his volitional normative model of disease is scientifically flawed. An ethical and social critique of the model is then conducted on the basis of the model’s implicit ethical underpinnings. We argue that Freitas fails to justify the normativity of his model by not addressing the ethical issues that permeate it, one of which is the question of responsibility regarding the development of medical nanotechnology and the practice of new forms of medicine such as the one he envisions. We conclude that, due to its radically individualistic position, the model implies an unjustified view of nanoethics and relegates this field of ethics to the periphery of discussions of nanomedicine

Aim: To assess ethical issues in everyday clinical practice among physicians and nurses of the University Hospital Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia.Subjects and methods: We surveyed the entire population of internal medicine, oncology and intensive care specialists and associated nurses employed at the University Hospital Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia . An anonymous questionnaire was used to explore the type and frequency of ethical dilemmas, rank of their difficulty, access to and use of ethics support services, training in ethics and confidence about knowledge in ethics. Physicians ranged in age from 27 to 61 years, and nurses , from 20 to 52.Results: The most frequent ethical dilemmas concerned uncertain or impaired decision-making capacity , limitation of treatment at the end of life and disagreements among family members . The most difficult dilemmas concerned euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide and limitation of treatment at the end of life . Only a minority reported ever using any kind of ethics support services or being very confident about knowledge in ethics .Conclusions: Similar ethical difficulties are present in the clinical practice of both physicians and nurses, with important differences in access and use of ethics support services. A need for systematic ethics educational activities was identified. Inclusion of individual ethics consultants in Croatian healthcare ethics support services is strongly advised

The ethical discussion of facial allograft transplantation for severe facial deformity, popularly known as facial transplantation, has been one sided and sensationalistic. It is based on film and fiction rather than science and clinical experience. Based on our experience in developing the first IRB approved protocol for FAT, we critically discuss the problems with this discussion, which overlooks the plight of individuals with severe facial deformities. We discuss why FAT for facial deformity is ethically and surgically justified despite its negative portrayal in the media

In a practice like ethics consultation, quality and accountability are intertwined. Critics of ethics consultation have complained that clinical ethics consultants exercise power or influence in patient care without sufficient external oversight. Without oversight or external accountability, ethics consultation is seen as more sophistical than philosophical. Although there has been more discussion of accountability, concern for quality in ethics consultation is arguably more important, because it represents a central challenge for the field, namely, how to structure a responsible practice of ethics consultation

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Seeking the Everyday Meaning of Autonomy in Neurologic DisordersGeorge J. Agich (bio)The Socratic aphorism that the unexamined life is not worth living and dictums like "Know thyself" remind us of the centrality of self-understanding in the history of philosophical reflections on autonomy. These traditional concerns with autonomy may seem far removed from the neurologic impairments to which Joel Anderson and Warren Lux draw our attention. Nonetheless, Anderson and Lux have provided an important discussion that links the traditional philosophical commitment to self-knowledge with an account that parses these concepts in the context of neurologic disorders. Theirs is a potentially productive approach for improving our understanding of autonomy, one that Emilio Mordini and I advocated in a paper entitled, "Autonomy and the Ethics of Neurosurgery" (Agich and Mordini 1998, 54). We argued that the focus of bioethics on issues such as informed consent misses the more challenging and potentially fruitful collaboration that neurosurgery and neurology affords for advancing the philosophical understanding of the conditions of autonomy. The challenge is in the integration of concepts used in one context of meaning with other domains of discourse. A good example of the challenges embedded in pursuing this kind of project can be found in Anderson and Lux's discussion of the concept of accurate self-assessment.Anderson and Lux argue that accurate self-assessment is a requirement for one to act autonomously. On first hearing, this phrase sounds unsurprising and consistent with standard approaches that assume a higher degree of awareness of one's capacities. Their characterization, however, derives from their observations of cases involving severe neurologic impairments, which point to more basic processes than the reflective awareness or knowledge that is often assumed. Paradoxically, the language of accurate self-assessment sounds remarkably like an intellectual function. It appears to fall squarely within the traditional philosophical tendency to define autonomy in terms of ego-centered, intellectual functions involving relatively high-level reflective capacities. Despite their terminology, Anderson and Lux stress that their account requires a type of reflexivity that is not the same as self-conscious reflection understood in the highest degree. They stress this in a number of places. For example, they see the neurologic concept of executive function as involving basic feedback mechanisms that are "broadly isomorphic with capacities associated [End Page 295] with autonomy;" these include anticipation, goal seeking, planning, initiation, sequencing, monitoring, error detection, self-correction, as well as initiation of novel responses, a clearly heterogenous set of capacities (Anderson and Lux 2004, 285). These capacities are not capacities of the "mind," but basic neurologic functions of the intact embodied agent who is actively engaged in the world. Thus, these concepts capture or express a practical (or clinical) as opposed to a theoretical understanding of the basic conditions or capacities defining autonomy. Similarly, their talk of "self-assessment" does not need to be understood as explicit or conscious; rather, it typically operates in the background (Anderson and Lux 2004). They term this character of self-assessment "mundane" (Anderson and Lux 2004, 289), which strikes me as exactly the right way to characterize this key feature of autonomy (Agich 1995). Their phenomenological and clinically based insights are quite sound, but the reader struggles with a terminology that seems to run in a different direction. To be sure, they stress that they intend their language of "autonomy" and "accurate self-assessment" to involve ordinary, background, and everyday functions that do not require high levels or significant capacities for reflective self-assessment, but their very insistence underscores the problem inherent in this terminology.Anderson and Lux argue that the capacity for self-assessment has a task-relative dimension that requires a degree of "accuracy." They characterize accuracy in a way that may promote rather than forestall misunderstanding. They state that "an adequate degree of precision" (281) is required in such assessment. For example, in assessing whether one is able to jump a hurdle, they say "one must accurately estimate not only the strength of one's legs but also the height of the hurdle" (Anderson and Lux 2004, 281). They further characterize their account of "accuracy" as involving an epistemological externalism, which might lead some readers to assume...

Frank Koughan and Walt Bogdanich's response to my article, “From Pittsburgh to Cleveland: NHBD Controversies and Bioethics,” reminds me of the Shakespearean line, “The lady protests too much, methinks.” My article was not about the specifics of the 60 Minutes April 13, 1997, story on NHBD at the Cleveland Clinic Foundation , even though the story formed the basis for the reflection. I did not attack the critics, though I do believe that bioethicists are accountable for their scholarly and public pronouncements. Although I do not see why the 60 Minutes' story should be treated with deference, my article was designed to raise questions for a primarily bioethics audience about the involvement of bioethicists in media coverage of bioethics topics. I am flattered that they took notice of my piece, but think their efforts to set the record straight only obfuscate matters further

Ethics consultation is the most engaged aspect of clinical ethics, a field focused on ethical issues, questions, and conflicts arising in the course of patient care and delivery of healthcare services. Despite the skepticism of some academic bioethicists and criticism expressed by social commentators, clinical ethics, which began in North America, has expanded to Europe and many other parts of the world with the proliferation of healthcare institution ethics and ethics consultation support services. Along with the development and implementation of ethics policies and guidelines for patient care through work on hospital ethics committees, clinical ethicists are increasingly involved in the ethics of healthcare organizational structures and processes and the day to day provision of ethics consultative services to health professionals, patients, and families

In March 1997, 60 Minutes, a nationally syndicated news magazine program, featured a story in which it was claimed that The Cleveland Clinic Foundation had in place a non-heart-beating donor protocol that involved killing patients for their organs. These charges were brought by a philosopher from a local university. A student who worked at LifeBanc, the northeastern Ohio organ procurement agency where the organ donation protocol originated, was given the protocol by LifeBanc with the understanding that it was to be used in class; the student and professor charged that the protocol involved killing patients for their organs. These claims were advanced without noting that the protocol was a draft that was being reviewed and revised and had not been implemented.

The bioethics literature on managed care has devoted significant attention to a broad range of conflicts that managed care is perceived to have introduced into the practice of medicine. In the first part of this paper we discuss three kinds of conflict of interest: conflicts of economic incentives, conflicts with patient and physician autonomy, and conflicts with the fiduciary character of the physician–patient relationship. We argue that the conflicts are either not as serious as they are often alleged to be or not unique to managed care. In part two we argue that managed care represents a new paradigm for medical care that features a new concept of management. We discuss three types or levels of management that managed care highlights, namely, administrative, clinical, and resource, which together offer a more sophisticated vantage point from which to assess patient care. We do not endorse managed care, but attempt to highlight some of the positive changes brought by managed care that were difficult to attain under traditional reimbursement systems

Background: In the USA, the Food and Drug Administration waiver of informed consent permits certain emergency research only if community consultation occurs. However, uncertainty exists regarding how to define the community or their representatives.Objective: To collect data on the actual preferences and values of a group—those at risk for stroke—most directly affected by the waiver of informed consent for emergency research.Design: Face to face focused interviews were conducted with 12 patients who were hospitalised with a stroke diagnosis in the previous year. The interviews were audiotaped and a transcript based method was used for their analysis.Results: All 12 participants felt “that it was important that new treatments for stroke be developed”, but they were initially confused about the distinction between “research for stroke” and “emergency research for stroke”. However, after explanation, most expressed willingness to participate in the latter. In the absence of a surrogate to give informed consent in a stroke emergency situation, the majority said they would want the physician to “go ahead and enrol them in the trial”.Conclusions: This study is the first to identify the values and concerns of individuals most directly affected by stroke emergency research. Further interviews and focus groups are needed to develop and test a validated questionnaire on the preferences and values surrounding emergency research for stroke.